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Abstract
In The Origin o f German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin presents the allegory as 
monadic in shape. Borrowing from Gottfried Liebniz, Benjamin sees the allegory as 
having similarities with the monad in that both are singular yet whole: the entire is 
condensed within the particular. In Benjamin’s schema, the truth can only be gained 
piecemeal; the whole can only be grasped through the minutiae. Accordingly, that which 
previously remained out of reach -  the whole -  becomes graspable through the fragment. 
Employing Benjamin’s understanding of the monadic properties of the allegory, this 
paper follows three allegorical figures of walking: Benjamin’s flaneur, Louis Aragon’s 
surrealist stroller, and Guy Debord’s situationist drifter or deriver. By studying these three 
city-walkers an entire world is brought into view: France of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries. This paper seeks to explain how revolutionary fervour dissipated in a country 
rife with revolutionary history. By inductively examining the three incarnations of the 
Paris stroller, the undulations of critical consciousness are rendered transparent, from the 
barricade-fighting of 1848, the dissipation after 1871, and the re-emergence in the month 
of May, 1968. The flaneur explains the disappearance of revolutionary desire with the rise 
of the consumer, while the surrealist stroller demonstrates the strength of phantasmagoric 
desire. By exposing capital’s inequalities, however, the situationist drifter paves the way 
for the return of revolutionary desire.
t -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------  — .......................
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Chapter One: Introduction
He impaired his vision by holding the object too close. He might 
see, perhaps, one or two points with unusual clearness, but in so 
doing, he, necessarily, lost sight of the matter as a whole.
- Edgar Allan Poe, "The Murders in the Rue Morgue" 1841
The predominance of barricade fighting in the narrow streets of 1848 Paris 
directly led to the ’boulevardizmg' of the city. Already in 1830 there were over six 
thousand barricades counted in Paris, clogging the city's arteries and establishing an equal 
footing between various revolutionary groups and state power. Wishing to secure power, 
Napoleon III appointed Baron Haussmann to head a large-scale renovation of Paris. This 
task included the modernisation of sewage systems, public utilities, and transportation 
facilities. Above all, Haussmann was charged with the responsibility of demolishing old 
neighbourhoods in order to make way for wide boulevards, which would enable 
dispatched troops to move around the city with ease. In this way Napoleon III eliminated 
barricade street-fighting and quashed revolutionary fervour, while ushering his capital
I
| into the twentieth century at the same time.
Two continental wars later, Paris had undergone massive changes. Certainly 
Haussmann had put a modem face on the city, but the devastation of war and economic 
downturn had left its mark. Immediately after the second world war, France's government 
saw its most urgent need for redevelopment among the provinces, in those towns 
destroyed by bombs and other weapons of war. In the first full decade after the war, 
however, the state turned to its capital: demolitions and excavations transformed the city.
I
Sections like the old Ville de Paris - at least a third of it - disappeared, as did many of the 
city's dilapidated areas and ghettos. When De Gaulle returned to power, moreover, his
j _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _       . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _    .    _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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government passed policies to restructure Paris as a metropolitan centre at the whole of 
Europe's disposal. With pickaxes, shovels, dynamite, and bulldozers, the Paris of the 
Renaissance was remodeled into a functionalist, modem capital. Remnants of the old city 
remained, of course, but between Haussmann and the postwar boom, the glories of a past 
Paris could only be visited in books.
In his Origin o f German Tragic Drama, Walter Benjamin raises methodological 
doubts concerning this very issue: can one truly confront the past? His subject - Baroque 
drama of die seventeenth century - is seemingly worlds apart from the city of Paris, but 
similarities emerge nonetheless. Paris under Haussmann and De Gaulle lies somewhere 
out of reach, as do those esoteric, German plays of Benjamin's study. Our access to the 
truth of such worlds is difficult to glimpse, let alone grasp. He likens truth to a mosaic: 
"The relationship between the minute precision of the work and the proportions of the 
sculptural or intellectual whole demonstrates that truth-content is only to be grasped 
through immersion in the most minute details of subject matter" {Origin 29). "Immersion" 
is the watchword here, although, paradoxically, it is immersion at a critical distance. Like 
Vidocq, the Parisian policeman in Poe’s "The Murders in the Rue Morgue," our vision is 
impaired if  we get too close. For "only by approaching the subject from some distance, 
and, initially foregoing any view o f the whole, can the mind be led [...] to the position of 
strength from which it is possible to take in the whole panorama" {Origin 56). From a 
distance, then, a single shard will reveal the entire mosaic. Truth can only be gained 
piecemeal; the whole can only be grasped through the minutiae. Accordingly, these tiny 
fragments unlock a vast reality which previously remained outside of reach. According to 
Benjamin’s conception, truth has a definite structure: it is composed of ideas, and each 
individual idea has a structure as well, which is monadological. He argues for an
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interconnectedness of ideas, and thus borrows from Leibniz. If truth, like a mosaic, can 
only be taken in through the details, these fragments must express the whole. Leibniz 
argued that the world was composed of one immaterial substance - monads - which have 
no causal relations to each other, but in an indistinct way contain all other monads (636). 
Important to note here is that the monad, as idea, is our only means to secure that which 
seemingly defies intellection. Since the monad expresses the totality, our grasp of the 
whole is assured. In the representation of the single idea, the doors blocking our view to 
the totality - whether that is baroque drama or a bygone Paris - are unlocked and opened 
wide, since such representation is an abbreviated or condensed approximation of the 
entirety. One question remains: what fragment behaves as a monad? Benjamin suggests 
that this fragment is the allegory.
Benjamin's faith in the allegory as the monadic particular that opens the vastness 
of a past age into full view is not at all arbitrary. It guarantees its monadic status by virtue 
of its coming into existence. Benjamin claims that we are drawn to the symbol, in part 
because one can locate symbols with ease: wherever there is a manifestation of an idea, 
he states, the critic dubs it a symbol. This trust in the symbol, however, quickly turns into 
a quagmire of subjective opinion. The allegory, on the other hand, emerges from within 
the work, resplendent in objective garb. Since allegories are extended metaphors, there is 
no mistaking the author’s intentions; they are explicit. The symbol, however, exists on the 
outside of a text, or more precisely, in the realm of the reader. Thus the symbol is that 
which is imposed on the text. Conversely, the allegory, since it is bom from within and 
swells out of the body of work, confirms itself as objective truth.1
Most important, the allegory acts as a condensed version of the totality from 
which it springs. All the constituent parts must come together in the allegory, must
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contribute to it, in order for the allegory to function properly. The baroque world - 
mournful and despondent, largely due to the impact of the Thirty Years War - comes into 
M l view with the allegory of the German Trauerspiel plays. So too does that Paris which 
can never be M ly revisited: the Paris of the nineteenth century. Benjamin finds his way 
into that world by way of the allegory, which he isolates in the Baudelairian stroller, the 
flaneur. Much of this study finds its cornerstone in Benjamin's Arcades Project and 
follows his template in the allegorisation of walking. From Benjamin’s insightful work on 
Baudelaire's Paris, through to the movement which inspired his study - the surrealists - 
and onto the postwar avant-garde, I wish to follow the flaneur as he walks through space 
and time, changing from a bourgeois stroller into a roamer in search of the marvelous, 
then finally transforming into the situationist drifter. Imposing an allegory of walking 
onto surrealist and situationist works may seem dangerously similar to those critics who 
place symbolic meaning onto texts, but there is a defense: I am weaving with a pre­
existing thread (Benjamin’s Arcades). Moreover, walking behaves like an allegory for 
both the surrealists and the situationists, condensing a vast and out of reach reality into a 
manageable shard, a fragment which, for example, brings a bygone Paris into sight.
; John Bunyan had long before established an allegory of walking in his Pilgrim's
I
Progress. Why follow his lead? The allegory of the city stroller is an extended metaphor, 
casting light onto modem urban experience. The walking allegory is reminiscent of those 
grade school experiments with mercury. The teacher pulls out a baby-food container of 
mercury, warns the children not to touch it, and pours the contents out onto the floor. The 
mercury breaks apart into little balls but eventually re-forms into the amoeba-like shape it 
was before. Allegory is not unlike the mercury. Because the allegory emerges within the 
text, it is separate but simultaneously part of the whole, just as the smaller pieces of
j_____________ __ _____________________________________ __ __________
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mercury are emancipated - only briefly - from the greater shape. The allegory contains the 
whole in its particular features, similar to the smaller pieces of mercury, which are 
quantitatively different but qualitatively similar to the larger mass. The city stroller is 
only part of a greater picture, that of traffic, crowds, boulevards, arcades, goods in 
storefronts, low-income neighbourhoods, and functionalist architecture. The figure of the 
walker is part of that world, but when he breaks free from his context, he pulls all the 
scenery along with him. That is, the Parisian stroller drags the entire totality with him, 
accumulating more and more of that reality the longer the metaphor is extended. The 
allegory of walking is to the urban what the urban is to the modem. What is modernity? 
One finds an answer to that question by examining the urban experience. Likewise, the 
urban is grasped through the figure of the walker; the city stroller encapsulates both. 
Consequently, by examining the three incarnations of the Parisian walker - the flaneur, 
surrealist stroller, and situationist drifter - entire worlds reveal themselves.2
This thesis is not concerned with locomotion, with moving legs and feet in a 
forward motion. The allegorisation of walking is a bridge to something greater: charting 
the emergence of consciousness in a city which possesses a rich history of revolution. I 
wish to begin with the barricades of 1848 and track Parisian revolutionary consciousness 
as it subsides during the heyday of the arcades, only to flare-up during the occupations 
movement of 1968. One hundred and twenty years of oscillating consciousness will be 
my focus, as well as how the city’s very materiality hinders or heightens such 
awakenings. That city is no more (in point of fact many of the arcades that Benjamin, 
Aragon, and others wrote about were demolished). The literature of Baudelaire,
Benjamin, the surrealists, and the situationists conjures up that vanished city through the 
lens of the walker.
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In Benjamin's analysis of nineteenth-century Paris, social life mirrors Marx’s 
reflections on commodity fetishism: the development of “material relations between 
people and social relations between things” (Capital 166). Human relationships were 
mediated through the goods they produced, and existed only in skeletal form outside of 
political economy. Certainly relational structures persisted - the family, bonds of 
friendship, etc. - but people for the most part lived as strangers to one another. Benjamin 
makes this observation by way of the poetry of Baudelaire and the short fiction of Poe. 
The condition of modem life in Paris, Benjamin asserts, could be described as a sense of 
solitude among the multitude. Nowhere was this more clearly seen than in the depiction 
of the urban masses. The crowd roamed the streets of Paris, yet despite their numbers, 
remained an estranged entity. Many in the crowd were, as Albert Thibaudet puts it, 
"travelers on the same journey" {Arcades 252), which is to say, workers engaged in 
commodity production. Notwithstanding their shared condition, there was scarcely 
solidarity among the masses. Disrupting the endless flow of pedestrians stood the flaneur. 
His walk was characterised by style (nonchalant), and speed (tortoise-paced). His 
nonchalance is an isolating feature, and a protest against the tempo of modem, urban life. 
Until about 1870, the streets of Paris were overrun by carriages. The flaneur, not wishing 
to be jostled by the traffic, would seek refuge in the arcades (glass-roofed corridors 
extending through entire blocks, lined with magasins on either side). Here stores would 
put a wide assortment of goods on display to dazzle and tempt would-be consumers. The 
flaneur's walk - from the crowds on the street into the arcades - would diagnose the 
isolation of the urban masses by literally tracing the symptom (alienation) back to the 
illness (commodity production). He draws a causal connection between production and 
alienation through bis walk, thereby uniting what previously remained separate.
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The surrealist strolls, exemplified by Louis Aragon's Paris Peasant, would sink 
the flaneur's rising consciousness back into the recesses of the arcades. The flaneur, as 
interpreted by Benjamin, paved the way for a nascent urban consciousness by drawing 
attention to the commodities in the marketplace. The surrealist project acknowledged the 
poverty of alienated life under capitalism and thus withdrew to the unconscious, which 
offered them freedom. As Andre Breton would claim many years later, the early 
surrealists would wander deliriously through the streets of Paris. Aragon’s 
aforementioned work takes place in one of the demolished arcades, the Passage de 
VOpera. But withdrawal to the surreal, the irrational, and the marvelous proved to be no 
more than an escapist strategy. Aragon recounts a strange encounter outside a storefront 
window, which is bathed in a phosphorescent light. The canes dangling in the window 
take on a life of their own and float like seaweed, finally clearing away to make way for alI
mermaid or siren. The scene Aragon describes is not at all a critique of capitalism; he is 
not writing about commodity fetishism here. Instead he is merely invoking the magical, 
which resides near to the everyday. Aragon wished to transform different localities, by 
way of a romantic, spell-binding inventiveness, into something intoxicating and unreal. 
The strolls through arcades and other parts of Paris did not provide for an emergence of 
consciousness. Metaphorically, the surrealists wandered deeper into the unconscious.
Whatever seed was planted by the flaneur did not germinate with Aragon, Breton, 
and the other surrealists. In point of fact, revolutionary potential withered under their 
care. With the birth of the Situationist International in 1957, however, a coherent critique 
of alienated, modem life emerged. The situationists were indeed heirs to surrealism and 
dadaism, but unlike their predecessors, they were an avant-garde focused not on art, but 
I on the transformation of life. Their leading figure, Guy Debord, had recognised that
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urbanism (city-planning and its accompanying ideology) preserves class power by 
dispersing the mass of workers throughout the city. Historically, industrial workers were 
necessarily brought together in urban centers; Haussmann negated their threat by 
renovating Paris. Technological advances like the automobile and the subway provided 
for a further defusing of revolutionary power, by casting the worker out into the suburbs. 
The modem city, in this case Paris, was thus socially structured. Or as some of the 
situationists once said: “[0]ne doesn’t live somewhere in the city; one lives somewhere in 
the hierarchy” (Knabb 66). Postwar Paris was home to tremendously wealthy 
neighbourhoods on one hand and, on the other, large ghettos like the ones immigrant 
Algerians called home in the early 1960s.
In describing Paris, Debord quoted Marx: “Men can see nothing around them that 
is not their own image; everything speaks to them of themselves” (Knabb 51). Here 
Debord’s appropriation, it seems, is narrowly confined to the materiality of the city. Paris
I
is a literal reflection of the stratified socio-economic reality of post-industrial France in its 
segregation of classes and its strict division of work and residence zones. Debord’s fear 
was that architecture and urban planning would reinforce class division. We internalise 
our environment, he argues, and consequently class divisions would be naturalised by the 
city’s inhabitants. The situationist drift (derive) was intended to allow the walker to 
experience the literal spaces of class struggle and, from there, map out revolutionary 
desire. As Parisian ghettos slowly changed into more subtle blemishes -  low-income 
housing -  economic disparities would become less transparent. Drifting through such 
areas like the Algerian immigrant projects, before they transformed into something a little 
more palatable (to French society on the whole), was an imperative for the situationists.
: Wandering through the city was not aimless, like the surrealist strolls, but was intended to
I
^  _         ____________________
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awaken consciousness of a society that progressed technologically, but had remained 
stagnant in other areas. Benjamin’s flaneur traced revolutionary consciousness to the 
source of its disappearance: the arcades and the transformation of the worker into a 
consumer. The surrealist walker strolled through the streets of Paris, but in search of the 
marvelous, lulled that consciousness back to sleep. The situationist drifter had modest 
plans: to stir up awareness of class difference and struggle through the very streets, 
buildings, and neighbourhoods of Paris. For the situationists, in short, walking was 
waking, waking to the inequalities that existed in a society which chopped off the 
aristocracy’s head long ago, but did not make good on the promise of liberty, equality, 
and fraternity.
The undulations of critical consciousness - which began with Benjamin and 
subsided with the surrealists - finally broke the surface in the month of May, 1968. The 
allegory of walking unveils not just a city, but, more important, reveals this consciousness 
and renders it perceptible. As Benjamin strove to understand his present by tracing its 
prehistory to the arcades of the nineteenth century, so we must comprehend the 
occupations movement of 1968 by following its antecedents, beyond the surrealists to that 
sauntering figure of the flaneur. The walking allegory is the thread which binds this 
narrative together, holding it fast so as to allow a glimpse, a snapshot, of a consciousness 
which, to many, has since evaporated. The allegory, however, preserves this fleeting past 
and guards it from being forgotten. Like a photograph, it seals the transitory in the eternal 
- an assurance that the past is still within reach.
I-------------------------- ------------------------------- -----------------------------------------------------------------
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Chapter Two: Walter Benjamin and the flaneur of Paris
'Let us do as the ancients did,1 suggested Salvator. Let us throw up 
a feather and follow wherever the wind may blow it.'
- Alexandre Dumas, The Mohicans o f Paris 1854
The world of the German baroque is not as dissimilar to nineteenth-century Paris 
as one would think. In fact, the two are bound together by way of the universal 
equivalence of objects: allegorical emblems in the former, and commodities in the latter. 
Tracing the Baroque allegory back through time, Benjamin observes that medieval 
society is the site from which the allegory emerges, since "it was absolutely decisive for
| the development of [Christianity] that not only its transitoriness, but also guilt" should!
I find a home (Origin 224). Guilt, which lies heavy on the human soul, is assigned to the
j
object world; projecting guilt outward cleanses believers and relieves them of the burden 
of sin. For guilt is an abstraction, and, as such, finds no material resting-place other than 
the Christian heart. Transposing sin outside us, by equating the Fall of Adam and Eve 
with a fallen world, gives the immaterial (guilt) a material form (the outside world). 
Consequently, the baroque allegorist has a wealth of objects to choose from, for if the 
, world is drenched in sin and shame, all objects can behave as allegorical emblems.
Benjamin writes: "If it is the creaturely world of things, the dead, or at best the half­
living, that is the object of the allegorical intention, then man does not enter its field of 
vision" (Origin 227). The allegorist mediates sin and guilt through objects, and any one 
will do since they are all "dead, or at best [...] half-living." In short, these allegorical 
emblems are arbitrarily chosen, for there exists an equivalence between objects when 
: everything is tainted with sin. Commodities produced under capitalism are no different
|
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from allegorical objects in this respect. Commodities are necessarily equivalent for 
exchange purposes, through the abstract human labour bound up within them. This 
coupling of allegorical object and commodity is Benjamin's own connection. In the 
Arcades he writes: "The singular debasement of things through their signification, 
something characteristic of seventeenth century allegory, corresponds to the singular 
debasement of things through their price as commodities" (22).
The price tag -  something common now but novel in the nineteenth century 1 - is 
highly significant, symbolising the complete usurpation of use-value by exchange-value. 
For only under certain historic conditions do goods or objects of utility transform into 
commodities or objects of exchange. The emergence of the commodity occurs when
i  objects are bestowed with value apart from their utility, and, as a result, grow into
i
• metaphysical objects. Thus the object -  a bed for example -  begins to “transcend
i
! sensuousness” when its value is found not in its usefulness but in its exchangeability with
i
i other products (Capital 163). The equation ‘five beds = one house’ only makes sense
because of the equal amount of labour spent in the production of both the beds and the 
house. Under a system of exchange like bartering, there is an intuitive understanding that 
such objects are, in a way, equal. But it is only under capitalism that “the labour expended 
in the production of a useful article [is] an ‘objective’ property of that article” (Capital 
153-54). The commodity, in Marx’s estimation, is a strange phenomenon, for its 
metaphysical properties become ‘objective’ properties which overshadow the object’s 
sensuousness; the metaphysical is more material than the material. Whether the bed is 
wood and a mattress is subsidiary, for the bed -  under capitalism -  is really x number of 
labour hours and it can be traded, through the medium of money, for any other
! commodity on the market. The price tag marks a decisive step in the development of the
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universal equivalence of commodities since it explicitly announces the central role of 
money in the exchange process.2 Use-value, as was stated above, remains secondary 
under commodity capitalism, but in the arcades of Paris, even the utility of goods is called 
in question.
The first arcade appeared in 1821 -  conceived by a group of speculators to 
connect the vestibule of the Paris opera house with the neighbouring stores.3 Most of the 
arcades, however, grew out of the textile boom in the 1830s and early 1840s, when 
merchants had to keep large stocks of goods on their premises, thus needing more interior 
space. A decade before, advances in iron production led to the birth of the railway; the 
railroad tracks -  prefabricated iron components -  paved the way for the manufacturing of 
iron girders, which the glass panels of arcade roofs rested on. These iron structures united 
buildings from either side of the street, creating an interior, sheltered environment in the 
very roadways of the city. The rest of the details followed later: elegant marble flooring, 
gas lanterns for shopping at night,4 winter heating, and summer ventilation. Within these 
passageways stood the magasin and its large storefront window provided those strolling 
through the arcades with a view to its goods. The display window, a development 
attributed to the Parisian shopkeepers, was “wholly adapted to arousing desires” (Arcades
42). The items on display were of the dazzling, arousing type, but scarcely utilitarian. 
They were, in short, the refuse of the nineteenth century: its junk. To stick with Marx’s 
exchange/utility dichotomy, these goods were removes apart from the objects of utility 
produced in earlier times.
In storefront displays stood debris in glittering disguise. Arcade windows were 
lined, for example, with “palm tree and feather duster, hairdryer and Venus de Milo, 
prostheses and letter-writing manuals. The odalisque lies in wait next to the inkwell, and
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priestesses raise high the vessels into which we drop cigarette butts as incense offerings” 
{Arcades 540). Benjamin offers readers a snapshot of what was sold in the arcades, 
insisting that the merchandise was not just superfluous, but entirely frivolous. These 
goods represented the dregs of a system of production which mass-produced any 
conceivable thing. The ornamental ashtray is not just gaudy and overdone; it has no real 
connection with the other items like the duster, the hairdryer or the palm tree, which is 
Benjamin’s point. These commodities are disparate items, living proof of their universal 
equivalence.
The arcades, however, are not the first places to house such dissimilar objects. The 
world exhibitions of the first half of the nineteenth century were precursors to the arcades. 
At such shows or fairs, commodities of all kinds made their first appearance before they 
found their way into the marketplace. These exhibitions, Benjamin writes, “glorify the 
exchange value of the commodity. They create a framework in which its use value 
recedes into the background” {Arcades 7). Here the commodity, through its transcendence 
over utility, finds itself “enthroned” {Arcades 903). The implication of the sovereignty of 
the commodity - first glimpsed in the world exhibitions but more clearly seen in the 
Parisian arcades -  is significant, and should not be overlooked. ‘Enthronement’ 
necessarily entails a throne and subsequent kingdom, and a kingdom, of course, implies a 
rule over subjects. When the commodity changes from an object of utility to an object of 
exchange, it achieves a position of dominance over its producers, for the solitary object 
conjoins with all other objects -  through exchange-value -  to form something monstrous. 
In the poem “The Seven Old Men,” Baudelaire describes the inhabitants of Paris as ants 
who, when taken together, form the figure of Colossus {The Flowers o f Evil 83-87); the 
same can be said about the commodity. Taken in isolation, the solitary object exerts no
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real power. When the commodity unites with all others, however, it lords over its 
producers. The reign of the commodity is woeful in and of itself, but is punctuated by the 
fact that the objects are not even useful: they are the odds and ends that line shop 
windows. That is not to say that all magasins resembled pawnshops or sold trifling goods. 
As commodity capitalism matured in the late nineteenth century, however, its triumph 
manifested itself through excess like slippers, pocket watches, egg holders, and cutlery 
cases {Lyric Poet 46). As such goods dazzled and glistened through panes of glass, 
attracting the longing glances of passers-by, their sovereignty was assured.
Georg Simmel viewed the city as a "space of over-stimulation" {Everyday Life
43),5 but the same could be said of the arcades. Therein the consumer was surrounded, or 
rather bombarded, with goods of all kinds. The display window, providing a space from 
which pedestrians could be drawn into the shops, resembled a phantasmagoria,6 
Phantasmagorias are displays of optical illusions, where figures appear, fade away, 
increase and decrease in size, and pass into each other. In the Arcades Project Benjamin 
refers to such passageways as "fairy palaces" (834), precisely because of their ethereal 
nature. Certainly the arcades, the shops, and the goods themselves are concrete and 
tangible, but that materiality is essentially illusory once the first layer of reality is stripped 
away. Underneath all that lies the immaterial, for the phantasmagoria is the deception that 
emanates from the commodity itself. Exchange-value is an abstraction, which the 
invocation of optical illusions points toward. As Rolf Tiedemann suggests, the 
phantasmagoria ‘is  already the commodity itself, [but it is also] the whole capitalist 
production process” {Arcades 938). The phantasmagoria is thus both the singular and the 
entirety, since the totality necessarily stems from the metaphysical properties of the single 
commodity (its capacity for exchange which unites it with all other goods). The
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deception, moreover, is twofold: the exchange-value masks the use-value, and the 
commodity masks its own production. The term phantasmagoria works on these two 
levels, but has more impact as understood in the latter context, for the word plays on the 
magical qualities of the commodity in the marketplace. The magic trick is the sudden 
appearance - like a magician’s wand conjuring some rabbit out of a hat -  of goods free 
from any trace of production. The arcades of Paris were the perfect expression of this 
optical illusion.
The gas lanterns cast a certain light on the goods in display windows. That glow — 
the lueurglauque of Aragon’s Paris Peasant -  made objects appear “strange and vivid at 
the same time” (.Arcades 933). Tiedemann’s word choice is very deliberate here: ‘strange’ 
because the goods bear no evidence of production, and ‘vivid’ because the commodities 
carry a very real allure; the latter is a consequence of the former. Adomo defines 
phantasmagoria as “a consumer item in which there is no longer anything that is supposed 
to remind us how it came into being. It becomes a magical object, insofar as the labor 
stored up in it comes to seem supernatural and sacred at the very moment when it can no 
longer be recognized as labor” (Arcades 669). The commodity, in short, obscures its 
production. The merchant is no producer, and as a result, the evidence of the good’s 
production is masked, if  not forgotten. The lueurglauque is the commodity’s disguise. In 
fact, it is its new garb — a sheen which lends the good its dream-like appearance. Instead 
of testifying to its creation (and all that it entails: alienated labour, assembly-line 
production, etc.), the good dazzles and glitters in its new home. That glow through arcade 
windows was nothing more than a lustre, a compensation for the “inadequacies in the 
social organization of production” (.Arcades 938). Any magic trick, once explained, loses 
its charm. For the phantasmagoric arcades, that trick was scarcely unveiled.
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Though many who strolled through the passageways were held spellbound, some 
were not so overwhelmed. Baudelaire was one who saw through the fagade of the 
arcades. In the poem “Eyes of the Poor,” 7 there is a detailed description of the arcades. 
He writes: “The cafe sparkled. The gaslight itself lavished all the intensity of a premiere, 
and illuminated with all its might the blinding white walls, [and] the dazzling expanse of 
mirrors.” He ends his illustration with the statement: “All history and all mythology 
placed at the service of gluttony.” The narrator in the poem is moved by a destitute father 
and his two sons who gawk at the wealth from across the street. They do not begrudge 
those dining on the outside terrace, but instead stand dazzled by the opulence of the 
arcade cafe. The narrator’s shame at such disparity leads him to conclude that the 
phantasmagoria is nothing more than the manifestation of gluttony. What is perhaps most 
interesting, however, is that the poor stand in wonderment. The father’s eyes seem to 
express: “How beautiful it is! How beautiful! You’d say that all the gold of the poor had 
gathered on those walls.” There is not the slightest cynicism in those thoughts, which is 
not entirely surprising given that the phantasmagoria -  from the days of the world 
exhibitions straight through to the shopping mall in present times -  has been so heartily 
embraced.
The phantasmagoria is the ultimate consolation. When an object of utility 
transforms into an object of exchange, disparate objects of all shapes and kinds are placed 
in social relations with each other. As commodities are drawn together, they overturn the 
social dimension of labour. In The German Ideology the origin of labour is presented as 
an inherently social exercise (42; 48-50). The family unit, but also larger cooperative 
groups, came together to meet certain collective needs. Under commodity production, 
however, the objects of labour share a social relationship, but not the producers. The
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social relation between objects is a relation “which exists apart from and outside the 
producers” (Capital 165). Capitalism contorts reality so severely that what we accept as 
given is really a world turned upside down; it creates “material relations between persons 
and social relations between things” (Capital 166). Men and women are by nature, 
according to Marx, social creatures. When the objects we produce usurp our social being, 
something essential (to our being) is lost. The phantasmagoria, however, acts as a 
compensation for this loss. If labour is an exercise in alienation,8 then commodities ease 
that suffering. Goods cannot fully cure the pain, just like modem science really cannot 
cure cancer. This stunted therapeutic understanding is perhaps what led Benjamin to 
claim that in the arcades “all the juices slow to a standstill, the commodity proliferates 
along the house fronts and enters into new and fantastic combinations, like the tissue in 
tumors” (Arcades 828). Baudelaire saw through the lueurglauque of the phantasmagoria 
and cried ‘gluttony.’ Benjamin observed more than greed; he saw a cancerous disease. 
The arcades only told one side of the story, that of the social relations between things.
The other side -  the stunted social relations between persons — was clearly evidenced by 
the alienation of the crowd.
In commodity production the worker comes into social contact solely through 
his/her products. As Marx states: “The specific social characteristics of [the producers’] 
private labours appear only within this exchange” {Capital 165). The material social 
process, according to the writers of The German Ideology, demonstrates a healthy 
interchange which has since been obliterated (42). Under capitalism, the only relationship 
the worker enjoys with others is one mediated through goods -  ‘material relations 
between persons.’ The effect on the human psyche, Marx argues, is substantial. In the 
Manuscripts he writes: “[I]n the relationship of alienated labour every man regards other
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men according to the standards and relationships in which he finds himself placed as a 
worker” (129). The worker is a kind of island, and if Marx is correct, views others as 
separate islands. Edward Timms suggests that the modem city “was perceived as the 
locus of alienation” (Unreal City 11). One could be more specific, however, and add that 
the crowd was the true site of alienation. For the crowd was where people were “strangers 
to one another [despite being] travelers on the same journey” (Arcades 252). The 
quotation, taken from Albert Thibaudet’s Interieurs, is perhaps not a critique, but 
certainly reflects the isolation bom out of nineteenth-century economic conditions.9 
However it was not Paris but London, as featured in Engels’ The Conditions o f the 
Working Class in England, which exemplified the self-estrangement of the crowds; 
coupled with the writings of Poe, Benjamin came to see the manifestation of alienated 
labour through the lens of the crowd.
In 1844, when Engels wrote Conditions o f the Working Class, London was a city 
of vast numbers: two and a half million people lived within its borders. Considering that 
many of its inhabitants were involved in heavy manufacturing and other forms of 
industrialisation, the author wonders why the streets were so cold with indifference. He 
writes:
The hundreds of thousands of all classes and ranks crowding past each 
other - aren't they all human beings with the same qualities and powers, 
and with the same interest in being happy? And aren’t they obliged, in the 
end, to seek happiness in the same way, by the same means? And still 
they crowd by one another as though they had nothing in common, nothing 
to do with one another, and their only agreement is the tacit one - that each 
keep to his own side of the pavement, so as not to delay the opposing 
streams of the crowd - while no man thinks to honor another with so 
much as a glance. (Arcades 427-8)10
Engels is not simply discouraged by the crowd, but disgusted. Benjamin writes: "He
responds with a moral reaction, and an aesthetic one as well; the speed with which people
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rush past one another unsettles him" (Illuminations 167). The people in the crowd are 
homogeneous in the sense that they are all ’travelers on the same journey’ - all 
commodities selling their labour - yet the only common ground they share is the 
unspoken agreement to keep out of each other’s way. Why, Engels sincerely asks, can 
they not even look each other in the eye?
Juxtaposing die geographical solitude of the rural with the emotional solitude of 
the urban, Rebecca Solnit praises the alienation of the city: "In the city, one is alone 
because the world is made up of strangers, and to be a stranger surrounded by strangers 
[...] is among the starkest of luxuries" (186). She goes on to suggest that such alienation 
is a "liberatory state" and, in a way, she is correct, for there is something desirable about 
anonymity. A distinction must be drawn, however, between strangers as unknown persons 
and the experience of indifference associated with strangers. To dissolve into the mass is 
not predicated on the self-estrangement of people who should have some sense of 
solidarity with each other, which is Engels' point. "From our fellow man," wrote 
Benjamin, "we should expect no succour" (One-Way 58). This emotional distance defies 
all thinking, considering that die private individual’s singular concerns were, in fact, 
universal concerns. The crowd should be anything but unfriendly, but such indifference 
exists because material relations are so completely reified. Benjamin argues that this 
reification literally follows Marx's observation to the point of absurdity. He writes: "If it 
was earlier a matter of course in conversation to take interest in one's partner, this is now 
replaced by inquiry into the price of his shoes or his umbrella" (One-Way 57). The social 
aspect of labour is lost under capitalism, which aids in explaining the phenomenon of the 
crowd; when there is warmth enough for conversation, however, that glimmer of hope 
quickly fades, since even discourse is mediated by the material: commodities and their
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prices. Conversation, however, was a rare occurrence; many silently walked on without 
so much as a glance.11 Reifying the relations created by commodity production, the 
individual turned inward and fixated on private concerns and struggles. In actuality, 
however, these concerns and struggles were common if  not universal. The crowd was the 
expression of these severely damaged social bonds:12 a mass of people turned into a sea 
of private individuals. Paradoxically, one felt alone and isolated in the midst of a throng.
Victor Hugo was one of the first writers to glimpse and articulate this alienation. 
He realised that "if man is [a] solitary animal, the solitary man is a man of the crowds"
(.Arcades 269). Consequently, Baudelaire could insist that solitude and multitude are 
"equal and interchangeable terms.”13 Poe similarly saw this paradox operating within the 
crowd. In "The Man of the Crowd" he writes that the masses "were restless in their 
movements, had flushed faces, and talked and gesticulated to themselves as if feeling in 
solitude on account of the very denseness of the company around them" (256). In Poe’s 
view, ‘solitude’ and ‘multitude’ might be, in a sense, synonymous terms, but a distinction
' must be drawn: the latter heightens the effect of the former. Baudelaire cannot pick up on
j
such a nuanced observation since, as a Parisian, he had naturalised the crowd. When he 
reads Poe’s story he concentrates on the narrator, not the crowd. His focus is on the
j
narrator's curiosity, which, he writes, "has become a fatal, irresistible passion" (Arcades 
442). In his reading the crowd is hardly a consideration,14 but we are warned by others not 
to be so cavalier. Solnit reminds us that "the crowd itself seemed to be something new in 
human experience" (199). Raymond Williams also suggests that we might forget "what a 
novel experience [the crowded street] must in any case have been" (Unreal City 16). The 
genesis of the crowd is not a foremost concern; instead what concerns us is the crowd as 
symptom of commodity production. The alienation present in the production process
i  ...................................................................................................... .......................................................................
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found its way into the phenomenon of the crowd. The isolation one felt, even among large 
numbers, was none other than the usurpation of social relations by commodities. The 
emergence of the estranged mass, at a time when the West was "dominated by its 
phantasmagorias," was no mere coincidence {Arcades 26), for the two - crowds and goods 
- were obverse images of each other.
Right in the middle of the solitary multitude stood the flaneur. He moves like a 
phantom in the crowd, which Benjamin calls the “phantasmagoria of the flaneur” {Lyric 
Poet SO).15 Teetering on this precipice, the flaneur never fully submerges into the mass, 
however close it may appear, he stands on the threshold between immersion and isolation. 
Benjamin describes this precarious positioning: “Dialectic of flanerie: on one side, the 
man who feels himself viewed by all [...] and, on the other side, the man who is utterly 
undiscoverable, the hidden man” {Arcades 420). Simmel argues that some of “the deepest 
problems of modem life derive from the claim of the individual to preserve the autonomy 
and individuality of his existence in the face of overwhelming social forces” (409). The 
city-dweller counters such forces by striving for distinction, for “extreme subjectivism is 
the response to the extreme objectification of culture” (Frisby 131). Something analogous 
to Simmel’s observation occurs when the flaneur steps out his door. He is not swallowed 
up by the mass because of his carefully cultivated image, which he achieves through pace 
and style. His pace is that of a turtle; this claim is no exaggeration: “In 1839, a rage for 
tortoises overcame Paris” {Arcades 106). A flaneur would put a tortoise on a leash and let 
the creature set the tempo. His stroll, consequently, transforms to a saunter, differentiating 
him from the bustle of passers-by. The flaneur’s style is also a distinguishing feature. His 
nonchalant swagger sets him apart from others and acts as a protest against the quick
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rhythm of the metropolis.16 The flaneur clings to his individuality, which is only one 
battle; he also had to fight for room on the crowded streets.
In his reading of Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd,” Benjamin notes: “If the crowd is 
jammed up, it is not because it is impeded by vehicular traffic -  there is no mention of it 
anywhere -  but because it is being blocked by other crowds. In a mass of this nature the 
art of strolling could not flourish” {Lyric Poet 53). One could say the same about the 
streets of Paris. In his study of the relationship between the urban and mental states, 
Simmel concludes: “The psychological basis of the metropolitan type of individuality 
consists in the intensification o f nervous stimulation which results from the swift and 
uninterrupted change of outer and inner stimuli” (409-10). The Paris thoroughfares were 
not as congested with people as Poe’s London: instead they were home to carriages in 
Baudelaire’s day, and later to automobiles and streetcars. Until the widening of 
boulevards under Haussmann, carriages dominated the streets and terrorised 
pedestrians.17 For a Parisian, the bombardment of outer stimuli was thus a very real 
concern. Navigating through traffic, writes Benjamin, “involves the individual in a series 
of shocks and collisions. At dangerous intersections, nervous impulses flow through him 
in rapid succession, like the energy from a battery” (Illuminations 175). Edmond Jaloux 
describes the urban scene as a “torrent where [one is] rolled, buffeted, cast up, and swept 
to one side and the other” {Arcades 436). The hazards of walking were manifold, and thus 
the streets were no place for one who wished to saunter. Paris was in no way saddled with 
overcrowding, but it was not just the ‘shocks and collisions’ of traffic which prevented 
the ideal conditions for flanerie from emerging. The streets were peopled enough to make 
the flaneur view pedestrians as rivals; they were meek and allowed themselves be jostled, 
but the flaneur was not so tolerant {Illuminations 172). He certainly fought for his space
   ■   ■    ■
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as he walked, but the frustrations mounted. Not desiring to dodge carriages and maneuver 
around people any longer, the flaneur scurried -  like one seeking shelter from the 
elements — into the arcades.
The arcades were certainly more spacious than the street, providing the flaneur 
with enough elbow room to stroll at a leisurely pace. Free from the frenzied bustle, these 
passageways were also, seemingly, a safer environment. Within, however, other dangers 
emerged. The bombardment of traffic and people was no comparison to the 
phantasmagoric bombardment in the arcades.18 Solnit claims that once the flaneur entered 
the arcades, he was intoxicated with the proliferation of goods (200). If the flaneur was 
indeed smitten with the dazzling commodities, he never let on that he was. On crowded 
streets he differentiated himself through pace and style; in the arcades he asserted his 
individuality by succeeding where others had failed: resisting the lueur glauque of the 
phantasmagoria.
The flaneur was part of that privileged class which did not have to sell its labour. 
As a result, he was a man of idle hours and highly vulnerable to the threats of boredom. 
Writing in the first two decades of the twentieth century, Siegfried Kracauer expounds on 
two types of boredom. In the modem city, he writes, one is subject to a deluge of posters, 
advertisements and “the thousand electric bulbs” of storefront signs and displays. As 
boredom sets in, the big city-dweller “saunters through the streets [...]. One’s body takes 
root in the asphalt, and, together with the enlightening revelations of the illuminations, 
one’s spirit -  which is no longer one’s own -  roams ceaselessly out of the night and into 
the night” (The Reader 302-3). The spirit, which leaves the body in search of fulfillment 
among the tantalising goods and endless allurements, is metaphoric of the pedestrian’s 
desire. The spirit is ‘no longer one’s own’ because it surrenders fully to this phantom
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
power. In Kracauer’s view, the spirit does not reenter the body because the ravenous 
desire to consume does not cease. If it does “by chance return at some point, it soon takes 
its leave” again, for the body cannot reclaim its spirit in the face of such hunger (The 
Reader 303). The dazzling arcade breeds this insatiable desire. In some cases, however, 
one could -  if  he or she had the fortitude to do so - resist its powerful lustre. This ability 
constitutes Kracauer’s second conception of boredom.
There are some who refuse to be “chased away” by phantasmagoric desire (The 
Reader 304). Kracauer’s word choice is deliberate: ‘chased away’ denotes the spirit 
which takes flight at the sight of electric lights and goods in storefront windows. For 
those who resist these incessant desires, body and spirit remain one or whole. This unity, 
accordingly, provides “a kind of guarantee that one is, so to speak, still in control of one’s 
existence” (The Reader 304). The state of being in command is a resistance to commodity 
culture, or rather, boredom with it. Disenchantment with its enticements is a boredom 
which becomes the “only proper occupation” (The Reader 304). The flaneur’s idleness 
takes the form of this second variety. Benjamin calls boredom “the dream bird that 
hatches the egg of experience” (Illuminations 91). He suggests that boredom establishes 
the necessary condition(s) for the emergence of certain kinds of experience, just like the 
warmth of a mother’s body is required for the baby to hatch from its egg. The experience 
in question is that of resistance, which is bom out of the flaneur’s boredom not with the 
arcades themselves (for they allowed him to stroll in a way that the streets could not allow 
for), but with what they represent. Heidegger writes about the dangers of being 
captivated, bewitched, dazzled and beguiled (56). One could counter such forces by 
adopting an attitude of “releasement toward things” (Heidegger 53), which is a strategy 
Benjamin’s flaneur employs.
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Solnit claims that the flaneur was intoxicated by the multiplication of goods in the
marketplace, but his inebriation took a different form altogether. In The Arcades Project
Benjamin writes:
An intoxication comes over the man who walks long and aimlessly 
through the streets. With each step, the walk takes on greater momentum: 
ever weaker grow the temptations of bistros, of shops, of smiling women, 
ever more irresistible the magnetism of the next streetcomer [...] Then 
comes hunger. He wants, however, nothing to do with the myriad 
possibilities offered to sate his appetite, but like an animal he prowls 
through unknown districts [...] until, utterly exhausted, he stumbles into 
his room, which receives him coldly and wears a strange air. (880)
As the length of the flaneur’s walk increases, the temptation to submit to the
phantasmagoria decreases, at least initially. His sense of dominance is a momentary
illusion, however, and begins to crumble and erode as he surrounds himself with ‘myriad
possibilities.’ The hunger of consumption is powerful and the flaneur’s resistance takes
its toll, for he grows weary and his walk degenerates into a stumble. The strength of the
commodity manifests itself in this: if it cannot be consumed, it consumes the one who
dares to turn away from it. The flaneur’s boredom does not guarantee anything; he is still
susceptible to the allure of the arcades. His boredom, however, provides him with
reserves of energy, sufficient enough to withstand the spell which the phantasmagoria
casts. His attitude of releasement provides him with the Herculean strength necessary to
master his desires. The weak, as Kracauer writes, disintegrate into the immaterial while
they stroll through the arcades. The flaneur resists - his boredom a “threshold to great
deeds” (Arcades 105). There is certainly a stigma attached to idleness,19 but for the
flaneur those idle hours bear very real fruit (.Arcades 453). The flaneur’s active opposition
to the arcades is great in the sense that he has overcome a powerful force. More
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important, his resistance proves beneficial because of its didactic quality; offering proof 
that the phantasmagoria is not as insurmountable as it appeared.
His strength was sapped by it, and he wilted under its bright lights, but ultimately 
the flaneur was not transfixed by the lustre of the arcades. In many ways we have 
advanced without pause for reflection, never bothering to inquire about this figure who 
possesses enough resolve to stand firm among these "temples of commodity capital"
(Arcades 852). Other than his idleness, we know very little of this man. Benjamin called 
the flaneur's imperceptible presence in the crowd the 'phantasmagoria of the flaneur.' One 
could suggest that this claim functions more effectively as a marker for the flaneur's 
questionable historical status than it does as a description, for he was more a phantom in 
history books than he was on the street. Solnit, desiring to hunt down this apparition, 
begins with the word itself - 'flaneur' - which has never been adequately defined in her 
estimation. She looks for etymological answers and discovers that it was either derived 
from the Irish word for libertine,' or was taken from an old Scandinavian word meaning 
'to run giddily here and there’ (198). In spite of her efforts she remains largely 
unconvinced, and the shroud of secrecy concerning the origin of the word contributes to 
the mystery surrounding the figure. Benjamin, Solnit observes, never defined the flaneur, 
but only made associations between him and crowds, alienation, goods, and walking 
(199). Its etymology remains uncertain and a definition is conspicuously absent in the 
works of a thinker so captivated by the image of a solitaiy stroller. The most significant 
question concerning the flaneur, however, is not that of origin or description, but comes 
down to the trivial: pet turtles. Solnit writes; "No one has named an individual who took a 
tortoise on a walk, and all who refer to this practice use Benjamin as their source" (200).
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The myth of leashed tortoises is the first assault on the historical validity of this 
figure; it is also a most decisive blow and, as a consequence, casts the whole idea of the 
flaneur in doubt. This discovery would be substantial if it actually mattered. Solnit 
concludes: "The only problem with the flaneur is that he did not exist, except as a type, an 
ideal, and a character in literature" (200). The flaneur, as he appears in Benjamin’s work, 
is a fiction and an ideal, but that is scarcely a problem. The flaneur is an allegorical 
creation in Benjamin's hands. His walk is not random like the flaneur who follows a 
wind-tossed feather in The Mohicans o f Paris. Benjamin's flaneur has a definite route in 
mind: "The path of one who shrinks from arriving at his goal will easily take the form of 
a labyrinth. [For the flaneur, this goal is the marketplace]" (Arcades 338; his brackets). It 
is not merely fortuitous that the flaneur moves from the crowded streets to the arcades.
An allegorical significance resides in that walk, for the flaneur's gaze "as it falls on the 
city, is the gaze of the alienated man" (Arcades 10). To be sure, the flaneur is no alienated 
man; the alienation refers to what he surveys: a sea of estranged souls. By arriving in the 
arcades, he draws the alienated mass to the source of its pain.20 Not wishing to get lost in 
the crowd, the flaneur escapes dissolution and sets foot in the heart of the 
phantasmagoria, where his resistance functions as an ideal.
The flaneur's stubborn refusal to submit to the alluring goods is intended as an 
example for others, but is more an afterword than a conclusion. The goal is the 
marketplace, as Benjamin writes, and not what he does upon reaching his destination. 
Eagleton goes the other way and stresses not the goal, nor what he accomplishes once 
there, but the process itself: "The flaneur [...], stepping out with his turtle on a lead, 
moves majestically against the grain of the urban masses who would decompose him to 
some alien meaning; in this sense his very style of walking is a politics all in itself* (335).
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He suggests that the style of walk is of political importance, but the political significance 
has more to do with the walk’s endpoint. The walk unites two, seemingly, separate 
phenomena: crowds and goods. Eagleton, however, is perfectly correct in his assertion 
that the flaneur's walk has political worth, for the "flanerie that began as the art of the 
private individual ends today as necessity for the masses" (Arcades 895). We are to 
follow the flaneur's path and understand the symbiotic relationship between alienation 
and consumption - that they are implied in each other. The arcades are a "world in 
miniature" {Arcades 3). They resemble a world, moreover, because the flaneur creates a 
totality out of these passageways by coupling the solitary with the dazzling. The flaneur's 
walk is the monadic shard which brings this entirety in view. In his study of Paris, 
Benjamin desired to "discover in the analysis of the small individual moment the crystal 
of the total event" {Arcades 461). His allegory of walking achieves this crystalline 
transparency,21 creating not only a condensed world, but bestowing this concept of 
totality on those who cannot see beyond their own private lives.
Solnit’s discovery that the flaneur -  as an historical figure -  did not exist seems 
only to solidify his status as an allegory. He encapsulates Marx’s observation that under 
capitalist production goods take on a social form as people grow more estranged from 
each other. The alienated mass and the Paris passages constitute the empirical proof of 
Marx’s claim and the flaneur absorbs both within himself; he is the congruent image 
pieced together by two previous incongruities (alienation and consumption). The totality 
of peopled streets and display windows is condensed into this singular figure and, as a 
result, the particular gives a view to the whole. The move from the particular to the 
general is a philosophical or epistemological concern dating back to classical Greece. For 
Aristotle, knowledge is accumulated through perception, but, since we do not perceive
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universals, we employ an inductive mental process to derive the abstract from what is 
sensible. Induction, then, bridges the divide between the particular and the general. 
Aristotle’s word for inductive thinking is “epagoge,” which is the rational faculty that 
human beings are endowed with to allow for the jump from the sensible to the universal. 
In his schema, inductive reasoning functions through the perception of tokens or types. In 
Posterior Analytics Aristotle provides an example: as one glances upon a military 
formation of men, the universal (not the particular) comes to mind. The eyes may 
perceive an individual soldier, but the mental perception is of the universal, man, and not 
of Callias or any other specific person (Modrak 167). The use of types guarantees the 
validity of the move from the singular to the general -  as a man Callias can stand in for 
the general (abstract man). The status of the particular is of vital importance in Aristotle’s 
conception, for if the status is assured then the move between the two points is a justified 
leap. Benjamin’s allegory of the flaneur is not a type or token in an Aristotelian sense, but 
its status does allow for the move to the whole because it is an abbreviated version of the 
totality (it expresses the totality like the Leibnizian monad).22 From the singular figure of 
the flaneur we can gain an understanding of the abstract, which is his function. In turn, 
the vast and out of reach -  capital’s total dimensions -  becomes graspable.
The flaneur is a generous figure; if  we do not comprehend the idea of a total 
system through his walk, we can understand it through his physiognomic practice. This 
art of estimating character through facial features casts the flaneur in a new role: an 
amateur detective. For the flaneur, “the joy of watching is triumphant” {Lyric Poet 69).
He may appear as a man of leisure, but “behind this indolence there is the watchfulness of 
an observer who does not take his eyes off a miscreant” {Lyric Poet 41). Establishing a 
connection between the stroller and the sleuth, Benjamin points his readers in the
R e p ro d u c e d  with p e rm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
30
direction of the detective story. Within this genre a complete portrait of the flaneur 
emerges.
The detective story originates with the rise of the metropolis. The sheer size of the 
modem city, with its infinite alleys, lanes, and courts, gives one the impression of its 
“impenetrability” (Unreal City 17). The urban detective, notes Williams, is the literary 
response to this labyrinthine confusion.23 It was not the gargantuan dimensions of the 
city, however, but its accompanying crowds which truly concealed the individual. The 
detective’s assignment was a difficult one, for all traces of the suspect were “obliterated” 
as (s)he was dissolved in the crowd {Lyric Poet 43). The hundreds of thousands of people 
- concentrated in a relatively small area -  swallow up the individual like an amoeba 
absorbs food.24 The flaneur, resembling a detective, wanders the streets looking beyond 
the veil of the masses for the individual. This daunting task was one the policeman had to 
perform, since the crowds provided the perfect asylum for the criminal {Arcades 193). 
Benjamin quotes from a 1798 police report: “It is almost impossible to maintain good 
behaviour in a thickly populated area where an individual is, so to speak, unknown to all 
others and thus does not have to blush in front of anyone” {Lyric Poet 40).25 There were 
ways, however, to manoeuvre around this disconcerting mass. The creation of types or 
character sketches narrowed the chaos of the many into neat categories and, by extension, 
manageable numbers.
In 1840s Paris there was a boom in the sale of pocketbook “physiologies.” These 
small volumes were intended for use on the city streets where one would encounter a 
variety of people. “From the itinerant street vendor of the boulevards,” writes Benjamin, 
“to the dandy in the foyer of the opera-house, there was a not a figure of Paris life that 
was not sketched by aphysiologue” {Lyric Poet 35). The physiologies, in short,
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familiarised the strange, providing Parisians with “soothing little remedies” for big-city 
life (Lyric Poet 40). The individual was empowered by these sketches since (s)he could 
deconstruct the throng into parts. The crowd was no longer alien, since the physiologies 
assured readers “that everyone was [...] able to make out the profession, the character, the 
background, and the life-style of passers-by” (Lyric Poet 39). This assurance, moreover, 
was premised on the art of physiognomy; police agents and detectives alike based their 
methods on this form of induction.
Through the depiction of types, the chaos of the crowd could be rationalised. 
Certainly the suspect could still dissolve into the crowd, but detectives benefited from the 
physiologies as much as pedestrians. These character sketches would confine the search 
by eliminating all but the criminal types. Once suspects were captured, however, a more 
pointed form of physiognomy was practiced. The reader of physiologies estimated 
character through the facial features of strangers with the sole aim of categorising the 
strange and unknowable; the detective -  at this point in the investigation - did not care for 
categories, but wanted to move beyond character to the (guilty) soul of the suspect. One 
glimpses this procedure in Dumas’ Mohicans. When a young girl is abducted at a Paris 
boarding school, Salvator and Monsieur Jackal, Chief of the Paris police, visit the school 
in search of clues and suspects. They both conclude that one of the students, 
Mademoiselle Suzanne, is in some way implicated in the kidnapping; they reach this 
conclusion, moreover, by applying physiognomy on the student after taking notice of her 
cold features as she flits past them. M. Jackal tells his friend: “Her mouth is so thin and 
firm and hard, her eyes are so cold blooded, her whole expression is so repulsive, fine 
though her features are, that she must be wicked” (Dumas 86).26 This account is intended 
only as a snapshot of the physiognomic method, which - at the present - could scarcely
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r th e r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
32
qualify as routine police procedure. Already in Benjamin’s day such induction was 
waning; the physiognomic gallery of the early twentieth-century German photographer 
August Sander attests to this fact, for his work was largely ignored by critics and the 
public. Sander had a collection of photographs of faces from every member of the social 
order, starting with the peasant, up to the highest members of the elite, and back down to 
the clinical idiot. It is a pity, comments Benjamin, that very little of his material is 
published, and someone should offer a potential publisher this incentive: that the “ability 
to read facial types [is] a matter of vital importance” (One-Way 252). To reinforce the 
point Benjamin continues: “Sander’s work is more than a picture book. It is a training 
manual” (One-Way 252). Benjamin is not salvaging Sander's work from obscurity so 
much as he is rescuing the physiognomies behind his art. For it is only through 
physiognomy that the total scope of commodity capitalism is revealed. Sander’s 
photographs can certainly teach one to classify the faces of strangers, but the importance 
of this collection ultimately rests in its ability to train the eye to see the vista behind the 
face of things.
Appropriating police induction in an effort to demonstrate the totality of capitalist 
production, Benjamin builds on the figure of the flaneur. The Paris stroller links the 
alienation of crowds with the dazzle of the arcades, but the allegory cannot fully capture 
the vastness of modem political economy. One of the few doctrinal issues agreed upon by 
most Marxists or post-Marxists is the notion of the base/superstructure divide. Capitalism 
is a total system and, accordingly, the economic base permeates all aspects of life and 
culture. Thus the self-estranged throng could be understood as the result of a specific kind 
of production process, although the crowd as a superstructural reflection is an obvious 
example. In many ways the mediated relationship between the substructure and the
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superstructure remains difficult to comprehend and "hard to deduce causally" (Buck- 
Morss 177). The method of induction enables one to glimpse this whole. The detective, 
writes Auster, "moves through [the] morass of objects and events in search of the thought, 
the idea that will pull all these things together and make sense of them" (9); so too does 
the physiognomist who sorts through the proliferation of goods in the arcades. He 
understands that those commodities do not dangle there in an abstract state, but are tied 
together by the base. This view was by no means self-evident, for in the shopping 
passageways of Paris a mist surrounded the goods in their display windows.
Adorno defines 'phantasmagoria' as the process in which the labour stored up in 
commodities is erased when they appear in the marketplace. To the unsuspecting eye 
there is nothing magical about these consumer items: they seem perfectly natural in the 
arcades. The arcades, however, only tell one side of the story - consumption - and neglect 
to tell of the commodity's production.27 Capitalism does not insidiously eradicate all 
traces of human labour. Instead it is simply a by-product of commodity capitalism that the 
good appears magically free of its labour, since the seller is not involved in production. 
The lueur glauque is a term which, among other things, signifies the hazy shroud which 
covers the object and, in the process, removes all evidence of its production.28 Adorno 
wishes to strip the phantasmagoria bare in order to shame its naked state, for once the 
sheen is wiped away, the labour process is exposed.
The cleansed commodity stands as testimony to its production and, more 
important, acts as a gateway to the totality. Benjamin argues that the relationship between 
base and superstructure is one of expression: the base finds its expression in its culture. 
The term 'expression' is not a haphazard choice, nor is it a synonym for 'reflection.'
Instead the word is a deliberate one which points back to Leibniz. In the Monadology,
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Leibniz writes that monads "go confusedly to infinity, to the whole; but they are limited 
and differentiated by the degrees of their distinct perceptions" (637). Although each 
monad has its own view of this "infinity," the individual monad still expresses the totality 
of the universe (including all other monads - God's omniscience, according to Leibniz, 
hinges on this interconnectedness). In Benjamin's hands the idealism of monads turns into 
the materialism of commodities, through their universal equivalence. Physiognomy is the 
art of seeing. Tiedemann explains: “Physiognomies infers the interior from the exterior; it 
decodes the whole from the detail; it represents the general in the particular" (Arcades 
940). The physiognomist can look past the fa?ade of the commodity to its interior; he is 
able to do so by inferring from the exterior of the object. To grasp the totality is both 
unnecessary and impossible - the singular commodity as monad will bring the entirety of 
capitalism into view. For any given commodity, writes Buck-Morss, contains the "totality 
in monadological abbreviation" (176). The commodity is indeed an alluring object, but 
when one glimpses the total story contained in it, the lustre quickly fades. Once cleansed, 
the commodity disturbs rather than dazzles.
In Dumas' novel, Salvator throws a paper to the wind and randomly proceeds. 
Benjamin comments: "No matter what trail the flaneur may follow, every one of them 
will lead tc a crime" (Lyric Poet 41). In the same way, all commodities lead back to the 
base. But one must possess the right method to properly follow that trace, since even a 
practitioner of physiognomy is not guaranteed any success. The narrator of "The Man of 
the Crowd" is one such figure. To be sure, he tries his hand at physiognomy as he sits in a 
London coffee-house. Glancing out the window, he reads "the history of long years” in 
the faces of passers-by (Poe 258). His physiognomic method, however, is flawed. The 
narrator errs by moving the wrong way:
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At first my observations took an abstract and generalising turn. I looked 
at the passengers in masses, and thought of them in their aggregate 
relations. Soon, however, I descended to details, and regarded with 
minute interest the innumerable varieties of figure, dress, air, gait, visage, 
and expression of countenance. (Poe 255-56)
He deduces, passing from the general to the particular. The mistake is significant because
he cannot locate the particular in the mass of people, and ends up roaming the streets until
daybreak. The narrator is "wearied unto death" in his fruitless search for the
solitary figure, admitting his failure only at the end. He states: "This old man [...] is the
type and the genius of deep crime. He refuses to be alone. He is the man o f the crowd. It
will be in vain to follow; for I shall learn no more of him, nor of his deeds" (Poe 262).
The narrator, in short, cannot see the mosaic through the shard. In point of fact, he cannot
even make out the shard. The flaneur, by ascending from  the particular and not
descending to the details, can glimpse the whole. Moreover, instead of losing the
individual among the mass like Poe's narrator, the flaneur rescues individuality from faces
as they flicker past him. Certainly the singular eventually dissolves into the many, but by
capturing faces in his gaze, the flaneur grows in understanding. He sees the pain of
inward-looking, private persons. He observes their cold features and notices that the eyes
of passers-by do not look into his, but are quickly cast downward. To study the faces of
individuals as they stroll past him is to understand their plight. By applying induction to
the crowd, moreover, the flaneur seeks solidarity among men and women where before
there was only division and estrangement; let the one stand in for all and his/her singular
problems -  the alienation that results from life under capitalist production - become
universalised.
The flaneur treats the individual on the street as a monad, and by doing so, can 
make sense of the shared condition of the crowd. As a physiognomist - one who studies
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faces - the flaneur can connect that hardship by seeing the true face of the commodity: its 
production. There is a wonderful economy of action with the physiognomist flaneur, all 
he needs to construct a totality is a single person and a single good. However, without the 
inductive method, this entirety cannot be sketched. Without an understanding of 
capitalism as a total system, moreover, any attempt to throw off the phantasmagoric yoke 
falls flat.
Induction allows one to piece the whole from the part, the base from the 
superstructure. If comprehension of the relationship between monad and totality falters at 
all, it is solely a result of Leibniz's wording. He argues that each monad is different from 
any other, but every monad "has relations that express all the others, and consequently 
[...] each simple substance is a perpetual, living mirror of the universe" (Leibniz 636; my 
italics). By likening the monad to a mirror, Leibniz incidentally stresses reflection, which 
is a misleading word. The mediation between substructure and superstructure is too 
complex for such an oversimplification. As Marx points out: "Ideologies of the 
superstructure reflect conditions falsely and invidiously" {Arcades 392). The more exact 
term is 'expression,' which is a qualitatively different word in Benjamin’s estimation. He 
writes:
The economic conditions under which society exists are expressed 
in the superstructure - precisely as, with the sleeper, an overfull 
stomach finds not its reflection but its expression in the content of 
dreams, which, from a causal point of view, it may be said to 
'condition.' {Arcades 392)
The digestive metaphor highlights the causal relation between superstructure and base,
while simultaneously rendering the idea of reflection an absurdity. More important,
Benjamin introduces a dream motif into his explication. He continues: "The collective,
from the first, expresses the conditions of its life. These find their expression in the dream
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and their interpretation in the awakening" (392). Just as one who wakes from a pleasant
dream does not quickly analyse what conditioned its agreeable content, so the mass does
not question why, for example, there is division and estrangement where there should be
solidarity. These reactions of analysis and inquiry are not instinctive; consider the sleeper
again. Upon waking from a dream, one either falls back asleep or rises out of bed. One
does not wonder about the correlation between the dreams and what (s)he previously had
to eat. Likewise, the collective does not self-reflect. On the other hand, it stumbles in a
kind of slumber, never seeing its connection with the economy.
In the nineteenth century, writes Benjamin, a "dream-filled sleep came over
Europe" {Arcades 391). It was, moreover, a "spacetime" or "dreamtime" in which "the
collective consciousness sinks into ever deeper sleep" {Arcades 389). Benjamin calls
forth the image of one asleep to further explain himself. He writes:
But just as the sleeper [...] sets out on the macrocosmic journey 
through his own body, and the noises and feelings of his insides, 
such as blood pressure, intestinal chum, heartbeat, and muscle 
sensation [...] generate, in the extravagantly heightened inner 
awareness of the sleeper, illusion or dream imagery which translates 
and accounts for them, so likewise for the dreaming collective, which, 
through the arcades, communes with its own insides. {Arcades 389)
The sleeper’s dreams may be conditioned in this schema - and there is no value-
judgement to be placed on such a claim - but there is something inherently wrong when a
society 'communes' with its own superstructural phenomena; it remains among the
soaring heights and never spirals downward to the reality of the base. When this realm,
moreover, is as alluring as the phantasmagoria of the arcades, it seems unlikely that the
collective will ever stir from its sleep.
Benjamin's invocation of dreams reveals his close ties with surrealism. Indeed, his
study of the arcades blossomed under the movement. What began as a newspaper article
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in 1927 grew into the gargantuan, unfinished work which we have today (Arcades ix). It 
was no mere coincidence that Benjamin forged connections with the Paris surrealists, for 
they were inextricably bound to the arcades. "The father of Surrealism was Dada," writes 
Benjamin, "[and] its mother was an arcade" {Arcades 883). Around 1919 Louis Aragon 
and Andre Breton held their meetings in the arcades, in a cafe in the Passage de 1'Opera; 
much of Aragon’s Paris Peasant was devoted to this arcade.29 The Arcades Project, 
however, was only half homage to Aragon, the other half being an antidote to his Peasant 
{Everyday Life 62-3). The arcades study certainly displays its surrealist influence, but 
Benjamin inevitably parts ways with Aragon, Breton, and others at the crossroads of 
dreams. His greatest disappointment with the surrealists is that they did not advance 
beyond this junction. He states: "Opposition to Aragon: to work through all this by way 
of the dialectics of awakening, and not to be lulled, through exhaustion, into 'dream'" 
{Arcades 908). Like a society which never reflects on its own conditioning, the surrealists 
confine themselves to that same place: the province of dreams. The dream is the final 
destination for the surrealists; for Benjamin it is nothing more than a starting point.
"By turning the optics of die dream toward the waking world," writes Tiedemann, "one 
could bring to birth the concealed, latent thoughts slumbering in that world's womb" 
{Arcades 933). Benjamin's shift away from dream represents a break with the surrealists 
but, more important, suggests an attempt to move beyond malaise and engage with 
actuality. For the surrealists, "both dream and reality would unravel to a dreamed unreal 
Reality, from which no way led back to contemporary praxis and its demands" {Arcades 
933). The idea of motion, however, of turning from one direction to its opposite, is 
absolutely crucial, contrasting with the entanglement of differing realities so
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characteristic of surrealism. As Marx states: "The reform of consciousness consists solely 
in ... the awakening of the world from its dream about itself' (Arcades 456).
To alter consciousness, or rather, to instill a true consciousness, is to perform a 
specific kind of dream-work: one that conjoins historical materialism with 
psychoanalysis. Tiedemann writes: "Under capitalist relationships of production, history 
could be likened to the unconscious actions of the dreaming individual, at least insofar as 
history is man-made, yet without consciousness or design, as if  in a dream" (Arcades 
933). History does not move forward under the direction of some Hegelian World Spirit, 
but instead there is an unconscious element to the unraveling of time, which does not 
negate the fact that it is fundamentally driven by the motor of man. The arcades provide a 
lucid example of this marriage of Freud and Marx, for these structures were bom out of 
conscious desire to create a shopping environment, and in that sense they testify to a real, 
human intervention into history. The motivation behind those first developers was not a 
calculated desire to transform the worker into a consumer, although the arcades result in 
this metamorphosis, which displays the unconscious aspect to the historical process. In 
that half-awareness one experiences while dreaming - realising that the inner logic of the 
dream exposes itself as such - two options are available: submission to this faulty logic by
l
j  continuing to sleep, or waking from slumber. The crowd was not a deliberate creation, but
was the manifestation of the alienation intrinsic to the production process. The collective 
could accept this distorted logic (which transforms fellow workers into strangers) or it
j could stir from its sleep and turn to die real, material world, where the phenomenon of
j
estrangement finds an explanation. Benjamin espouses a trajectory which is dialectical: 
dream consciousness as thesis, waking consciousness as antithesis, and awakening as 
synthesis (Arcades 463). By understanding the causal conditioning of the superstructure,
j. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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the spell that the dream casts can be broken. The surrealists, however, prove themselves 
unable to dissolve this spell because they lack the proper tool: an understanding of the 
totality of capitalism. Benjamin’s miscarried hashish experiments act as a metaphor for 
the surrealists' failure, for his physiognomy (and by extension, the crucial idea of 
induction) collapses under the effects of the drug.
Surrealist practice, writes Benjamin, is certainly not circumscribed by "dreams, 
hours of hashish eating, or opium smoking. It is a cardinal error to believe that, of 
'Surrealist experiences,’ we know only the religious ecstasies or the ecstasies of drugs"
(Reflections 179). Later he concedes, suggesting that hashish or opium can provide a 
sufficient introduction to their project, which is a path Benjamin and his friends follow.30 
Surrealist literature does not flagrantly advise narcotic intoxication, but drugs do 
represent an opening to the marvelous. Although Benjamin does not stress this aim, he 
delves into hashish experimentation nevertheless. Nowhere in his writings is he clear on 
motives, but intention is scarcely an issue since it is the amalgam of Benjamin’s thought 
with surrealist methods which is of interest; more specifically, the synthesis of the two 
punctuates the surrealist inability to grasp the totality.
As Benjamin sits in a hotel room in Marseilles, he eats hashish and waits until the 
overwhelming effects subside to the degree that he can safely venture outside. As he takes 
to die streets he turns into a physiognomist, “or at least a contemplator of physiognomies” 
(Reflections 139). The hashish, however, is not as weak as Benjamin initially thinks, and 
it manifests its potency in his hostility toward others. In another journal Benjamin 
addresses the negative effects of the trance: instead of cordiality, “the rudiments of an 
unfriendly attitude toward everyone [...] begin[s] to take shape” {Selected Writings 86). 
Something analogous happens to Benjamin in a harbour bar. He writes: “I positively fixed
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or ugliness” (Reflections 139). Instead of reading faces like the flaneur, Benjamin stands 
opposed to the those whom he surveys, until finally his hostile physiognomy degenerates 
into a game: he attempts to recognise people he knows in the faces of the other patrons. 
The physiognomy breaks down, moreover, because under hashish “connections become 
difficult to perceive” (.Reflections 137). The above statement can explain his inability to 
infer character from facial features, but works more effectively as a summary of 
surrealist-inspired physiognomies.
Induction is an art - a point Benjamin repeatedly stresses. While under the spell of 
i the hashish, he cannot make ‘connections’ because he is distracted by the brutality he sees
in other faces. More important, the physiognomist needs all his wits about him, which the 
figure of the detective attests to. While under the hashish trance, one is subject to “a 
continual alternation of dreaming and waking states [which is an] exhausting oscillation 
between totally different worlds of consciousness” (Reflections 137). Held under the grip 
of die drug, Benjamin cannot perceive with any amount of clarity; tom between two 
opposing poles of consciousness, he cannot read faces but can only humour himself with 
a game. Of course Benjamin’s foray into hashish is not to be carefully scrutinised, but 
must be understood metaphorically: infusing physiognomy with surrealist methods ends 
in failure.31 Benjamin describes the hashish experience as one which cuts the user off 
“from everyday reality with fine, prismatic edges” (Reflections 142). The hashish, after
i
i  tossing one back and forth between two states, finally casts one into the realm of dreams.
In short, it takes one away from the desired site of the everyday, which is the only place 
where a true vision and full understanding of the world can emerge. Surrealism does not 
j  allow for such comprehension as it moves one in the opposite direction.
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The surrealists, despite the fact that they loiter too long in the sphere of dreams, 
cannot be dismissed - a point Benjamin is quick to make. In his essay "Surrealism: The 
last snapshot of the European intelligentsia," Benjamin is full of praise for them, and 
more specifically, lauds their gift of the "poetic life" which they bequeath to Europe. This 
gift, he notes, is not to be associated with merely the artistic or poetic, which is a 
superficial view of the surrealist movement {Reflections 178).32 Instead it must be 
understood as a "radical concept of freedom," given to a society sorely lacking one 
{Reflections 189). By planting the seed of freedom - all the while disguising it in the garb 
of art - the surrealists demonstrate that they are the vanguard of revolution, and not, as 
Trotsky would have it, the after-effect. Beyond these virtues, however, lies the 
movement’s blind spot: the surrealists’ fixation on dreams and the unconscious, which 
bar them from seeing the true face of things. The physiognomist flaneur, conversely, did. 
By practicing induction he constructs a totality, which he bestows to others by creating an 
allegory.33 He has a firsthand knowledge of the powerful lustre of the phantasmagoria, 
and thus knows what is required to break the spell. Benjamin believes that capitalism 
“will not die a natural death" {Arcades 917): a statement which, at first reading, appears 
urgent but with some deliberation seems more like wishful thinking. Underneath it drips 
with melancholy and despair, for Benjamin understands that the unrest of previous 
generations has since dissipated. A modicum of hope exists; it is the flaneur's allegorical 
walk from the alienated crowds to the dazzling arcades. By casting a light on the 
transformation of the proletariat into consumers, Benjamin explains the disappearance of 
revolutionaiy fervour and helps to awaken a slumbering consciousness. Due to his 
untimely death, this task passed into the hands of the surrealists. With the surrealist
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falling back asleep.
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Chapter Three: Louis Aragon and the surrealists of Paris
A man's footsteps lead him to all sorts of places.
- Fyodor Dostoyevsky, Crime and Punishment 1866
Surrealism was bom in 1919 in Paris, when a group of young people gathered 
together to discuss their despair over a war-torn Europe. Andre Breton, Louis Aragon, 
and others distinguished themselves from the avant-garde before them through their 
wholesale rejection of pessimism and negativism: attitudes that, in their view, had 
crippled the dadaist movement. In sharp contrast, the surrealists were considerably 
optimistic. The first two decades of the century were certainly marred by a “few 
monstrous historical failures,” but humans were “still free to believe in [their] freedom”
(Manifestoes o f Surrealism 187). The reality of twentieth-century life was not restricted to 
commodity production and continent-wide war, a point the surrealists vehemently argued. 
There was also the revolution in Russia, and in that event they saw the possibility for a 
“radical transformation of society” (Lewis x). Assembly lines and trench warfare were 
two images of the early 1900s, but by no means was the real world restricted to these two 
pictures. As Franklin Rosemont writes: “Surrealism finds realism deficient in its estimate 
of reality” {What is Surrealism? 24). Their movement, however, was not an attempt to 
transcend the real, but an effort to deepen it by extending the notion of reality (24). To do 
so, the imagination must be emancipated from the bondage of rationalism (with its logic 
of profit valorisation and imperialism). Once freed, the mind could catch glimpses of the 
dream, the unconscious, and most important of all, the poetic. For the poetic acts as an 
ideal, which, juxtaposed with the dull monotony of the assembly line, produces a
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revelation, a critique, and a desire for change. Thus the surrealists did not retreat into 
imagination, but sought imagination on the road toward praxis.
‘Praxis’ is a word not often associated with the surrealist movement, but their 
political involvement suggests that this group was driven by a sense of urgency and a 
desire for practice. Wollen argues that the surrealists were just one example of the many 
ways in which art converges with the political, citing the surrealists’ 1923 manifestoes 
against the Moroccan war, and the Manifesto of the 121 (denouncing the Algerian war) 
which Breton signed just before his death in I960.1 The stand they took against French 
colonial practices, however, scarcely attests to their commitment. Their fight against the 
capitalist order, on the other hand, is a stronger demonstration of their resolve. They 
joined the Communist Party (the PCF) until they were banished for not towing the party 
line, and they befriended Trotsky in his final years.2 More subtly, they introduced Henri 
Lefebvre to Hegel’s writings which, over time, rejuvenated French Marxism.3 Leaving 
aside the manifestoes, the party politics, and the recovery of German philosophy, a 
significant surrealist contribution came from Aragon’s nightmare image of the capitalist 
apparatus. This bleak picture of a large wheel, spinning out of the grip of a hand, is, as 
Aragon states, “an essentially modem tragic symbol” (133), but it is no debilitating one.4
Marx observed that in the Victorian factory system, human mastery over its own 
tools was reversed, for workers no longer employed machines to aid in production but 
instead found themselves usurped and transformed into industrial appendages. Aragon 
hints at Marx’s insight in an effort to reveal what occurs when our creations turn against 
their creators. Aragon’s stance, however, is not entirely defeatist in tone. In point of fact, 
the wheel which is no longer steered by a hand is a bad dream only if  we surrender to it, 
and in this sense it is an image which inspires one to action. The crucial first step is to
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search out the real which exists behind the official version of reality; blind obedience to a 
system which defines ‘life’ as ‘life-activity’ (labour) only perpetuates the damage and, in 
the process, limits our vision, like the leather binders on a horse.5 Life, in short, did not 
have to conform to this image. If we look for the enchantments that surround us, Aragon 
implies, we can stretch out our arms and prevent that wheel from rolling overtop us.
Many of us, however, cower in the shadows of that looming object, passing our “lives in 
the midst of magic precipices without even opening [our] eyes” (Aragon 190). As such, 
Aragon suggests that “Lazarus will never leave his tomb” (199). Lazarus was raised from 
the dead, but there is no resurrection for those living in modernity, no stirring from that
j unimaginative realm. People consign themselves to death, which for Aragon is a
|
desireless, rational, ordered world. Through their passivity, moreover, men and women 
“endorse their own reality” (203). To pierce the facade of the rationalised ‘real’ is to call
II
it into question; to open our eyes to other possibilities, experience a deeper reality, and
l
awaken desire, one must move from despondency to hope, from the grim image of the 
giant wheel to the magic of Paris streets.
The surrealist walks in the city are not to be understood as the aimless drunken 
revelries of youth. Instead, they walked with a definite object in mind: “the golden fleece 
J  of everyday magic” (What is Surrealism? 25). This fleece, of course, is derived from
Greek mythology, and Jason had to journey to the far reaches of the known world (to 
Colchis) to locate it. The surrealists, conversely, did not have to travel far to find their 
prize, for it lay hidden in the most familiar of spaces. One had only to “bestow a vacant 
glance upon [one’s own] surroundings” to gain a different perspective, like viewing one’s
|
environs for the first time (Aragon 191). By describing this glance as “vacant,” Aragon 
suggests that the magical resides in close proximity, if  one’s sight aligns with one’s
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unoccupied state of mind. The point is more subtle than it appears, for if  one looks at the 
familiar with any amount of attention, then one builds on previous experience -  like the 
person who feels insecure about the scars and blemishes which (s)he sees every day in the 
mirror, but pass unnoticed by others. The end result is that one’s glance is inevitably 
spoiled or tarnished. If the mind is defamiliarised, however, it enables the onlooker to see 
with new eyes -  a recurring theme in Aragon’s Paris Peasant. This work is exemplary for 
a number of reasons, but it is the repeated emphasis on vision which makes Aragon’s 
book absolutely essential for understanding the full import of surrealist thought. To mine 
the secret life of the city, one must have the eyes to see beyond the ordinary and past the 
‘reality’ we impose on ourselves; Aragon recasts vision to prepare his readers for this 
task.
Certainly the mind shapes how we see in Aragon’s schema, but some have 
misinterpreted it as the creative mind draping a magical veil over reality. Peter Collier 
describes surrealist literature as fundamentally involving a “metropolitan projection of the 
imagination” (Unreal City 216), which is misleading, for it suggests that the surrealists 
overlay the real with their own desires. The surrealists wanted nothing of the sort, wishing 
merely to unearth the buried, which is something we glimpse in Breton’s Nadja. His book 
focuses on the chance meetings on Paris streets between himself and the woman who 
fascinates him so intensely: Nadja. In one passage, Breton and the title character near the 
Palace Dauphine, and although the area seems desolate (there are only two or three 
couples wandering around), Nadja sees a crowd, and exclaims: “The dead, the dead”
(.Everyday Life 54). Here the past collides with the present, since the ghosts that surround 
the palace are the slain from both the Revolution and the Paris Commune. Highmore 
writes: “Thus, in the everyday environment of Parisian streets lies a history of
j L _ .    ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- — -
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insurrection and struggles, struggles that Breton uses as a ghostly presence and a 
reminder” (Everyday Life 54). Breton reminds his readers that the reality of the past is not 
buried deep underground, but exists near the reality of the present. Curiously, it is not the 
author who possesses the ability to see this hidden force. Instead it is his textual creation, 
Nadja, who observes this collision of past and present, and notices the revolutionary 
potential bubble toward surface. This latent energy does not break through however, but 
remains concealed until the surrealists bring these immense forces “to the point of 
explosion” (Reflections 182). They employ dialectics to do so, drawing the past into 
confrontation with the present so as to blast this consciousness into the twentieth century. 
Revolutionary fervour existed in the city before, peaking in 1789,1848, and 1871, but has 
subsided after the days of the Communards. Drawing upon this rich history, Benjamin 
writes: “Paris is the counterpart in the social order to what Vesuvius is in the geographic 
order: a menacing, hazardous massif, an ever-active hotbed of revolution” (Arcades 83). 
The volcano image is a perfect analogy for the consciousness which is ready to erupt; the 
surrealists merely expedite this process. The ghosts in Nadja do not haunt. Instead they -  
like that famous ghost of Denmark6 -  inspire one to act. These apparitions from the past, 
moreover, reveal a reality deeper than bombs and factory labour: a world where change 
can occur if  people only will i t  The initial step towards change starts with the ability to 
see beyond the familiar, to spot the ghosts lurking in the shadows; the imaginative mind 
paves the way for such vision.
There is a danger, however, in readying the mind for imagination: this 
revolutionary potential can dissipate in the face of an appeal to desire and dream — 
something we observe in the figure of Aragon. His is a precarious walk between two 
opposing worlds - reality and dream - but he leans too far in one direction. He writes: “O
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reason, reason, abstract phantom of the waking state, I [have...] expelled you from my 
dreams” (Aragon 22). In an effort to combat western rationalism, Aragon eradicates 
reason not by fleeing into dreams, but by cleansing even the world of dreams from any 
residue of reason. He does so to prepare for the liberation of the mind:
i
j How mankind loves to remain transfixed at the veiy doors of the
■ imagination! The prisoner would dearly love to escape, but he
I hesitates on the threshold of possibilities, dreading that he may
find he has stepped on to a rampart walk leading back to its own 
J  casemate. He has been taught the mechanism of the logical
| sequence of ideas, and the poor fellow has assumed that his ideas
are connected. (73)
|
j Once the doors of imagination are opened, one can enter the realm of the unreal, that is, if
| it were not for the shackles of rationalism. What Aragon prescribes is, in essence, a
conundrum: in order to glimpse change and its precursor, hope, one must abandon all 
reason to pass into the unreal. Once saturated with the unreal, however, one finds it 
difficult to return to the real, which is a place the surrealists do not wish to abandon. Thus 
this paradox, above all, highlights the frailty of their movement. Walking through the city 
eventually leads one to the marvelous or poetic, which — if we have the eyes to see - 
broadens a previously narrow view of reality. Extending the boundaries of the real under 
the direction of the imagination leads to change, or rather, a desire for change.
Sometimes, however, this desire for change simply turns to desire, defusing the 
revolutionary potential in the process. Aragon’s Paris Peasant is one such example.
In part this book is an homage to the birthplace of suxrealism, for in the Passage 
de 1’Opera -  where much of the narrative takes place - stood the meeting place of its 
! founders: a cafe called the Certa.7 The arcade was slated for destruction,8 and thus
i
Aragon’s text safeguards this passageway from the threat of erasure. He not only 
recreates this world through his realistic prose, Aragon also documents the fight to keep it
r  ------------------ ------------- ---------  "
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alive by including newspapers clippings and posters which record the struggle between 
the shopkeepers and the BD Haussmann Building Society.9 His writing style and his 
chronicling are thus deliberate measures, since an authentic treatment of the Passage de 
l’Opera is the only choice available. The arcade, by the time Paris Peasant was 
published, was no more; to prevent its complete disappearance (not materially but from 
one’s memory) the author must necessarily sustain a realist style -  rebuilding this 
passageway in the hopes of preserving it. This style, however, is ill-suited to a surrealist. 
He begins well, describing the arcade in the most precise detail, especially the Certa 
(including even its drink selection and list of prices), but falters when he leaves the cafe:
! very quickly Aragon loses his footing and inevitably sinks into dream and desire. Collier
suggests that when the “narrator enters the arcades they set up reverberations in his mind 
which will enable him to move into the world of the ‘merveilleux’” (Unreal City 220). 
This phantasmagoric world, Collier continues, “invites the narrator to loosen his grip on 
external reality and allow his internal fantasies to flower and proliferate” (220). Aragon’s 
realism, buckling under the pressure of these “internal fantasies,” transforms into an 
altogether different style of writing. The book’s content, moreover, mirrors the sudden 
transformation of its form.
1
| Aragon’s Paris Peasant begins with the best of intentions. If he describes his
nightmare -  that large wheel which spins out of human control -  it is not to petrify us 
with fright, but to move us forward. His critique of the arcades pushes his readers in that 
direction. Despite being rooted in the real world, the critique eventually collapses into the 
unreal. Aragon insists that in the arcades “everything signifies havoc” (61), writes about 
the “enchantments” within (36), and views these alluring goods as “distractions” (60). 
Furthermore, he describes commodities as objects that plunge one into a whirlpool of
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diversion, which is a kind of “vertigo” (60). Thus far, the author seems to parallel 
Benjamin’s work on the dazzling object and the powerful and destructive spell it casts. 
The rudiments of a critique are certainly present in Paris Peasant, but they are exactly 
that: rudiments - undeveloped threads. As Aragon slips away from the realm of the real, 
however, he negates the possibility of a sustained attack. This inability to maintain a 
coherent critique is rather surprising, considering that the surrealists’ fascination with 
collage already represents an accomplished assault on the commodity.
The idea behind the collage -  of pounding two disparate objects together to form a 
bizarre hybrid -  is not confined to the surrealists, but stems from the avant-garde before 
them: the dadaists. Furthermore, many artists outside of Aragon and Breton’s circle were 
intrigued by this juxtaposing practice. Picasso had his bull’s head, composed of a bicycle 
seat and handlebars, and Duchamp had his fountain urinal. Meret Oppenheim combined a 
piece of fur with a cup and saucer, and Man Ray’s “Gift” was an (household) iron with 
spikes coming out of its surface. The surrealists, however, were particularly fond of 
Lautreamont’s “Chance meeting of a sewing machine and an umbrella, on a dissecting 
table” — a work they often cited. These artists conjoin two dissimilar objects, but the 
intention is not, as Highmore has it, to generate “a defamiliarizing of the everyday” 
{Everyday Life 46). Instead, the surrealists laud this art form because the work of Picasso, 
Oppenheim, and others challenges the reified world (Jay 287). By fusing, for example, a 
sewing machine with an umbrella, the commodity-form is cast in a new light: in its hybrid 
state it is rendered absurd. As a result, our reified view of a good, especially its utility, is 
called into question. Jameson goes further by suggesting that this challenge is closer to a 
full-blown assault. The collage declares war on the logic of the commodity, and in fact 
violently splits “open the commodity forms of the objective universe by striking them
R e p ro d u c e d  with perm iss ion  of th e  copyright ow ner.  F u r the r  reproduction  prohibited without perm iss ion .
52
against each other with immense force” (Marxism and Form 96). The collage artist is no 
sadist, (s)he merely commits violence on the object to tear the commodity inside out, thus 
displaying its “inner [metaphysical] contradictions” (97). Aragon does not evoke the 
image of the collage in his critique of the arcades; he claims that the goods on display are 
enchanting and distracting but by no means does he expose them in the way that Ray and 
Lautreamont do. The collage, however, helps to contextualise Aragon’s treatment of the 
Passage de l’Opera, and demonstrates that surrealist praxis is no myth. Some, like Jean- 
Paul Sartre, would state otherwise.
Sartre was neither impressed with collage (he claimed that these “ready-made” 
objects only compound reification), nor was he taken in by the surrealist movement in 
general (Jay 289). He argued that surrealism failed in its task of liberating desire, 
emancipating only pure imagination instead. The complaint is as old as the movement 
itself, and, what is more, is not entirely accurate. The surrealist programme was 
characterised by a strong emphasis on desire, which, in theory, provides a catalyst for 
change. Unlocking the prison doors of imagination is not an act of self-indulgence, but 
i must be understood as a step towards change in the real world. However, Sartre is correct
i
j in raising concerns about the surrealist fixation on the imagination, for it is intended as an
| avenue rather than a destination, but oftentimes the imagination stood as the endpoint
(one thinks of surrealist painting, especially Dali’s work, in this regard). Aragon’s Paris 
Peasant follows this pattern, clinging for some time to the real, but finally sinking into
|
the imaginative. The author admits as much; earlier he equates phantasmagoric distraction
|
' with a kind of dizzy spell, but he only reaches an understanding of the arcades when he
j
submits to his desires. He writes: “Lucidity came to me when I at last succumbed to the 
vertigo of the modem” (129). Aragon’s admission suggests that he is not able to
I  -  -------------------------------
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understand the nature of appetite (which multiplies in these shopping structures) until he 
yields to his own. Accordingly, what appears as critique, eventually ends in the arms of 
desire.
Their admiration for the hybrid image suggests that the surrealists have a solid 
base from where they can construct a commodity critique; Aragon’s account of his 
wanderings among the shops in the Passage de 1’Opera builds on this foundation. Marx, 
however, lays the groundwork. In the opening chapter of Capital, Marx writes about the 
fetishism of the commodity, which is precisely what the term ‘fetishism’ designates: the 
bestowing of the magical or supernatural on the material. Commodities are objects in
j which use-value quietly wears away as exchange-value becomes the sole objective value.
The collage exploits this metaphysical transcendence by forcefully bringing two unlike 
commodities together. A sewing machine -  Lautreamont certainly knows - has very little
j
in common with an umbrella, and the collage punctuates this arbitrary equivalence by 
fusing the two into one object. Aragon’s description of his stroll through the arcades is 
not so much an assault on the universal equivalency of things (it is implied), as it is a 
vivid re-creation of Marx’s famous first chapter. Instead of the table which comes to life 
and stands on its head, as in Capital, Aragon transforms a display window into an 
underwater scene, replete with seaweed and sea-shells.
As the narrator of Paris Peasant roams through the desolate passageway, he
I notices a humming noise which he traces to a nearby cane shop. It is late at night and the
| lights are off, but a greenish aquatic glow, emanating from the display window, seems to
|
' be the source of this low throbbing sound. Aragon isolates this echo -  it is the sound of
sea-shells — and as he peers into the window he understands why he hears such a sound, 
for an ocean scene is revealed before him. The canes float harmlessly like seaweed in this
r~ ■ “------- ------ -
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phosphorescent light until they line-up in battle formation. On any other day they hang in 
pairs, criss-crossing to form an X shape, but as Aragon looks on, these canes point out 
towards the glass like “a row of pikestaffs” in the hands of soldiers (38). Thus far 
Aragon’s evocation of commodity fetishism seems perfectly congruent with Marx. He 
captures their metaphysical properties by imaginatively transforming an ordinary display 
into an extraordinary underwater spectacle. The transcendence of the ‘sensuousness’ is 
marked by the metamorphosis of the canes from objects of utility into drifting pieces of 
scenery. More important, Aragon signifies the powerful strength of the commodity 
through the image of the pikestaff. For the arcade goods exert a force over the passerby 
through their dazzling qualities. They enchant, and the pedestrian reinforces his/her 
subservience to the commodity by submitting to its allure (purchasing it). The cane as 
weapon, in short, symbolises the supremacy of the phantasmagoria. Here Aragon’s realist 
prose slackens as he employs his imagination, but the magical -  at this point in the text - 
merely buttresses a real-world critique. The canes, however, are not the only objects 
floating in this store window. Aragon also notices a human form swimming toward the 
surface of the glass. As she approaches, Aragon observes that she is neither a mermaid, as 
he initially thought, nor a siren, and it is here -  as this figure swims closer -  where the
I
critique suddenly vanishes.
The figure Aragon sees is no creature of the deep; she is a prostitute named Lisel. 
She moves toward the glass and stretches out her arms in Aragon’s direction, but the
| seaweed quickly blocks her from view. Soon the green light dims as the sound of the sea
ii
fades, and the narrator is left alone in the quiet passageways. Only a fleeting glimpse of 
Lisel is offered, and one is left wondering why Aragon includes her in his narrative. She, 
however, is not the only prostitute in Paris Peasant and thus the reader must view her as a
|
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kind of forerunner, heralding the arrival of another. At the end of his long stroll in the 
arcades, Aragon reads an advertisement for a massage parlour, which directs him indoors. 
Of course the massage is just a cover for something more clandestine, and what follows is 
a “very casually physical experience in a dirty room” (Unreal City 226). Breton’s Nadja 
and Philippe Soupault’s Last Nights o f Paris both have remarkable similarities to 
Aragon’s work, Solnit observes. She states: “All three are first-person narratives about a 
man wandering in Paris, give very specific place names and descriptions of places, and 
make prostitutes one of their main destinations” (207). These three works parallel each 
other, but the reason why they do is not attributable to chance: the prostitute is the clue. 
For the prostitute stands as a surrealist image of desire. She embodies desire because she 
can gratify it. Obeying its inner logic (the satisfaction that results from consumption), the 
prostitute also personifies the commodity.10
Lisel’s appearance in the cane shop is brief, but the point is made nevertheless: 
she is a commodity just like all the other goods in the arcade. Aragon’s critique of 
commodity fetishism is nearly effective, although it degenerates into pure desire as soon 
as Aragon recognises Lisel’s face. As a nondescript mermaid, she is part of the 
underwater scenery, but as a prostitute she signals the erasure of the critique, which 
occurs when the narrator visits the ‘masseuse’ (since he perpetuates the very system he 
opposes by reinforcing her position as a commodity). By making the destination of his 
walk the massage parlour, Aragon establishes the prostitute as his final word on the 
subject of the arcades. He nears the threshold of critique but the prostitute as commodity 
bars him from crossing it. Aragon believes that to see things clearly, one must succumb to 
the vertigo of the arcades; the prostitute is that point of submission. However, the author 
is mistaken about lucidity: it only arrives through resistance, which is something we learn
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from Benjamin’s flaneur (who possesses strength in the face of the phantasmagoria). The 
flaneur’s message is crystal-clear, and it directly contrasts with Aragon’s murky one. 
Although his message is obscure, one small detail shines through the haze: that desire can 
certainly deepen our understanding of reality, and act as a catalyst for change, but it can 
also carve a path away from the real.
This failure to maintain a grip on the real has raised the ire of many an opponent. 
Some have accused the surrealists of abandoning reality altogether in the pursuit of 
pleasure.11 Others have claimed that surrealism is -  above all -  highly individualised, 
moving “on a different scale from that of the revolution” (Wollen 134). Their project is 
thus viewed as, at best, a handbook for counter-cultural living, and at worst, a self- 
indulgent straying from the path of revolution. Still there were others who narrowly saw 
surrealism as nothing more than an art movement, which rarely left “the aesthetic realm” 
(Everyday Life 130). These assailants, however, reveal their own limitations: they have a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the surrealist project. The surrealists did not fail 
because they were merely artists; they did not run aground because they drifted off- 
course; and they did not stumble because they rejected reality. If they had a shortcoming, 
it was that the surrealists lacked a proper understanding of totality. The idea of totality, 
moreover, brings the discussion back to Benjamin -  the figure who forms one of the only 
sustainable critiques of the movement.
As Benjamin demonstrates, revolutionary consciousness will only surface when 
the symptom is traced to the ailment; casting a light on the commodity is a vital part of 
this process since it links the disappearance of the proletariat with the emergence of the 
consumer. Capitalism is not just a system of production, it is also a total system. The 
flaneur grasps this idea inductively and renders it visible through his allegorical walk. The
r  ■     . . .  . .
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physiognomic method, however, provides no guarantees. When the physiognomist is cut 
off from the everyday - like the hash-eating flaneur - there is no possibility of sketching 
the general from the particular. The art of induction is lost on him, and his physiognomy 
quickly deteriorates into a game. To be removed from everyday reality, to be shuttled 
away from it, is a causal result of the hash trance, as Benjamin suggests, but it is also a 
tendency among some of the surrealists. There is certainly a strong emphasis on the need 
for praxis in their movement, and they have a systematic critique of commodity 
capitalism as well. Desire and distraction, however, infiltrate Aragon’s Paris Peasant, 
which subsequently sends him off into the imaginative and away from the demands of the 
real. ‘Distraction’ in this case does not have the same connotations it did earlier in this 
essay. Before this word designated a kind of feast for the eyes, like one bombarded by all 
kinds of commodified stimuli as (s)he walked through an arcade. Here ‘distraction’ is to 
be understood differently: as a distraction of purpose. Aragon embarks on a critique, but 
as soon as a mermaid invades the scene, the author’s trajectory suddenly takes a wrong 
turn, spiraling downward. As the critique descends into pure imagination, it irrevocably 
slips away from reality. In the process, Aragon finds himself in a precarious position.
To formulate a critical response, one must have a panoramic view, which the 
flaneur -  by way of induction -  possesses. He moves from the particular because he 
knows that this method represents the best opportunity to glimpse the vista before him. 
Aragon espouses a different strategy: full immersion, but he is dangerously close to the 
object of study and, as a result, cannot see clearly; similar to the police inspector from 
“The Murders in the Rue Morgue,” his close proximity mars his vision. Aragon claims 
that lucidity only comes to those who submit to the vertigo of consumption. The claim 
proves false though; Aragon does not have a view to the entirety because there is no
r ~ . . .  ■ ■
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critical distance between himself and die arcades. In short, he has no “position of strength 
[...] to take in the whole panorama” (Origins 56). When he succumbs to the 
phantasmagoric desire of the arcades, Aragon is prevented from seeing the whole, but he 
has no wish to glimpse it either. For the surrealists have no totality to catch sight of, 
which is perhaps why, metaphorically, hash-driven physiognomy tumbles so severely.
The truth is, at times, best concealed in the most obvious of places; such is the case with 
the flaneur of Marseilles. His induction proves futile because, quite simply, there is no 
totality to estimate from the particulars.
When under the effects of hashish, writes Benjamin, the user finds connections 
“difficult to perceive” {Reflections 137). The surrealists prove no different from the hash- 
eater in this respect, since they too do not make out the connections between phenomena. 
They do not, for instance, link commodity production with the alienation of the crowd. 
Collier observes that in Nadja, “Paris remains a comfortingly familiar village-city [...]. It 
secretes individuals, not [...] anonymous throngs” {Unreal City 218). There is no self­
estranged mass in Breton’s book because the surrealists do not have a coherent image of 
alienation.12 The flaneur, conversely, does make out these connections, and his stroll from 
the crowded streets to the arcades testifies to his clarity of vision. He sees sorrow and 
hardship in the faces of strangers and estimates its cause in the face of goods. Submerged 
in these passageways, Aragon was too close to see anything other than a blurred image, 
and that image did not connect with the image of the alienated crowd.
The surrealists wandered rather than strolled. They roamed the streets of Paris 
conjuring the magical, scouring for the imaginative, and searching for “the poetic 
possibilities of everyday life” (Solnit 207). To this end, their urban walks were fruitful, 
but they were essentially aimless, contrasting with the deliberate path of Benjamin’s Paris
b
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stroller. In Crime and Punishment, Svidrigailov tells Raskolnikov that their chance 
meeting was not governed by some providential force, but was entirely fortuitous. “A 
man’s footsteps,” he says to Raskolnikov, “lead him to all sorts of places” (539). For the 
surrealists -  who walked all over Paris - this statement is certainly true; their footsteps 
lead them “to all sorts of places,” but they eventually led them away from the real and 
towards desire (as personified by the prostitute).13 Allegorically, however, Aragon never 
leaves the arcade: he begins and concludes his walk in the Passage de 1’ Opera. The 
surrealist stroller -  if he truly wished for change - was compelled to leave this realm of 
distraction. He never did.
When the Paris opera house was destroyed by fire, the arcade that joined the 
vestibule with the neighbouring shops was deemed irrelevant, and was subsequently 
slated for destruction. A widened boulevard, city administrators thought, made more 
sense than an arcade which began at the smouldering remains of a former landmark. A 
short time after Aragon wrote Paris Peasant, the demolition crews transformed the 
narrow passageways into a major thoroughfare, but the Passage de l’Opera remained, 
albeit textually. Aragon preserves this world, but really it is just half a world; like the 
passageway after the fire, his critique is castrated.
The monad is an abbreviated version of the totality, and the allegory acts as that 
monadic fragment which brings the whole into view. Benjamin’s allegory of walking 
creates a miniature world, linking the ‘material relations between people’ with the ‘social 
relations between things.’ The surrealist stroll does not unite goods with the producers of 
goods, capturing only the fetishism of the commodity; as a result, it does not behave as a 
monad: an entire world is not condensed within this walk. The surrealist programme -  to 
initiate change but drawing on the unconscious, the unreal, and the marvelous -  was
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neither a triumph nor a failure, but the surrealists certainly faltered in their inability to 
produce a view to the vista (capital’s total scope).14 They glimpsed revolutionary energy 
just as Breton and Nadja had glimpsed the ghosts of insurrection in the Palace Dauphine, 
yet they could not draw out this energy -  not on a mass scale. An eruption of 
revolutionary fervour would come later, in May 1968, under the watchful eye of another 
avant-garde movement.
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Chapter Four: Guy Debord and the drift through Paris
Sometimes I walked with Peter Reece as he went about his business 
in the parish. He would go about on foot: he had a theory that people 
should normally go about on foot, then there might be time for things 
to sort themselves out.
- Nicholas Mosley, Hopeful Monsters 1990
The Situationist International came into existence in 1957, when a group of eight 
people, meeting in Cosio d’Arroscia on the Ligurian coast, called themselves 
‘situationists.’1 They had met a year earlier at the World Congress of Free Artists, where 
members from three avant-garde groups converged: the Letterist International, the 
Society for an Imaginist Bauhaus, and the CoBrA group. The SI was short-lived, 
dissolving in 1972, and was quite small, having a membership that never exceeded twenty 
people at any given time.2 Considering that Guy Debord was the driving force behind the 
situationists, their story does not begin at a congress in Alba, Italy. Instead, it began five 
years earlier in the city of Paris.
In the early 1950s, Debord and some friends frequently met in a cafe in the Latin 
Quarter. They were known as the ‘Letterists’ and would often “drink too much and plan 
systematic rambles that they referred to as derives” (Jappe 45). The rudiments of 
situationist theory sprang from conversations held at these cafe tables. This image of 
artists gathered around a table and expressing their malaise is a familiar one: the avant- 
garde before, the surrealists, similarly congregated in a Parisian cafe. The parallelism of 
origins, however, is superficial, for the situationists strove to distance themselves from 
prior avant-garde movements. They certainly acknowledged their inheritance to these 
groups, which Debord announced at the founding meeting of the SI. But unlike their
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predecessors, they abandoned all notions of utopia and moved outside the boundaries of 
art (Sadler 161). In their estimation the avant-garde never formulated a coherent critique 
of either capitalism or modernity, and its art took them places that the situationists did not 
wish to visit; Debord wanted to go elsewhere -  not museum walls or the pages of 
magazines, but to the streets.3 He is reported to have said: “That which changes our ways 
of seeing the streets is more important than what changes our way of seeing painting” 
(Plant 60). For the cardinal error in previous cultural movements was that the focus 
inevitably turned upon itself (usually on its art). The situationists found such self­
reflection both indulgent and unproductive, and, as a consequence, directed their focus 
outward.4
The SI was seen as the latest in a long line of avant-garde movements, but was 
often coupled solely with the surrealists. Many viewed situationism as a “latterday 
incarnation of surrealism” (Knabb 384), but Debord did not think the comparison was 
entirely accurate. In point of fact, he had venomous words for the surrealists, calling them 
ostentatious and weird, and describing their methods as monotonous (Plant 59). Other 
avant-garde groups were inward-looking -  which was their weakness -  yet such a failing 
did not compare to the shortcomings which plagued the sunealists. Even as its outset, 
Debord states, surrealism “ground to a halt practically and theoretically (Knabb 42). 
Furthermore, that place which the surrealists wanted to access -  the unconscious mind -  
was both miserable and poor (Plant 59). To stray towards the unconscious was to move in 
a direction which Debord did not sanction. The situationists sought to awaken a dormant 
consciousness; the surrealists kept it slumbering (at least in Debord’s view). In the 
process, Breton, Aragon, and the others withdrew “from the responsibilities of living in 
the world” (Shields 45). Henri Lefebvre, who was briefly associated with the surrealists,
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admits that their movement, as a symptom, was important. Yet by fixating on the 
unconscious they inevitably lived “outside of the real world, without it, [and] against it” 
{Critique 112). When an avant-garde group finds itself in this position, thought Lefebvre, 
it ceases to retain its value. Spotting the cul-de-sac where surrealism was headed, 
Lefebvre left for the university. Here he hoped to find the right climate where intention 
would not be derailed by art, and where an understanding of the real world would be 
deepened without the aid of the surreal.
Once there, Lefebvre encountered an environment beset with its own set of 
difficulties. The surrealist programme was in many ways too slack and disorganised, 
resulting in a loss of focus. French Marxism, on the other hand, was far too stifling and 
unbearably doctrinaire.5 In the first half of the twentieth century, any analysis of Marx’s 
work rarely left the confines of the economic and the political. This rigid adherence to 
only two areas of his thought would have been fine a century earlier, for in the 1800s 
capital was merely building geographical empires (abroad, through imperialism, and at 
home, through world fairs and shopping structures like the arcades). In the twentieth 
century all this had changed. A dramatic shift occurred when capitalist relations quietly 
encroached upon “the very intimacy of people’s everyday lives” (Plant 11). An orthodox 
Marxist, however, would not suggest that alienation extended beyond the borders of the 
workplace, viewing ‘the home’ as a refuge for the worker. Understanding the full 
philosophical import from earlier texts, Lefebvre was one of the first thinkers to observe 
the total scope of alienation.6 The Critique o f Everyday Life, his book about the extent to 
which modem existence is colonised by capital, was published in 1947 and was poorly 
received by academia. Philosophers were outraged because their discipline was dragged 
from the lofty heights into the mundane and trivial, and Marxists thought culture critique,
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especially an analysis of bourgeois culture, was useless and antiquated (Critique 6). The 
situationists, however, received Lefebvre’s work with open arms.
Debord met Lefebvre when a friend -  Michele Bernstein - urged Debord to audit 
one of his seminar courses. A relationship blossomed out of that initial meeting, and 
Debord and the other situationists maintained a dialogue with Lefebvre from 1958-1963, 
until a disagreement caused an irreparable rift between the two.7 Despite the inglorious 
end to their friendship, Lefebvre had a tremendous influence on the SI. Debord 
recognised his debt to him, but took the situationists in another direction. Lefebvre 
explored the depths of alienation, whereas Debord addressed how this alienation was 
disguised by way of “the mirage of ‘satisfaction’ and ‘freedom’” (The Reader 237). If 
modem existence was impoverished, argued Debord, it was lamentable for one reason 
alone: that we are incapable of recognising the alienation which makes life so 
insufferable. The essential question -  as for Aragon -  was that of sight or perspective.
The mosaic that constitutes twentieth-century life could not be glimpsed in its entirety, 
but the solitary fragment that could bring it into view was conspicuously absent from 
Lefebvre’s work. Debord spoke of this dilemma at a conference, likening everyday life to 
a “sort of reservation for good natives who keep modem society running without 
understanding it” (The Reader 240). We view life through “specialized fragments that are 
virtually incommunicable,” he continues, “and so [the everyday...] is naturally the 
domain of ignorance” (The Reader 240). Given the above, the situationist programme was 
fairly straightforward: replace the non-monadic shards with monadic ones, which is the 
equivalent to giving sight to the blind. Such a task required the corresponding method; in 
Debord’s opinion the narrowness of vision could only be corrected with the most crass of 
gestures. To bring the panorama in view, he called for guerilla-style tactics, which ranged
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from the distribution of pamphlets, to insightful/mcr'teful graffiti and bizarre media
a
stunts. These activities were by no means self-indulgent, but were steps toward the 
revolution, placing them closer to figures like Luckacs and further from the avant-garde 
movements before them.
The poverty of life in the twentieth century was not self-evident (although 
unmistakable to thinkers like Debord and Lefebvre), because people were unable to unify 
a world of seemingly disparate phenomena. We need a paradigm to bring these fragments 
together, writes Plant, and the situationist understanding of “the spectacle” is a useful way 
of turning those pieces into a picture of our alienation (9). The spectacle makes the 
incomprehensible comprehensible by condensing the totality of life into a single idea.
This term first appeared in some entries in the SI journal publications, but is treated in full 
detail in Debord’s Society o f the Spectacle. His definitions are manifold: spectacle as a 
“social relation among people, mediated by images” (Debord 4), the “materialization of 
ideology” (212), and the very image of capital (34).9 To be sure it is all these things, but 
the spectacle is, above all, the intensification of commodity capitalism.
In the nineteenth century, the world was dominated by its phantasmagorias 
(Arcades 26); in die following century, however, the world was a little more complicated: 
“all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles” (Debord 1). The 
distinction between the two centuries is a notable one. As one walked through the 
arcades, one was susceptible to the allure of the commodity, but the individual could 
always leave its sphere of influence, for the commodity was restricted to world fairs, 
market places, and shopping centres (the arcades were the most concentrated site for this 
bombardment, with Scylla and Charybdis on either side of the street). In the twentieth 
century, the commodity branches out. Unfettered, it comes searching out the individual
L -  -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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(and not vice versa). The spectacle is thus a process: it “informfs] the commodity world” 
(Knabb 158), which is not to suggest that the spectacle is mere advertising.10 The word 
‘inform’ is best understood as a kind of heralding, for the spectacle announces a new 
stage in capital. Yet at the same time it disguises this phase, masking the aggression that 
characterises it. In the arcades the consumer, although prey to the arousal of desires, 
could maintain a certain amount of autonomy; with the sophistication of capitalism, 
however, that control is magically stripped away without any cognizance of its absence. 
For the spectacle is “the omnipresent affirmation of the choice already made in 
production and its corollary consumption” (Debord 6). The degree to which capitalism 
deceives -  the choice is already made for us, yet we cling to the false notion of self- 
determination - attests to the extent of its advancement. It is a total system. Through the 
lens of the crowded streets and shopping arcades of Paris, Benjamin saw how material 
relations developed between people and how social relations developed between things, 
which is capital’s move towards a totality. In both its victory over the consumer and its 
vast dimensions, the spectacle marks the arrival of this system.
In many ways the situationist project parallels Benjamin’s work, and the spectacle 
is an extension of his understanding of the phantasmagoria. The commodity had 
fetishistic tendencies in the arcades (where use-value is usurped by exchange-value); 
commodity fetishism has its apogee, however, in the spectacle, where the tangible is 
replaced by the intangible (Debord 36). For in Benjamin’s schema, the value of exchange 
overshadows the good’s utility, and so a false veil is draped over reality, yet by the mid­
twentieth century -  when the image exists over and above the object - that veil replaces 
reality.11 In The Arcades Project, the phantasmagoria is represented as a consolation for 
the labour process; for Debord, commodities enslave us while promising liberation from
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1 *yneed. Furthermore, Benjamin believes that the phantasmagoria induces sleep; Debord 
goes one step further and claims that the spectacle is “the guardian of sleep” (21). As the 
spectacle ensures that we never stir from our sleep, it too puts to rest all thought of 
revolution. The last real revolution in Paris, and in all of France for that matter, occurred 
in 1871. The phantasmagoria put that social unrest to bed, and the spectacle kept it 
sleeping. To return to the days of the Communards, the proletariat would have to 
emerge.13 In order to do so, it must -  despite the consumerism which followed after the 
war - become “the class of consciousness” (Debord 88).14
The sudden shift in topics in Debord’s book, from the spectacle to the USSR, is a 
seemingly mystifying one, but makes perfect sense given the undercurrents of 
consciousness present in both sections of the work. In the West, consciousness could not 
emerge because the spectacle did its best to erase the proletariat’s existence. As the 
economy after the war gathered strength, prosperity trickled down to the lower classes, 
offering compensation for their participation in the production process. In the Soviet 
Union matters were different; consciousness did not erode as prosperity increased - as it 
did in places like France - but existed in an imperfect form. As Debord turns his gaze 
toward the East, he observes what occurs when consciousness is imputed elsewhere. 
Bolshevism “triumphed fo r itself in. Russia,” and subsequently, it quickly became 
apparent that “the representation o f the working class radically oppose[d] itself to the 
working class” (Debord 100). The Soviet model failed, Debord argues, because the 
Bolshevik party justified its rule and “became what it was: the party of the proprietors o f 
the proletariat'’ (102).15 What was intended as the catalyst quietly became the status quo, 
but the real misfortune lies in the fact that for many, the vanguard party stood “as the only
Il
proletarian solution” (Debord 102). The battle was that of revolutionary ideology against
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revolutionary theory, and the former proved victorious (Debord 124). Revolutionary 
ideology accepts a vanguard to destroy the existing state and makes excuses when it does 
not relinquish its bureaucratic hold. Industrialised or pre-Bolshevik capitalism thus 
transformed into state capitalism, which is why revolutionary theory is the enemy of 
ideology: it is not content with a mere changing of the guard. A false and imputed 
consciousness, if  we look to the example of Russia, allows for the continued subjugation 
of a people. Despite the above claim, there is another ‘proletarian solution;’ it demands a 
consciousness which is pure and accepts no substitute.16 Yet all this discourse, if  we turn 
our focus back upon the West, amounts to very little if the class that was to overturn the 
bourgeoisie had disappeared (under the weight of consumerism). In short, why write 
about consciousness when there is no corresponding class?
Debord repeatedly stresses that the proletariat was not disappearing in France, 
although the peasantry and factory hands were (114). The working class certainly existed, 
but they could not “recognize and name their misery” (Debord 122). With the post-war 
boom, the misery of their condition was not so miserable. The Luddites of Victorian 
England, Debord reminds his readers, targeted the source of their pain by attacking the 
machines of industry; the working class of the twentieth century must “follow a new 
‘General Ludd’ who, this time, urges them to destroy the machines o f permitted 
consumption” (Debord 115). By attacking the literal machines of production, the Luddites 
could only go so far, but by assaulting the inner logic of consumption (as reward for 
labour), the proletariat could catch a glimpse of itself. There were, however, considerable 
obstacles. First, economic expansion, which was a result of Marshall aid in Europe and 
the Monnet Plan in France, greatly increased the average worker’s purchasing power, thus 
blurring the line between workers and consumers (Sadler 16 and 43). Second, the
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economic structure had also changed in the process, with an emphasis on services rather 
than manufacturing and production (by the middle of the nineteen-fifties there were more 
white-collar than blue-collar workers). For many these were the halcyon days of high 
incomes, encouraged freedoms, and increased leisure and tourism. Some theorists went so 
far as to suggest that capitalism was transformed by its own successes into a “progressive 
society free from class and ideological conflict” (Plant 2).17 Considering this backdrop, 
Debord’s task was an arduous one: convince the working class that it not only was the 
revolutionary class, but that it possessed real strength and significance.
Accordingly, Debord’s task turns the discussion back to the issue of perspectives 
and the common theme of either failing to see the whole or failing to gain a favourable 
position with which to take in that whole. There was, moreover, a practical consideration: 
how does one awaken a class which is - under the spectacle’s influence - lulled to sleep? 
This class does not even realise that it is under the rule of another, for the bourgeoisie 
excels at masking its own sovereignty. Jappe claims that they “buttress existing 
hierarchies [while keeping] the true nature of the functioning of society from becoming 
conscious” (42). The days of the obvious target - the capitalist - had vanished, for he was 
replaced by a legion of shareholders. The change, however, scarcely mattered, for the 
situationists argued that the inability of the working class to observe its own subjugation 
far outweighed its failure to spot its oppressors. Yet Debord and others did not lose hope 
and, instead, remained considerably optimistic. To puncture the false dream of a 
“progressive society” required just one attempt. The comprehension of one fragment 
alone would allow one to see through the complexity of the spectacle to capital’s 
essentially dichotomous structure. Of course capitalism evolved considerably, but its 
basis -  the valorisation of labour -  could not change in any way. Thus the shard that
r   - ...
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would render the totality perceptible involved the division (and disparity) between those 
who stand to profit from and those who stand to suffer from the production process. The 
rising salaries of the working classes, coupled with the impetus to consume, only 
complicated the issue. By returning to the simplicity of capital’s first premise -  the 
dominance of one group over another - consciousness and its corollary, discontent, would 
undoubtedly emerge. The city, the SI argued, represented the best opportunity to 
construct the entirety through the monad of inequality. With that monadic fragment, 
moreover, the working class could finally catch sight of itself.
When one speaks of the city, one has in mind a collection of streets, buildings, and 
people; one thinks of infrastructure, diversity, and the intersection of nature (geography) 
and development (concrete and iron). The urban is all these things, writes Lefebvre, but it 
is also where “the many elements and aspects of capitalism intersect in space” (Shields 
145). Social relations are thus, as Lefebvre wrote in Les contradictions de lE tat, spatial 
relations (Shields 182). If one’s wish were to expose capitalist production, (s)he should 
turn to the city. For capitalism’s greatest lie is that it promises so much to all, but fails to 
deliver on that promise. Political economy tells us that lives will improve as capital 
evolves, regardless of class. This claim, however, is untrue and the city offers tangible 
proof of the deceit - a quick look around Paris would demonstrate how far this ‘truth’ was 
stretched. The situationists read the city like a text, extracting the social dynamics of 
capitalist production from the spatial. They believed that “people don’t live somewhere in 
the city; they live somewhere in the hierarchy” (Knabb 66). To read this urban text 
required very little in the way of preparation. No secret skill was needed, nor was one 
expected to be steeped in specific forms of knowledge. The situationists began with one 
basic premise: that the city was the materialisation of social hierarchies (Jappe 86). In
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many ways this hierarchy was obvious, for there were “embarrassing contrasts of wealth” 
in the city (Sadler 94). The Algerian ghettoes of Paris were the most glaringly obvious, 
placed outside of view on the city’s fringes in the early 1960s.18 The town of Mourenx -  
Lefebvre’s hometown -  was another, and perhaps more explicit, example. Here city 
planners used housing “to literally stratify workers according to their social and economic 
status” (Sadler 52). The majority of the residents of Mourenx worked in the nearby gas 
fields and petrochemical complex at Lacq, and the labour relations within this oil 
company were reproduced in Mourenx’s housing. General labourers were placed in 
apartments if  they were single, condominiums if they were married, and semi-detached 
homes if  they had families. Higher income employees, however, lived in their own 
separate villa, and the managers lived even further away: in different towns (far from 
Lacq’s industrial plants and Mourenx’s lower classes). But in some respects it did not 
matter how hierarchical the urban fabric was, for oftentimes the city evades careful 
scrutiny.
The situationist message was crystal clean “look to the [literal] spaces of class 
struggle” (Sadler 47), which was essentially a call to move from the corridors of
■ universities and their libraries to the streets, from the rarefied heights of theory to the 
materiality of the quotidian. The SI had a deep-seated hatred for the elitism associated 
with institutional learning -  articulated best in Debord’s “The Poverty of Student Life” -  
and as a consequence, did their utmost to prevent their message from becoming even 
remotely esoteric. The only obstacle barring access to an understanding of the urban (as 
hierarchical) was that of sight. The inequalities inherent to capitalist production were best 
glimpsed in the city, but the eye had to be trained to read the “regimes of signification”
, within it (Shields 78). Situationist theory was the lens with which one could see the city
i
t
I-  ..................... ;-------------------  ----------------------------------------
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
72
for what it was. In many ways, however, we are ahead of ourselves, for all this discourse 
on vision amounts to very little if  the object in question is scarcely observed in its 
entirety. Many live in urban areas, but rarely do we experience the total scope of the city, 
let alone a fraction of it. Chombart de Lauve conducted a study which charted the 
narrowness of a person’s experience in an urban environment, fixating on a student who 
never deviated from her triangular path of the School of Political Sciences, her residence, 
and the home of her piano teacher (Knabb 50); the majority of us, the SI argued, resemble 
this Paris student. In One-Way Street, Benjamin recounts how a neighbourhood -  which 
he previously ignored - came alive after a friend moved into the area. He writes: “A 
highly embroiled quarter, a network of streets that I had avoided for years, was 
disentangled at a single stroke when one day a person dear to me moved there. It was as if 
a searchlight set up at this person’s window dissected the area with pencils of light” (One- 
Way 69). As it was with Benjamin, so it is with us: if  we open our eyes to the city, the city 
will open itself to us. This appeal to the empirical constitutes the cornerstone of the 
situationist derive.
Conversations regarding this derive or “drift” first took place when Debord was 
heading the Letterist International, and stem from his strong belief in practice over theory. 
More a sociologist than a theorist, Debord is reported as saying: “We didn’t seek the 
formula for changing the world in books but by wandering” (Jappe 45). The word 
‘wandering’ is slightly misleading, since it denotes an aimlessness with which the derive 
certainly could not be characterised. On the contrary, the drift through the urban 
environment was intentional. As one cuts a swath through the city, one “measures the 
distances that effectively separate two regions of a city, distances that may have little 
relation with the physical distance between them” (Knabb 53). Simply put, the idea was
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to measure the economic distances within the city by walking through parts of i t  That 
modest goal, as the idea of the drift passed from the situationists themselves to scholars 
writing about the SI, was somehow misconstrued, and the derive was transformed into 
something entirely different.
Despite its seeming straightforward appearance, many misconceptions surround 
the derive. Some have seen die derive as a new kind of flanerie and the situationist as a 
flaneur for the twentieth century (Sadler 56). Both figures, Sadler continues, skirt “the old 
quarters of the city in order to experience the flip side of modernization” (56). Solnit also 
draws a similar comparison between the two, but scoffs at DeboTd’s attempt to present die 
derive as something new and radical (212). In no way, however, does Debord make such 
an outrageous claim -  the surrealist strolls through the city were too well-known for the 
SI to claim ownership over walking (if that is even possible) or pass it off as something 
intrinsic (and novel) to their movement. The connection between the drifter and the 
flaneur is in itself dubious, for a gulf separates the two. The flaneur’s task was to link the 
seemingly disparate (crowds with goods); the drifter was concerned with exposing the 
inequalities of capital. A more glaring error, however, is the suggestion that the derive 
was somehow aimless, a claim that Wollen, Shields, and Highmore all make.19 To 
describe the situationist drift in such a fashion was -  there is no other explanation - poor 
scholarship. In sharp contrast, the surrealist walks were certainly aimless, for Aragon, 
Breton, and the others were governed solely by “whim and desire” as they strolled 
through the streets of Paris (Plant 50). Their urban walks were not unlike their practice of 
automatic writing. The surrealists would put pen to paper and write for long stretches, 
feverishly scribbling down random and incoherent thoughts in an attempt to tap into the 
unconscious; their strolls were much the same: they kept walking until the city’s
I  ..........................................................
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unconscious was penetrated. In defining a derive, Debord begins by telling his readers 
what it is not. The situationists, he writes, see these surrealist strolls for what they truly 
were: “dismal failures” (Knabb 51). For the subordination to the random, which was so 
characteristic of the surrealist walks, was entirely unproductive when one’s desire was to 
search out the material proof of capital’s lie.20 The surrealists, in short, relied on the 
accidental, but the situationist drift, which was more scientific than spontaneous, left little 
room for chance.
In his 1956 essay “Theory of the Derive,” Debord explains that during a drift the 
“element of chance is less determinant than one might think” (Knabb 50), which is a 
colossal understatement. The evidence suggests otherwise. The situationists produced 
maps for their drifts, which were extremely detailed. Sections of a map of Paris were 
enlarged to make room for notes and a host of arrows connected certain streets and 
neighbourhoods with other parts of the city.21 The maps hint at how precise and 
premeditated these walks really were, but the fact that a number of derives were limited to 
a single neighbourhood or block (or even a static derive in a train station) demonstrates 
beyond a doubt that the situationists left little opportunity to chance. In point of fact, with 
all its calculations the derive resembled something of a science. The SI worked out the
ideal duration and amount of people for a successful derive, which varied in different
00cases. With such precision, all thoughts of an aimless stroll had to be jettisoned in 
favour of something more accurate. If one merely wandered through the city (s)he might 
experience the urban, but by no means was an understanding of that environment 
guaranteed. The situationists, by transforming walking into a science, strove for some 
kind of objectivity which would transcend the inner experience of the surrealist stroll.
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By burrowing themselves in the deeply subjective, the surrealists placed more 
importance on the internal than on the external. Certainly the derive had subjective 
elements to it -  the situationists were concerned with the atmospheric effects of certain 
urban environments on individuals -  but it was with a view to formulating some objective 
truths. For the modem city was, for a large part, under-theorised, and the derive stood as 
the countermeasure to this problem. The drifter explores the connection between the 
individual and his/her surroundings, instead of seeing the relationship between the two as 
something merely given. When capital grows in strength and stature -  to the point where 
it is a totalising force -  nothing remains given. All must be explored, even something as 
seemingly benign as one’s city. Behind its innocent fa?ade lies the deliberate use of 
space, of zoning, of turning a blind eye to dilapidated areas while improving affluent 
areas with parks and tree-lined boulevards. City-planning is no haphazard endeavour, but 
is, on the other hand, highly sophisticated, involving a keen understanding of how an 
urban population can be shaped through its environs. In Society o f the Spectacle, Debord 
moves from the topic of consciousness to the issue of the urban with relative ease, which 
comes as no surprise to his readers. The two are not separate. The very materiality of the 
city, he argues, prevents (revolutionary) consciousness from emerging. Some could 
suggest that Debord is more a conspiracy theorist than a theorist -  for how could city 
planners the world over arrange municipal space in a consistently ideological way? -  but 
such a charge evaporates when his work is given a context. While most Marxists were 
interested in studying relations of production, Debord and the situationists were traversing 
uncharted territory, looking beyond production to the question of social reproduction. 
They inquired into the preconditions which enabled the relations of production to exist in
f  "" ~ ~
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the first place (The Reader 78). The city, moreover, was where questions of social 
reproduction appeared.
The SI argued that the modem city was divided into a number of different zones: 
work, residence, leisure, etc. These zones are not blended together into a kind of unity, 
but are separated, giving the false impression that life is not at all integrated either. 
Alienation, as such, is not an all-encompassing phenomenon; it is relegated, as doctrinaire 
Marxists would have it, to the workplace. As work is separated from home and leisure in 
terms of the cityscape, so it is in life: the material boundaries reify the immaterial 
boundaries. The suburbs exemplify this rigid division of work life and home life. 
Historically, they were created to diffuse revolutionary energy. Debord writes: “After the 
experience of the French Revolution, the efforts of all established powers to increase the 
means of maintaining order in the streets finally culminates in the suppression of the 
street” (172). The urban conditions of production drew a mass of workers together, which 
in volatile times, like 1871, led to imminent unrest. The suburbs atomize that dangerous 
force through a “general movement of isolation” (172), dispelling the workers to their 
own separate homes on the outskirts of the city. Now, however, the suburbs represent 
something a little more insidious: they give the lie to the notion that life is separated from 
production (traffic circulation makes this illusion possible).24 The result of this strict 
division is devastating, for it breeds complacency; workers can go to their homes satisfied 
that there is respite (and some distance) from their work, and can sleep well knowing that 
in all societies labour is a fact of existence, but in the present age only forty hours of work 
have to be performed in a given week. As car culture grew and the suburban home 
became more and more appealing, alienation was tolerated (discontent was left at the 
workplace), and any longing for a unity o f existence had eroded.
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The derive is certainly intended as an exploration of this division between zones 
(and a shattering of the ideology behind this separation) but there is a more practical 
reason for this discourse on drifting. There is a sense of urgency to the situantionists’ 
essays and publications, which, given the speed with which France was transforming after 
World War Two, had to do with a desire to seize hold of the city before it was too late. 
The SI was not a group of nostalgics. They did not urge others to walk through Paris 
because parts of it -  like the old Ville de Paris -  would not survive the postwar 
redevelopment of the city. The 1950s and 1960s saw France turn from a predominantly 
rural nation to an industrialised, urban one. French society, notes Highmore, experienced 
a period of hypermodemisation unrivalled by any other western country (Everyday Life 
130-32). Towns in war-torn provinces were rebuilt, and the capital city, as De Gaulle 
wished for its rise to European prominence, received massive renovations. As entire 
sections of the city were demolished and old buildings razed to make way for new ones, 
Paris was growing increasingly homogenised. One neighbourhood looked identical to 
another, and those sites which distinguished different areas, like the old marketplace in 
Les Hailes, were paved over to make room for shopping complexes. Gone were those 
“spaces of different temporalities [and those] outmoded spaces with distinct cultural 
characteristics” (Everyday Life 141). But as those spaces were bulldozed over, the ability 
to see the disparities and the unevenness of capitalist development grew considerably 
less.25 Highmore claims that the city “that evidences dereliction and decay alongside 
glamour and wealth is a city that can rupture the false historicism of modernity, a 
revelation that can awaken us from the dream of commodification” (Everyday Life 141). 
The juxtaposition of class was what the derive was intended to exploit, but the ‘new’
Paris left little room for such stark contrasts. Paris was socially-structured,26 and was
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certainly hierarchical,27 but that was quickly changing. Understood in this light, the drift 
through the city was absolutely critical, for the situationists had to capture capitalism’s 
blemishes before they were covered up. The homogeneity of Paris, however, did not 
simply threaten to mask disparities; it also deprived the city of its character, its 
uniqueness, and its charm. When the city lost its three hundred year-old wine market - so 
that the University of Paris could erect a new building for its Faculty of Sciences -  it was 
not the old story of art versus science. Instead, the splendour of the old was replaced by 
the sterility of the new.
The dty exerts a tremendous power over the individual, which is something 
Dickens already observed in Hard Times. His tale of Louisa Gradgrind’s struggle against 
Victorian pragmatism and utilitarianism opens with a description of a bleak industrial 
backdrop:
It was a town of red brick, or of brick that would have been red if the 
smoke and ashes had allowed it [...]. It was a town of machinery and 
tall chimneys, out of which interminable serpents of smoke trailed 
themselves for ever and ever, and never got uncoiled. It had a black 
canal in it, and a river that ran puiple with ill-smelling dye, and vast 
piles of buildings full of windows where there was a rattling and a 
trembling all day long, and where the piston of the steam-engine 
worked monotonously up and down, like the head of an elephant in a 
state of melancholy madness. It contained several large streets all very 
like one another, [...] inhabited by people equally like one another, 
who all went in and out at the same hours, with the same sound upon 
the same pavements, to do the same work, and to whom every day was 
the same as yesterday and tomorrow [...]. (Dickens 28)
This place is aptly named Coketown, but Dickens did not have to resort to the fictional,
for many urban centres in nineteenth-century England would have sufficed. The lack of
colour in the cityscape -  the red of the brick was covered over by the black residue of
pollution and there was little in the way of vegetation or trees -  matched the grey in
people’s lives. This perfect congruence between the external and the internal was no mere
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coincidence; the individual corresponded to his/her surroundings since, in the author’s 
view, the latter shapes the former. Underneath the story of the Gradgrind family lies a 
subtle reflection on the relationship between environment and human subjectivity, and 
Dickens concludes that the industrialised landscape acts as a kind of incubator for the 
factory worker. In this dreary town it was as “though every house put out a sign of the 
kind of people who might be expected to be bom in it” (Dickens 68). The narrator can 
describe these people only generically: they are called “the Hands.” The materiality of 
Coketown prepares the individual for the production process. The gloom that hovers over 
the city gives one little hope for something better, and the sameness of the streets and 
houses eradicates any concept of the individual: the townspeople are all factory hands, 
which is their shared fate and their only reality. Hard Times is a novel which gets lost 
amid some of Dickens’s more polished works -  like Great Expectations -  but his writing 
on the close relationship between the city and its inhabitants is to be celebrated for what it 
accomplishes: it breaks new ground. In the following century figures like Simmel, 
Lefebvre, and Debord only began to scratch the surface of the issues that Dickens had 
raised, and yet, despite their efforts, the urban question remained largely ignored. If the 
city did indeed affect the individual’s emotions and desires, it was of little concern to 
most people outside of sociology and geography departments. But as masses of people 
flocked from the countryside into metropolitan areas after World War Two, as they did in 
France, this urban question grew more and more vital.
The city does more than affect the individual: manipulation occurs in the most 
subtle of ways, from “the width of streets, [to] the heights of buildings, the presence of 
trees, advertisements and lights, the circulation of traffic, the colours of front doors, and 
the shapes of windows” (Plant 57). The relationship between the material and the
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subjective is, as Plant suggests, highly complex, which is perhaps why the derive was 
mapped out and not spontaneous: an understanding of how urban phenomena shape the 
city dweller demanded a deliberate and systematic approach. The SI premised their drifts 
through Paris on the science of psychogeography, which they defined as “the study of the 
precise laws and specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organized 
or not, on the emotions and behavior of individuals” (Knabb 5). The drift in no way 
resembled a simple stroll through the streets, for it distinguishes itself “from the classical 
notions of the journey” (Knabb 50); as the situationists phrased it: the derive was a 
“technique of locomotion without a goal” (Plant 58). The intent was not to travel -  to 
move from one point to another - since what mattered most was not the destination but 
what occurred along the way. Putting the theory into practice, the derive was the principal 
means to explore how “certain areas, streets, or buildings resonate with states of mind, 
inclinations and desires” (Plant 59). At its most basic, the derive measured disparities and 
revealed hierarchies in the hopes of drawing out a proletarian consciousness, yet as these 
inequalities became less obvious (through the homogenisation of the postwar city), the 
focus of the drift shifted; it gained in complexity. Instead of proving that cities were 
socially-structured, the situationists inquired into the effect of such structuring. Their 
work on the suburbs -  as the false separation between work and home -  points to this 
change in concerns, although it only represents a beginning. The SI knew that the city’s 
materiality conditioned its residents; the derive, with its psychogeographic emphasis on 
mood, behaviour, and desire, was an exploration into how it did so. Coketown’s bleak 
atmosphere, characterised by the smokestacks and uniform streets, produced despair and 
compliance among its townspeople. In a similar way, the aesthetic of 1960s Paris 
conditioned its residents. De Gaulle envisioned a glorious city which would have no
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European rival, yet the redevelopment did little more than drain his capital of its charm 
and character. Such a sterile environment, it seemed, would have a devastating effect on 
the inhabitants of Paris.
During the first two decades after the second continental war, Paris underwent a 
massive “stylistic revolution,” the scale of which was matched only by the transformation 
of the city during the time of the Renaissance (Sadler 11). The word ‘stylistic,’ however, 
is used liberally, for “modernism’s functionalist and rationalist tentacles” squeezed all the 
life and beauty out of Paris (Sadler 11). Of course Sadler’s claim is an exaggeration -  
there are many who would argue that Paris still retained its brilliance -  but for the 
residents who witnessed the redevelopment firsthand, the city’s charm evaporated at the 
moment the bulldozers and demolition crews appeared on the scene. Areas like the old 
Ville de Paris, despite its cultural heritage, did not survive the restructuring. Here utility’s 
sovereignty was assured, but Debord comforted his readers with the assurance that this 
allegiance to function was nothing new. He writes: “The notion of utilitariness should be 
situated historically. The concern to have open spaces allowing for the rapid circulation of 
troops and the use of artillery against insurrections was at the origin of the urban renewal 
plan adopted by the Second Empire” (Knabb 5). Debord points to Baron Haussmann, the 
figure who had demolished arcades and run-down neighbourhoods in the previous 
century, to suggest that utility had long been established as having more worth than 
culture or character. To lose historical landmarks was just collateral damage in the pursuit 
of progress. The inhabitants of Paris could do little in the face of this redevelopment, but 
the situationists argued that, at the very least, they should not be so naive as to think that 
such renovations were in any way neutral, which is perhaps why Debord alludes to
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Haussmann: Napoleon III employed him, first and foremost, for the purposes of police 
control.28
There is a blackmail of utility, wnte Kotanyi and Vaneigem, “which hides the fact 
that architecture and conditioning are really useful only in reinforcing reification. Modem 
capitalism dissuades people from making any criticism of architecture with the simple 
argument that they need a roof over their heads” (Knabb 65). In the 1960s functionalism 
was the order of the day, but necessity did not dictate that it be so. The SI urged its 
readers to, at all costs, remain sceptical. We accept architecture as given because we 
cannot live under the open sky.29 Likewise, we blindly place television sets in our homes 
“on the grounds that [we] need information and entertainment” (Knabb 65). The analogy 
works because city-planning and television programming are both ideological, both part 
of the spectacle. Once we recognise them as such, we will no longer overlook “the 
obvious fact that this information, this entertainment and this kind of dwelling place are 
not made for [us], but without [us] and against [us]” (Knabb 66). The concept of the 
spectacle - which functions as a lens - allows us to look through the complexities of 
modem existence and locate the real, which exists beyond the ‘real.’ For once we see 
urbanism for what it actually is, we will rightfully observe that the city reinforces 
reification, that it is divided into various zonesj that it is hierarchical. Furthermore, once 
we understand that the city is spectacular, we can see through functionalism’s facade; 
instead o f examining how the city establishes hierarchies and reifies social relations, we 
can study why it does so, which, during the period of the Paris redevelopment, was the 
more pressing of the two questions.
The situationists, however, did not have to work too hard to find an answer. In 
point of fact it was quite simple: “A functionalist environment,” they argued, “bred
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functionalist behavior*’ (Sadler 157). If there is any insight in Dickens’ portrait of 
industrial England, it is contained in his observation that human beings internalise their 
environment. The derive seemed to verify such an observation, for as the situationists 
walked through Paris, they grew to understand how the internal reflects the external, that 
a process not dissimilar to osmosis occurs as one cuts through the urban fabric. As the 
less concentrated solution passes through a porous partition to the more concentrated 
solution until equilibrium is reached, so a balance exists in the city-dweller between the 
inner self and the outer environment. The city drains into the individual, which is a 
process we already glimpsed in Benjamin’s study of nineteenth-century Paris. The city’s 
arcades, over time, helped create a consumer class by dazzling the alienated mass into a 
state of submission. Likewise, when one encountered a functionalist aesthetic, the same 
result occurred: the aesthetic was inevitably internalised. As a principle, functionalism 
obeys the logic of the miser; it spends only what is absolutely necessary and clings onto 
the rest. Functionalism hangs a price tag on beauty and then dismisses it as too expensive. 
In short, aesthetic appreciation is bad for the profit margin. Yet when residents saw their 
old neighbourhoods replaced with slabs of concrete, there was no outcry. They quietly 
surrendered to the logic behind such drabness and bought apartments in these new 
buildings, rented space in the new office towers, and frequented the new shopping malls. 
The situationists interpreted the complacency in which Parisians took to their city’s 
reconstruction as a resignation with not just their environment, but with modem existence 
in general. The attitude, especially in sharp contrast to the unrest in the previous two 
centuries, was defeatist in tone; it almost seemed mathematical: no magic equals no hope, 
and no hope equals no desire.
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There is a situationist riddle that asks: If dreams spring from reality, but reality 
(the city) does not allow for dreaming, can we still dream? May 1968 seems to solve this 
conundrum, for 1he inhabitants of Paris did not let their sterile surroundings diminish their 
ability to dream. The events of May were an astounding success: it was the largest general 
strike to halt an industrialised nation’s economy, and was the first wildcat general strike 
in history, it was “the complete verification of revolutionary theory” (Knabb 225); and it 
symbolised “the sudden return of the proletariat as a historical class,” which was perhaps 
May’s greatest achievement (Knabb 225). The arcades cloaked the lower classes in 
consumerism, but May 1968 saw them shedding that mantle, en masse. The numbers 
alone were astonishing: on the twentieth of that month, six million workers were on 
strike, and in a matter of days four million more workers joined the others. But was this 
eruption of consciousness based on the materiality of the city? In all likelihood those ten 
million striking workers were not discussing the negative effects of a functionalist 
aesthetic, yet there certainly exists a strange relationship between revolt and materiality in 
the history of Paris.
A little less than a hundred years earlier, Haussmann recruited workers from the 
French countryside to build his boulevards, but things went horribly awry: the influx of 
workers directly allowed for the possibility of the Paris Commune.31 No one would 
suggest that this revolt was a reaction to the urban environment, but one could claim that 
the urban environment did bring the insurrectionists together. In contrast, the uprising at 
the university in Nanterre -  for many the catalyst for May 1968 - was inextricably linked 
to the city, through die functionalism of Nanterre’s buildings. In the early months of that 
year a group of students, along with a handful of artists, held protest meetings and 
occupied a number of buildings on campus. Their motivation was not grandiose (like a
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general despair over modernity), but was a reaction to the alienation they felt was a by­
product of the campus and its immediate surroundings. The university was situated in one 
of the poorest areas in the western part of Paris, and the campus consisted of “functional 
buildings that [were] utterly devoid of character” (Shields 16). Yet despite its drab and 
colourless aesthetic, the university still stood as a symbol of privilege amidst a 
neighbourhood full of decay and hardship, and it was this contrast between wealth and 
poverty which prompted the students to act. Soon the frenzy at Nanterre spread to other 
campuses, including the prestigious Sorbonne, and with the student populace 
demonstrating in the streets, the workers broke free from the influence of the trade unions 
and the PCF (who urged the workers to remain compliant and moderate) and took to the 
streets themselves.32
The SI did not view the students as forerunners, but they did not see themselves as 
occupying the role of vanguard either. The situationists were invited to the occupations 
meetings at the Sorbonne and other schools where they spoke, handed out pamphlets, and 
bestowed their audiences with slogans which later appeared as graffiti on Paris walls and 
buildings. Yet to insist on a vanguard would detract from the magnitude of 1968, which 
in the eyes of Debord and others was nothing short of the emergence of a pure proletarian 
consciousness. A clarification, however, is required: one must distinguish between urban 
awareness and class awareness. Did 1968 have anything to do with the city? No, it was 
more a result of momentum and a chain of events unfolding in rapid succession than 
anything else; May was the Vesuvius of consciousness -  a massive eruption -  completely 
unrelated to the city, but at the same time the urban lurks in the background because the 
city’s materiality brought about the conditions for the disappearance and reappearance of 
consciousness. The arcades caused the proletariat to lose sight of itself and the social
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structuring within the city caused the working class to internalise the hierarchy so 
characteristic of capitalist societies. Furthermore, the postwar reconstruction made this 
hierarchy palatable. The destruction of the arcade passageways -  so as to widen city 
thoroughfares -  allowed for an expansion of consciousness: a giant derive as thousands 
upon thousands of demonstrators took to the streets. In a tidy way things came full circle, 
for the allegorical stroll of the flaneur began on the crowded streets of Paris and 
concluded in its arcades; the surrealist walks, metaphorically, never left the arcades as 
desire prevented them from leaving, and in 1968 the streets were overcrowded once 
again. This time, however, the streets were not peopled with an alienated mass but were 
filled with a procession of people alive to their world. These drifters were not the 
somnambulists of Baudelaire’s or even Benjamin’s day; they were, in contrast, a people 
fully awake and fully conscious.
I The death of the arcades, a little less than a century after Haussman, literally
paved the way for the communal derive through Paris; here intention met its goal and the 
derive fulfilled its purpose: it led to a mass awakening. For the state, 1968 was certainly 
disastrous, but for the SI it was entirely encouraging, even if it proved them wrong. They 
mistakenly believed that if  the conditions for dreaming were eliminated, change would 
not come about. Between the work of both Haussmann and De Gaulle, these conditions 
were almost wiped out by a functionalist aesthetic, but the effects of dreaming occurred 
nonetheless. May 1968 may have been a deception of sorts, something akin to an “Indian
| Summer” as Jappe puts it (146), since that explosion of awareness did not last. The month 
of May was merely “a paroxystic expansion and subsequent collapse of consciousness” 
(Wollen 150), and thus the Left could scarcely rest on its laurels. On the other hand, they 
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very quickly, fizzled out. The situationists could take comfort in this truth: that once the 
spectacle is shattered, something tremendous can take place. The world observed this 
truth before in a town in California, three years before the events of 1968.
In the lower-income suburb of Los Angeles, in a town called Watts, the residents 
rioted for four days in the middle of August. Some have presented the rebellion in gross 
caricature: African-Americans looting stores, but the SI took a more sophisticated view of 
things. What occurred in August 13-16 in 1965, they write, was a “rebellion against the 
commodity, against the world of the commodity in which the worker-consumers are 
hierarchically subordinated to commodity values” (Knabb 155). Understood in this light, 
the word ‘looting’ cannot fully begin to describe the Watts rebellion and, in fact, 
characterises it in a negative way. For the residents did not merely appropriate what was 
not theirs; instead they took literally the spectacle’s “publicity of abundance,” and 
scrambled to take all that they could gain possession of. The motivation was not 
covetousness, however, since they destroyed whatever goods they initially stole. The 
spectacle gives the lie that happiness is mediated through goods; the residents of Watts, 
by emptying stores of their goods, only to set fire to them or dash them to pieces, revealed 
their deep mistrust of a commodified existence. In short, they declared war on the 
spectacle, refusing to believe that the accumulation of ‘stuff would ever truly satisfy. 
Above all else, Watts demonstrated that the spectacle -  once punctured -  would 
eventually collapse by folding in on itself. The derive obeys this logic. The drift through 
the urban environment was always intended as a means of rupturing the false image of a 
progressive and egalitarian society. At its most basic, the purpose of the drift was to 
expose societal inequalities through the urban fabric; on a deeper level the derive was a 
means to understand how social structuring -  through the very material of the city -
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caused people to grow complacent. The degree to which this complacency spread 
throughout the working class, infecting this populace with resignation, made for a 
particularly bleak picture, but there was hope, which was glimpsed in 1965 in a suburb of 
Los Angeles and again three years later in the streets of Paris. There was a good chance, 
the SI argued, that hope would be glimpsed once again. There is, however, a 
precondition: that, like the townspeople of Watts, we want more than what the spectacle 
offers. The situationists appropriated a surrealist slogan which, in turn, a 1968 
demonstrator wrote on a Paris wall with a can of spray paint; it reads: “I take my desires 
for reality because I believe in the reality of my desires” (Wollen 136).33 By succumbing 
to their own desires, the surrealists ended up straying from reality, but the call was to 
inject desire into reality (fusing the two together, yet never fleeing the dictates of the 
real). May 1968 gave the proof of the success of such a programme: ten million workers 
cried out and a million of them took to the streets of Paris (Plant 99). They desired more 
than what the modem age provided.
‘Desire,’ at least in the preceding chapter, was a slippery word, denoting a 
withdrawal (either slight or substantial depending on one’s view of the surrealists) from 
the real world. In situationist hands, however, this word signals a longing for something 
far better than the poverty of our present age. To desire, then, is to be driven to change. 
The first step towards change begins with an understanding that the spectacle is not a veil 
draped over reality; the spectacle is a distortion of the real. Sadler claims that the result of 
drifting is a “flowering of consciousness” (98). Yet there is a context. Consciousness can 
only come about when the derive opens up a vista. A panorama, or at least a view to the 
panorama, is a necessary precondition for the emergence of consciousness, which is 
something we already observed in Benjamin’s study of Paris. The flaneur stood as the
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single monad in which the (near) totality of capitalist production could be glimpsed. 
Through the fragment of the consumer, the working class could see that it had been 
‘bought-off,’ and that its revolutionary potential withered in the face of the 
phantasmagoria. By the mid-twentieth century, however, the proletariat’s transformation 
into consumers was complete; in addition, capital grew increasingly complex and such a 
shard as the flaneur’s allegorical walk proved incapable of bringing the mosaic into view. 
The spectacle complicated matters considerably and, as a result, a new monad was 
required. The situationists, quite matter-of-factly, argued that if the spectacle was a 
distortion, what was needed was an exploration of this contorted reality. The derive -  on 
one level -  was certainly an act of exploration, for the drifter cuts through the city in the 
hopes of dissecting it. But to suggest that the derive is mere exploration is too simplistic a 
summary: a better word is penetration. Drifting through the urban environment allows 
one to penetrate not just the city, but also capital itself (by targeting its vulnerable spots). 
For the situationists, that entry point into the totality was the issue of inequality, which is 
the first premise of capitalist production and an economic law it cannot deviate from, no 
matter how progressive the society. Capitalism exists through the logic of profit and 
valorisation, and the city -  its poverty and hierarchy - confirms that this iron-clad law 
cannot be overruled. The transformation of the worker into a consumer was an attempt at 
masking class divisions, but the derive acted as the antidote to this deception. According 
to Debord and the situationists, the city is the site where the theoretical meets the 
empirical, and the derive was the means to secure the proof.
The situationists gave a name to the intensification of capital: they called it the 
‘spectacle.’ As a contortion, the spectacle blurs reality. In a world where life is 
experienced second-hand and desire is broadcasted directly into people’s homes, it is
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difficult to make one’s way through the haze. The SI wished to clear the air: to evade the 
spectacle’s many tentacles by fixating on its basic structure. Despite being a total system, 
twentieth-century capitalism still retained its essential shape and, in consequence, could 
be condensed into something tangible. The monad of inequality is the fragment which 
unlocks a vast reality and draws the disparate into a coherent whole. The rest -  the totality 
of capitalist production -  could be inferred from this one shard. More important, the issue 
of inequality answers the one question which had plagued many thinkers, the question of 
revolutionary desire and its disappearance in the West (desire of a kind that led to mass 
events like the French Revolution or the 1848 street-fighting). The drifter -  with this aim 
i in mind -  searches out the city’s poor, locating that class which many believed had
i
disappeared with the rising prosperity of postwar Europe. Over time social unrest was 
quelled because the phantasmagoria had broken down its barriers and, unleashed from the 
arcades, invaded the furthest reaches of people’s lives. In short, the rise of the 
phantasmagoria had replaced a desire for change with a desire for goods. Yet there still 
existed the poor -  the drifter spotted them on his walks -  and despite the restructuring of 
Paris during the 1950s and 1960s, there existed an even greater number of the working 
class which had been disguised by the new aesthetic. The city in this case had concealed a 
. dormant force with the camouflage of ‘prosperity’ but the sheen was wiped away in May
1968 when this force came to the surface. For those areas of obvious class disparity there 
was certainly a set of problems: divisions were reified by the city-dweller as (s)he 
internalised the social hierarchy, settled into place, grew complacent and, if 
disappointment set in, negotiated discontent with the accumulation of commodified 
things. However, the real problem areas -  those sanitised places where class and privilege
i
lay hidden -  had a more daunting set of challenges. The situationists had to expose the
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true nature of capitalist societies by tearing away the facade of the city; behind it stood 
this fact: that there would always be a proletariat, necessarily so, no matter what the 
apologists claimed. Where there is a proletariat, moreover, there is suffering; the city, 
once exposed, testifies to this fact. And where there is suffering there is dreaming.
In Hopeful Monsters, a priest explains to one of the protagonists that “people 
should [...] go about on foot, then there might be time for things to sort themselves out” 
(Mosley 177). The derive is exactly that: as one strolls through the city the urban is 
unraveled. Ivan Chtcheglov writes: “The derive (with its flow of acts, its gestures, its 
strolls, its encounters) was to the totality what psychoanalysis is to language” (Knabb 
372). How does the analyst come to an understanding of the patient: by employing 
psychoanalysis as a kind of strainer-just let the patient keep talking. The derive, 
likewise, employs the same strategy. Keep walking because the drifter will confront the 
totality (and comprehend it to some degree) by drawing upon ideas regarding urbanism 
and psychogeography. The derive is not cognitive, nor is it theoretical; it is entirely 
practical, calling one to pierce the city by walking through it in order to experience 
reification and experience the camouflage of the sanitised city. ‘Experience’ is the 
watchword here, which is not surprising considering how Debord and others looked at the 
USSR, union bureaucrats, and political communists. Consciousness cannot be imputed; it 
must be experienced or felt.34 People do not fight behind barricades or march through the 
streets because they cognitively accept change. They do so because they fee l a desire to 
force change. The derive is, in the truest sense then, the mapping out of revolutionary 
desire. The arrows on Debord’s meticulously mapped out routes, connecting certain 
neighbourhoods with others by way of specific streets and avenues, are metaphoric of the 
precision in which the SI sought to draw out a dormant consciousness. These arrows,
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moreover, delineated a pathway to a felt desire to change life, a pathway that crisscrossed 
through lower income areas into renovated, functionalist districts of Paris, past Nanterre 
and the Sorbonne and onto the wide boulevards where thousands upon thousands of 
Parisians expressed their desire by marching in solidarity. But, it needs to be asked, is the 
derive really an allegory?
There is no real allegory of walking, and certainly not with either the situationists 
or the surrealists. Perhaps the flaneur’s walk is genuinely allegorical, but that fragile 
allegory was supported by two sentences in a book that spans a thousand pages: “The 
gaze of the allegorist, as it falls on the city, is the gaze of the alienated man. It is the gaze 
of the flaneur, whose way of life still conceals behind a mitigating nimbus the coming 
desolation of the big-city dweller” (Arcades 10). To extract an allegory of walking out of 
these two sentences is an act of deception -  a fiction -  but it remains true to the spirit of 
Benjamin’s methodology: that a single fragment can unlock an entirety and render it 
perceptible. The allegory, then, helps explain how consciousness undulates, withering 
with consumerism (Benjamin), sinking with desire (the surrealists) and re-emerging in 
May 1968 (the situationists). At the end of his Trauerspiel book Benjamin declares: 
“Allegory goes away empty-handed” {Origin 233). The same could be said of this study. 
Allegories of walking are myths, but walking behaves as one in that a totality is brought 
into view by way of its allegorical form. The flaneur’s walk abbreviates a total world by 
linking the alienated crowd with the arcades, and the deriver abbreviates the complexity 
of twentieth-century capital by simplifying it with the single notion of inequality (and its 
disguise). The surrealist stroll, on the other hand, abbreviates only half a world, the world 
of commodity fetishism (the dangling canes in the storefront window), and as a 
consequence die totality can not be glimpsed. This failure, however, is scarcely that, for it
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alerts us to the symbiosis of totality and consciousness: the two imply each other. 
Benjamin’s attempt at unearthing a revolutionary consciousness began with an 
understanding that phantasmagoric distraction had blinded the lower classes to the source 
of their alienation, hence the allegorical walk of the flaneur which conjoins the seemingly 
disparate and, at the same time, approximates the totality of capitalism. The situationist 
drift also condenses the whole by targeting inequality, thereby waking the proletarian 
population from its spectacular sleep. In contrast, the surrealists never, metaphorically 
speaking, left the arcades, and with only half a vision of the totality their project faltered. 
The narrative which threads together Walter Benjamin, Louis Aragon, and Guy Debord 
demonstrates that consciousness can only emerge with a comprehension of totality. The 
allegorical shard provides for this insight.
Like one who sits in a confession booth, more than a single sin must be admitted. 
The entire notion of allegories of walking was fictive, yet there is more to be confessed. 
Earlier, in the introduction of the essay, it was stated that the allegory brings the past into 
view, but that was a lie as well. The claim was made to convince readers to embrace the 
allegory for its ability to preserve the past, but the intention was for readers to embrace 
the monadic properties of the allegory instead. The distinction between the two is 
significant. According to what was stated in the introduction, the past cannot be fully 
revisited but, by condensing a bygone reality into a fragment, it can be preserved. The 
city walker, whether a flaneur, a surrealist stroller, or a drifter (it makes no difference), 
pulls that distant reality into the present. We will, for example, never set our eyes on the 
Passage de l’Opera and we will never see the Paris that existed before Haussmann and De 
Gaulle, but the allegorical walker will not, in truth, magically contain this world within 
itself. Nor does this figure have to, for the real concern is not with the preservation of the
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past but rather with an ability to discern a world and come to understand it. The allegory 
as monad provides a window into a vast world, enabling us to see the entirety in 
miniature. Since the whole is condensed into the singular, we do not have to strive to 
accomplish the impossible: we do not have to take in the foil mosaic in one glance. This 
negotiation of the singular and the whole, the monad and the totality, is of interest, for 
during the one hundred and twenty years o f Paris life - from the barricades of 1848 to the 
demonstrators of 1968 - the issue of sight has been lurking in the shadows. Revolutionary 
consciousness dissipated in a city rife with a history of social unrest because people did 
not see the entire panorama. The allegory explains how totality and consciousness are 
interconnected. The concern with condensing a past world was merely a garden path.
One final question remains. Are oscillations of revolutionary consciousness really 
tied to a notion of the totality? Certainly the masses do not need to have an orthodox 
understanding of the totality, but if the proletarian populace cannot recognise itself as 
such, then unrest dissipates. The idea of totality holds up a mirror to the working class, 
revealing that they are disguised (Benjamin’s consumer) and have internalised the 
hierarchy (the reification of Debord’s city dweller); the tiny fragment that contains the 
entirety can, however, initiate change. In the nineteenth century, the immaturity of the 
production process was transparent. The existence of the lower classes was given, 
disparities were obvious, and revolutionary desires were very real. As the production 
process matured, growing in complexity, a monad was needed to pave the way for desire 
and change. Unfortunately this paper ends in a kind of cul-de-sac, since history tells us 
that the fervour of May 1968 rapidly faded. In point of fact, ‘revolution’ is so far from 
memory that its connotations are negligible. Plant observes that only a little while ago 
French society was on the brink of revolution (31), but now the “foe word ‘revolutionary’
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has been neutralised to the point of being used in advertising to describe the slightest 
change in an ever-changing commodity production” (77). This dead-end is really just an 
illusion though, for the concerns in this paper are not of a prescriptive nature; the topic is 
method, not emancipation. This paper is a treatise on induction and physiognomy, and, if 
it posits anything at all it is this: that there is much truth contained in Poe’s “The Murders 
in the Rue Morgue.” Unable to take in the whole in its entirety, we must select the proper 
fragments from which we can come to understand our reality.




1 Deborah Madsen notes that for Benjamin, “allegory represents the antithesis of symbolism” (122). The 
allegory is a “less mystified method of figuration” because it makes plain its rhetorical movements (122). 
Simon Brittan contextualises Madsen’s remarks by returning to German symbolism, which was the 
framework for Benjamin’s study of the seventeenth-century Baroque. In Werke, which Brittan quotes from, 
Goethe sketches the essential difference between allegory and symbol: “Symbolism transforms the 
experience into an idea and an idea into an image, so that the idea expressed through the image remains 
always active and unattainable [...]” (Brittan 170). Allegory, however, “transforms experience into a 
concept and a concept into an image, but so that the concept remains always defined and expressible by the 
image” (Goethe quoted in Brittan 170). What appears as a deficiency in allegory is in actuality its most 
cherished feature: the allegory is not open like the symbol and, as a result, maintains a level of objectivity 
that the symbol cannot attain.
2 ‘Worlds’ is a word pluralised for a reason: the allegory-as-monad reveals two distinct worlds. Consider 
Bunyan’s Pilgrim’s Progress. The allegory of walking (or pilgrimage) condenses the entire narrative into 
the single image of Christian’s walk from his humble beginnings as “Graceless” through to his journey’s 
end at the gates of heaven, the “Celestial City.” Everything contained in the story is absorbed by the 
allegory -  the characters, the various settings, the unfolding of the plot, etc. are all held fast by the 
allegorical walk of the Christian. The walk, in short, encapsulates the entire tale, or rather, the entire tale is 
encapsulated by the image of the walk. But the allegory condenses more than the internal reality of the text; 
Pilgrim's Progress also reveals the world in which it was composed: Restoration England. During that time 
religious freedom was scarce, class antagonism was surfacing, and the nation was tom between self- 
government and royal absolutism. Bunyan’s England was a place of religious and political instability, and 
Christian’s walk offers the reader a view to the text’s external reality of dissenting churches, Restoration 
nonconformist policies, and religious persecution. Bunyan spent one-third of his adult life in prison (twelve 
to thirteen years) for leading a separatist congregation. In that time he wrote Pilgrim’s Progress, and this 
world seeps into his allegory, in both the general theme -  the believer’s walk is an arduous one -  and in the 
particulars like characters and setting. At one point in the narrative Christian visits the Palace Beautiful 
where he is given a sword and armour. For many scholars this palace represents the illegal separatist 
congregation which equips the believer with the armour of God and the sword of the Spirit (Ephesians 6: 
lOff). The state church, by inference, is incapable of bestowing gifts upon believers, and, in point of fact, 
represents the enemy of the true believer. Shortly after Christian is given the sword and armour he is 
confronted by Apollyon and is forced into combat against him. The passage follows the chivalric model but 
the language contained in this episode suggests a deeper meaning: Apollyon wants to claim Christian as his 
“subject” just as the Anglicans tried to coerce separatists to join the established church. Bunyan infuses the 
religious with the political here, and although this cursory look at Pilgrim’s Progress is exactly that 
(nothing more than a sketch), one can still observe how seventeenth-century life drains into the allegory. 
Christopher Hill suggests that “allegory was traditionally a way of circumventing the censor” (201), which 
only helps to support the claim that the allegory contains within itself an external reality. For the real world 
is certainly present in Bunyan’s book: it lies under a publishable facade. Underneath the generic 
conventions of romance literature resides a defense of non-conformist faith and its practice (Reading 
Dissenting Writing 129). The allegory provides a view to two distinct worlds, but when we move from 
Bunyan to Benjamin, Aragon, and Debord, our concern with the first world quickly fades. For the monadic 
allegory provides an understanding of the inner reality of their texts, but allegory’s potency rests in its 
ability to open up an outside reality. With Bunyan this world was one in which church and state towered 
over the believer with immense power and authority; with Benjamin, Aragon, and Debord the external 
world was one rich in revolutionary history but poor in revolutionary consciousness. The flaneur, the 
stroller, and the drifter condense this world and, in the process, render it perceptible.
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From Chapter Two:
I For the introduction of price tags, and the further alienation of buyer and seller, see Highmore The 
Everyday Life Reader (26).
'  Unless one barters one good for another, money of course mediates exchange, but the fixed or non- 
negotiable price, denoted by the price tag, suggests that money, not goods, takes centre stage.
3 The arcade roof, at this point in time, was made of wood {The Arcades Project 32).
4 Gas lighting, introduced during the days of Napoleon III, enabled storeowners to stay open until well 
beyond the evening hours. Stores usually stayed open until ten o’clock at night (Charles Baudelaire: A 
Lyric Poet 50).
5 Ben Highmore is the author of Everyday Life and Cultural Theory: An Introduction and editor of The 
Everyday Life Reader. To avoid confhsion, die shorthand Everyday Life refers to the former, The Reader 
refers to the latter.
6 The term applied specifically to commodities is found first in Marx, but has since proliferated among later 
writers.
7 Baudelaire’s Prose Poems (67). For more on the use of mirrors in the arcade shops, see Benjamin’s 
Arcades Project (537-8), where he suggests that mirrors provide the smaller shop with an artificial 
expansion, giving the illusion that the storeowner has an abundance of merchandise.
8 The term as understood in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts where alienation is presented as 
three-pronged: alienation from nature, from life-activity, and from fellow man.
9 The reflection of the base in the superstructure -  for our purposes the expression of the economy in the 
crowd -  was taken quite literally by some. Georg Simmel saw economic conditions as having a direct 
bearing on the individual’s inability to communicate with others. In “The Metropolis and Mental Life” he 
writes: “For the division of labor demands from the individual an ever more one-sided accomplishment, and 
the greatest advance in one-sided pursuit only too frequently means dearth to the personality of the 
individual” (422). In Simmel’s view the individual is “reduced to a negligible quantity,” so much so in fact 
that (s)he cannot even relate similar experiences to others. The crowd, then, is die explanation of such 
failure -  a throng which should be united, but remains divided. Poe’s “The Man of the Crowd” is perhaps a 
better example of the near-perfect reflection of the base in the crowd. Poe’s jostling London crowds, as 
Benjamin reads them, mimic the abrupt movements of machine production. He states that the pedestrians 
“act as if they had adapted themselves to the machines and could express themselves only automatically” 
{Illuminations 176). In A Lyric Poet Benjamin expands on his analysis, suggesting that the reflex actions of 
the crowd -  they all jostle each other and then bow profusely to the jostling culprits -  are completely 
similar. The significance is that Poe “does not show the hopeless isolation of men in their private interests 
through the variety of their behaviour [...] but expresses this isolation in absurd” uniformity {Lyric Poet 
53). Here Benjamin combines this idea of literal reflection with a more causal understanding of how the 
alienation of crowds results from a specific type of economy.
10 It is mystifying that Benjamin ends his quotation so abruptly, for Engels writes in the very next sentence: 
"The dissolution of mankind into monads ... is here carried out to its utmost extremes" {Unreal City 17). 
Curious that he would exclude such a sentence since it could only buttress his argument The individual is 
likened to a monad, and since a monad acts as a window to the whole, one person is as good as another 
they all express this sense of extreme isolation. To apply the principles of induction to the crowds (to see 
the general through the particular) is to seek solidarity among men and women where before there was only 
division and alienation. Let the one stand in for everyone and his/her singular problems (related to the 
production process) become universalised.
II Simmel suggests that the indifference metropolitans exhibit towards each other may be termed “reserve.” 
Consequently, one could fail to recognise those who have been living next door for many years. Simmel’s 
observation is, no doubt, an exaggeration, but his point is that the skirting eyes of passers-by have reached 
new levels of unfriendliness. This reserve, moreover, runs deep: “This inner aspect of this outer reserve is 
not only indifference but, more often than we are aware, it is a slight aversion, a mutual strangeness and 
repulsion” (Simmel 415-16).
12 The crowd, as mentioned above, was perhaps the best expression of such alienation, but more 
concentrated forms existed elsewhere. Benjamin cites Simmers observation of the dynamics involved in 
taking public transit: "Before the development of buses, railroads, and trams in the nineteenth century,
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people had never been in a position of having to look at one another for long minutes or even hours without 
speaking to one another" (Lyric Poet 38). Here the alienation almost seems stifling, since in a closed 
environment like a bus or railway car, there is no respite from the silence and cold looks.
13 A discovery the poet makes in “The Crowds” (The Prose Poems 44).
14 Growing up among the crowded streets of Paris, Baudelaire had taken the crowd as a fact of existence.
He sees the crowd as a natural phenomenon, and as a result, "it is rare to find a description of [the crowds] 
in [Baudelaire’s] works" (Illuminations 167). Something analogous occurs in Borges’ "The Argentine 
Writer and Tradition." In this piece, the author defends the position that a writer can be patriotic and 
nationalistic without filling the pages of his/her works with local flavours, local parlance, and local themes 
or concerns. He writes: "Some days past I have found a curious confirmation of the fact that what is truly 
native can and often does dispense with local color; 1 found this confirmation in Gibbon's Decline and Fall 
of the Roman Empire. Gibbon observes that in the Arabian book par excellence, in the Koran, there are no 
camels; I believe if there were any doubts as to the authenticity of the Koran, this absence of camels would 
be sufficient to prove it is an Arabian work. It was written by Mohammed, and Mohammed, as an Arab, had 
no reason to know that camels were especially Arabian; for him they were a part of reality, he had no 
reason to emphasize them; on the other hand, the first thing a falsifier, a tourist, an Arab nationalist would 
do is have a surfeit of camels, caravans of camels, on every page; but Mohammed, as an Arab, was 
unconcerned: he knew he could be an Arab without camels. I think we Argentines can emulate Mohammed, 
can believe in the possibility of being Argentine without abounding in color" (181).
15 ‘Phantasmagoria’ is a loaded term for Benjamin, but here it is not a reference to the Parisian arcades. 
Instead it denotes the immateriality of the flaneur, who is scarcely visible in the mass, but stands apart 
nonetheless.
16 Some have seen Baudelaire as a type of flaneur, which is not unreasonable considering that he was a poet 
who took to the streets. Benjamin is careful, however, to suggest that this connection is a false one. The 
flaneur was one who strolled through the streets in a nonchalant manner; Baudelaire did not possess this 
style. Nadar writes: “Baudelaire walked about his quartier of the city at an uneven pace, both nervous and 
languid, like a cat, choosing each stone of the pavement as if he had to avoid crushing an egg” (Arcades 
230). If Nadar’s description is not convincing enough, consider Baudelaire’s poetiy. In “One O’clock in the 
Morning” the poet writes: “Alone at last! Now all that you can hear is the rumble of a few tardy and 
exhausted hackney cabs. For a few hours, we’ll possess silence, if not repose. At last! The tyranny of the 
human face has disappeared, and now I will suffer only at my own hands. At last! So I am at last allowed to 
relax in a bath of darkness! First, double lock the door. It seems to me that the double turn of the key will 
increase my solitude and strengthen the barricades which currently separate me from the world. Horrible 
life! Horrible city!” This lamentation belongs to no flaneur. It is, on the other hand, the cry of one tired of 
the streets. In 1848 Baudelaire stood behind the barricades. Now he employs the word to designate his 
fatigue from urban life.
17 Rebecca Solnit argues that in some cases, these carriages “mangled pedestrians without fear of reprisal” 
(180). One is reminded of perhaps the most vivid case of such mangling in fiction: Marmeladov’s death by 
carriage in Crime and Punishment, which sent his family into a tailspin of ruin.
18 John Gay, in his poem “Trivia; or, The Art of Walking the Streets of London,” describes the how walking 
must become an art if one wishes to avoid the varying degrees of obstacles on early eighteenth-century 
London streets. He moves from the somewhat trivial concerns of mud and mire which fling from the hoofs 
of horses, to the more serious, thundering wagons and carts. In the third and final section of the poem he 
warns readers about the pickpockets and violent thieves who come out at night. In the day these robbers are 
humble beggars, but at night the “crutch which late compassion mov’d, shall wound / Thy bleeding head, 
and fell thee to the ground” (lines 137-38). These hazards are external and can -  if one heeds Gay’s advice 
-  be avoided. The dangers in the arcades are of a subtle nature and represent internal struggles, either 
submitting to what is on display or resisting the commodity’s siren song.
19 In Protestant culture idleness is not only unproductive; it is also self-indulgent and ungodly. Benjamin, 
however, turns the tables and suggests that idleness is something to be praised, not abhorred. He reads a 
Baudelaire poem - where anchored ships rot in the harbour -  allegorically: the modem is the time when the 
hero is “not provided for” (Lyric Poet 96). The hero is likened to those sturdy ships which never set out to 
sea; he is both ready and willing but there is nothing for him to do. He is abandoned to “everlasting 
idleness” because there is no role for him outside of commodity production. Unless he opts to sell his 
labour-power for a wage, he remains a “Hercules with no work” (Lyric Poet 96). The flaneur takes to the
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street, in part because he possesses many idle hours, but he displays, as outlined above, his heroism in his 
walk by resisting the allurements of the phantasmagoria.
20 Walter Ruttman's 1927 film, Berlin: Symphony of a Great City, does for Berlin what Benjamin's flaneur 
does for Paris. The film depicts a day - from sunrise to midnight - in the German capital. The rolling train in 
the first frame sets the tempo for the following scenes of frenzied early morning commuters with briefcases 
and lunchboxes in hand. What follows are many shots of alienated labour heavy manufacturing, industrial 
automation, and smokestacks. The first three acts of the film trail the masses into their offices, 
manufacturing plants, and other places of employment A subtle critique of this massive apparatus of labour 
seems to emerge, most specifically when the filmmaker cuts from all these scenes of the workplace to a 
shot of two dogs fighting each other on the streets, suggesting the barbarous nature of such an existence. 
The portrait of labour - die feverish pitch matches the fury of the soundtrack - culminates with the suicide 
of a woman as she jumps from a bridge. Once the workday ends, however, scenes of alienation seem to 
evaporate in the midst of such leisure activities like sailing, spectator sports, swimming, horse races, dining 
and dancing. The final act begins with an electrified Berlin at night (the city is ablaze with electric and neon 
lights, flashing bulbs and well-lit storefronts). The streets are filled not with a self-estranged mass, but with 
liberated people as they go about the city watching circus acts, cabaret performances, ballets, jazz 
musicians, boxing matches, and hockey games. The film closes amid a barrage of fireworks, celebrating 
this great city of distraction. It is difficult to read Ruttman's intentions. Does his critique of political 
economy dissipate in the face of leisure, or does he suggest that one's nightlife cannot compensate for the 
toil of the day? Regardless of his motivations, he makes the same connections as Benjamin does in The 
Arcades Project, the last shot is of celebration, but the film's most vivid scenes involve the bustle of the 
alienated, reminding the viewer that the consumer is foremost a labourer.
21 For more on allegorical clarity, see Benjamin's "The Task of the Translator." The piece is, as the tide 
indicates, about translation, but what he says has some affinity with his views on allegory. He writes: "A 
real translation is transparent; it does not cover the original, does not block its light, but allows the pure 
language, as though reinforced by its own medium, to shine upon the original all the more frilly"
(Illuminations 79). Translation and allegory are both forms of representation. When the translator, liberated 
from the tendency to faithfiilly reproduce the text, focuses on the text's “intentio,” (s)he constructs a 
window into that other world, the original work. The translator represents the original source, guided not by 
fidelity but by intention, and in so doing adds clarity without leaving any marks. Likewise, the allegory 
does not block the light of the foreign reality, but allows that world to shine through itself.
~ Aristode’s writings on the justification for induction are not entirely analogous to the monadic allegory 
(as the encapsulation of the whole within the singular), but Aristode proves helpfid in his rigorous demands 
for an assured particular, for his entire theory of knowledge rests on the translatability of the sensible 
(particular) into the abstract. In his schema, epagoge is the reasoning faculty which allows humans to make 
this move and the perception of tokens or types guarantees the leap; exemplarity, moreover, further 
buttresses the validity of Aristode’s epistemology. Irene Harvey contests his notion of the example, 
claiming that it cannot provide the “intellectual elixir” to move from the particular to the general (2). The 
example functions as one part to another- as “part to part” (Harvey 210), but it cannot fully justify any 
movement toward the general since the example is, in essence, one particular referencing another particular. 
Aristode’s use of the example as an inductive tool is demonstrated in the following scenario: when one asks 
for a bodyguard, that person has designs on making himself a despot (Aristode lived in a time when, in 
Athens and other city-states, democracies could give way to the rule of tyrants or oligarchs). By citing two 
such examples, Aristode establishes a general rule. Harvey spends much of the book deconstructing the 
inductive principle of exemplarity, but the idea has more currency -  in terms of the concerns in this paper -  
in a Liebnizian understanding of the word. The singular monad, as an example of the whole (because it 
contains the whole), provides a view to the entirety. The flaneur, since he abbreviates the total scope of 
commodity capitalism, is an inductive tool; with this singular figure we can perceive the imperceptible.
23 The detective, Williams continues, represents the mastery of rationalism over the chaos of the city. This 
conquest is best exemplified by Conan Doyle’s Sherlock Holmes, whose logic always trumps the irrational.
24 The individual is dissolved not just by numbers, but through superficialities of attire as well. Stefan 
Zweig, in a piece called “The Monotonization of the World,” strongly laments the tidal wave of American 
culture which crashes on the shores of Europe. The essay, written in 1925, could easily describe 
contemporary views of the hegemony of American cultural imperialism. His thesis is simple enough: that 
the monotonisation of culture threatens, or rather, ends individuality. Zweig observes: “It is not with
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impunity that everyone can dress the same, that all women can go out in the same clothes, the same 
makeup: monotony necessarily penetrates the surface” (398). Benjamin argues that the labour process 
contorts the social essence of humans, transforming them into inward-looking, anonymous beings. What he 
sees he traces back to the economic base, suggesting that the urban, alienated crowd is an expression of 
capitalist production. Zweig claims otherwise, remaining in the superstructure! realm. It is a shallow, 
colourless, pedestrian culture which transforms individuals into an undifferentiated mass. His view is not 
superficial; those external similarities like clothing and makeup slowly penetrate the skin, and move inward, 
affecting the psyche. Yet what terrifies Zweig most is not the sheer force of this imperialism, but the fact 
that it is embraced so enthusiastically. There is a “passion for self-dissolution,” he notes (Zweig 400). There 
is no antidote for this illness, for “if humanity is now letting itself be increasingly bored and monotonized, 
then that is really nothing than its deepest desire” (Zweig 400). This drive to relinquish one’s individuality 
for absorption into the mass is a desire which Robinson reads in Baudelaire’s “Loss of a Halo.” The marks 
of the individual, Robinson writes, are more “a burden than a consolation and a strength” (98). Baudelaire, 
as remarked earlier, was no flaneur, and thus did not cling to his individuality with the same intensity as the 
Parisian stroller; in point of fact, Baudelaire -  in Robinson’s reading of the poem -parted with it quite 
quickly.
25 Again, Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment comes to mind. After butchering two women with an axe, 
Raskolnikov slides the murder weapon into the inside of his overcoat and slips out onto the street, 
disappearing without a trace among the mass of pedestrians. For measures to combat the difficulties in 
maintaining order and safety in metropolitan areas, see Charles Baudelaire: A Lyric Poet (47). Here 
Benjamin discusses how Paris countered this problem: standardised house numbers, which Napoleon made 
obligatory in the capital in 1805.
26 Later in the novel, M. Jackal crosses paths with an escaped convict in the sewers of Paris. Gibassier 
promptly tells the Police Chief that he is a reformed man. Jackal doubts his claim, because if he had indeed 
turned from crime, then his facial features would, accordingly, be changed beyond recognition. Holding a 
lantern to his face, Jackal disregards Gibassier’s words, for his face “has not changed a whit” (135).
27 The topic of hidden labour is treated more extensively earlier in this paper, on pages 14 and following.
28 In "A Small History of Photography," Benjamin wonders about the harmful affects of advertising, since it 
seems to further the concealment of labour. He writes that the photograph, under the direction of 
advertisers, "can endow any soup can with cosmic significance but cannot grasp a single one of the human 
connexions in which it exists" (One-Way Street 225).
29 Aragon's book was the foremost inspiration for Benjamin's study, not - as some would claim - the poetry 
of Charles Baudelaire; his first notes on the arcades were derived from Aragon’s book. Paris Peasant was, 
moreover, an exhilarating read: Benjamin admits that in evenings in bed he could not put the book down 
(Solnit 206).
30 Benjamin's hashish experiments are well documented. His first recorded hashish session took place in 
1927, with subsequent sessions in 1928,1930, and 1934. Other participants were two physicians - Ernst 
Joel and Fritz Frankel - and a neurologist, who was a cousin of Benjamin’s: Egon Wissing. The 
predominantly scientific background of the participants strongly suggests the serious tone of their inquiry.
31 Above all, hashish-induced physiognomy ends in failure because the surrealists did not have a concept of 
totality. Physiognomic induction is absolutely crucial if one wishes to glimpse the entirety of capitalism, but 
proves fruitless without such a concept In the second chapter of this essay there is a more developed 
discussion of this theme.
32 The surrealists are more revolutionary than artistic, Benjamin argues. The idea of l'artpour Vart "was 
scarcely ever to be taken literally; it was almost always a flag under which sailed cargo that could not be 
declared because it still lacked a name" (Reflections 183-4). The emphasis on art is thus a sheen, something 
to cover or mask what is of true import: the notion that the poverty of everyday life must be transcended.
33 The verb ‘constructs’ is a misleading word since it denotes the building of some thing. By inferring from 
the particulars -  as a physiognomist would do -  the flaneur does not construct a totality: he gives shape to it 
(renders it perceptible) through his walk. By giving it form, he enables others to see the whole from the 
shard. The allegory -  it is worth repeating -  has monadic properties in that the minute or singular provides a 
view to the vast In The Arcades Project, the allegory of walking reveals a world of crowded streets and 
phantasmagoric allure as it is stretched over the length of the text The external reality of Benjamin’s book 
(the reality of life during its composition) is also revealed through the allegory. As Restoration England 
permeates Bunyan’s allegory, so a pacified proletariat seeps into Benjamin’s allegory. The darling arcades
r  - ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------     . .
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and the alienated mass were images of the nineteenth century, not the twentieth century. And thus we 
recognise that Benjamin unites the two only to explain how revolutionary energy erodes: it dissipates when 
the working class takes on the role of consumer.
From Chapter Three:
1 Wollen traces a long line of the entanglement of art with politics in French history: De Sade freed from the 
Bastille in 1789, Baudelaire behind the barricades in 1848, and Courbet tearing down an historic column in 
1870. The surrealists and other avant-garde movements, he argues, followed in these footsteps (Raiding the 
Icebox 120).
* For more on the surrealists’ alignment with the PCF, see Sadie Plant The Most Radical Gesture (52). Here 
she writes. The surrealists were convinced that the achievement of an impassioned social experience in 
which authentic communication, the realisation of art, and the union of individual and world would 
characterise everyday experience was possible only with the end of capitalism and the dawn of a new, ludic, 
age. Nevertheless, this awareness did not prevent the surrealists from pursing their experiments in the' 
cultural domain; indeed, their insistence on the autonomy of their project and its importance to a successful 
social revolution was the main point of their disagreement with the PCF, who failed to see why the 
surrealists seemed to accept so much of the Marxist project while refusing to drop their activities in favour 
of political duties. Of course, the surrealists considered that their actions were political, arguing that their 
propaganda of desire was as necessary as the Party’s own work and insisting that although surrealism might 
consider itself ‘in the service of the revolution,’ it would remain free to determine the nature of that 
service.”
3 Breton chastised a young Lefebvre for not reading Hegel, a philosopher Breton did not swerve from. 
Playing the hero, Breton recounts his resurrection of this thinker “The fact remains that ever since I first 
encountered Hegel, that is, since I presented him in the face of sarcasms with which my philosopher 
professor, around 1912, Andre Cresson, a positivist, pursued him, I have steeped myself in his views and, 
for me, his method has reduced all others to beggary. For me, where the Hegelian dialectic is not at work, 
there is no thought, no hope of truth” (Wollen 131). Breton’s martyr act -  introducing Hegel to a scorning 
academic - is one thing; his treatment of Lefebvre is another thing altogether. In a well-known story, Breton 
showed Lefebvre a translation of Hegel’s Logic and disdainfully asked: “You haven’t even read this?” 
(Everyday Life 118; my italics). A few days later, Lefebvre began to read Hegel, and from there was led to 
Marx. He reanimated French Marxism, moreover, with his belief that all of life was colonised by 
capitalism, which stems from an understanding of the Hegelian totality.
Aragon’s vision is not unlike Benjamin’s view of capitalism as a “discrepancy between the tremendous 
means of production and their inadequate utilization in the process of production” (Reflections 242). The 
hand which loses its hold on the wheel is like that apparatus which can meet many needs but does not He 
writes: “Instead of draining rivers, society directs a human stream into a bed of trenches; instead of 
dropping seeds from airplanes, it drops incendiary bombs over cities” (Reflections 242). When the grip is 
lost, the wheel falls back upon the person holding it; Benjamin allows us to glimpse this crushed figure.
For more on the misconception of seeing iife-activity’ or ‘being’ as only a means for existence, see 
Marx’s Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts under the chapter “Alienated Labour.”
Jacques Demda, in his book Specters o f Marx, is the first figure to invoke the ghost of Hamlet’s father and 
tie it to Marxism. In his reading of Shakespeare, Derrida claims that the prince’s inheritance is an injunction 
to act, which is a type of debt or responsibility. We share in Hamlet’s debt, for the spectre of Marx calls out 
to us. The most fascinating aspect of this book is the projection the reader has to suffer through; Derrida, as 
a post-structuralist, is the one ignoring Marx’s call for decades, not his readers.
7 Aragon recounts: “It was while sitting here one afternoon, towards the end of 1919, that Andre Breton and 
I decided that this should henceforward become the meeting place for ourselves and our friends, a choice 
motivated partly by our loathing for Montparnasse and Montmartre [two upper class student destinations], 
but partly also by the pleasure we derived from the equivocal atmosphere of passages” (87).
Paris Peasant was written in 1924, but was published in 1926. In between those years, the Passage de 
l’Opera was demolished to make room for the expansion of the Boulevard Haussmann. This arcade was 
already targeted for destruction as early as 1860, and then again in 1873, but when the opera house burnt 
down, the arcade was deemed unnecessary (Everyday Life 55).
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9 This struggle is an interesting one, for it involves a conspiracy of sorts. The Haussmann Building Society, 
which was supposedly a civic department, had ulterior motives for the demolition of the arcade. It had ties 
with a massive department store, Galeries Lafayette, which would stand to benefit from the demolition, 
attracting consumers who previously shopped in the arcade. Ben Highmore bills it as the old story of the 
small shopkeeper versus big business. For more see Everyday Life and Cultural Theory (55-56).
10 Under capitalist production, all wage-eamers are commodities in the sense that they sell their labour 
power (potential) for a sum of money. The prostitute sells more than just potentiality, selling her very body. 
Thus she personifies the commodity in a way that others cannot Incidentally, the gendering of the word 
‘prostitute’ is in no way a loaded gesture, but is simply in keeping with the surrealist literature which 
features only female prostitutes.
11 Sadie Plant puts it in Freudian terms: “Surrealist activity [...] was a rejection of the reality principle in 
favour of the pleasure principle. But whereas Freud had argued that some repression of the drives to 
pleasure was essential for the maintenance of civilisation, the surrealists wanted the entire social world to 
be arranged in harmony with desires, pleasures, and imaginings” (49). Plant’s observation is somewhat of a 
caricature (the imagination was intended to instill a desire for change in the real world), although one 
cannot blame her entirely for misrepresenting the movement when its own members commit the same error. 
Consider what Salvador Dali writes: “I believe the moment is at hand when, by a paranoiac and active 
effort of the mind, it will be possible [...] to systematise confusion and thus help to discredit completely the 
world of reality” {What is Surrealism? 136; quoted from Dali’s La Femme visible).
12 To be fair, part of the reason for the depiction of Paris as a village rather than a metropolis is that it is a 
necessary narrative technique, enabling Breton (as a character) to repeatedly cross paths with Nadja as they 
walk the streets separately. This narrative device, however, does not negate the fact that Paris is depicted in 
a much different fashion than Baudelaire’s Paris or Poe’s London: it is not alienating in the least. Instead, 
Breton’s Paris is more like a small town or village where encounters (of the sort in Nadja) are possible.
13 To judge the entire movement by one text is, admittedly, unfair. The surrealists’ concerns were -  for the 
most part -  rooted in the real world: one has only to look at the “Second Manifesto of Surrealism” to 
discover how hard they fought to stay within its bounds. The PCF certainly did not make it easy. One party 
member lost 200,000 francs in a single day by gambling in Monte Carlo, money entrusted to him for the 
purpose of producing revolutionary propaganda, yet this man -  Morhange -  was not repeatedly interrogated 
or barred from entering the PCF headquarters like the surrealists were {Manifestoes 142). Surrealism is not 
an intellectual pastime, writes Breton. Instead, it is for those “who refuse to knuckle down” {Manifestoes 
133). Yet throughout their years in the Communist Party, the surrealists had to continually make the case 
that they were committed to the real-world task of human liberation. Breton and others firmly believed that 
the “liberation of man [could only] result from the Proletarian Revolution” (Lewis 128), but the PCF 
remained convinced that surrealist ideology was opposed to Marxism (Lewis 85). When they finally left 
party politics, the surrealists plunged into art and here -  in the realm of art -  the movement fell headlong 
into desire. No longer feeling the constraints of having membership in the PCF, surrealist artists enjoyed 
unbridled poetic liberty. But when one thinks of something like Dali’s pornographic contribution to a 
surrealist journal, a piece where he describes the fantasies he had as he performed self-pleasure in front of a 
young girl (Lewis 111), one gains an understanding of where desire can lead an avant-garde. To properly 
evaluate the movement -  if that was one’s wish -  one would have to situate the surrealist project in time 
(either early, middle, or late). The purpose of this footnote is not to judge the surrealists, but only to 
demonstrate the depths of desire and its sheer potentiality. Desire can be the first step on the road to 
revolution; desire can also be the first step in fire opposite direction.
14 The connection between vista and proletarian consciousness is an integral one, which becomes clear in 
the final section of the paper. For now it is worth noting that the monadic shard helps to recovery the 
proletariat’s true identity; previously they were blind to this loss (of identity) when they took on the role of 
consumer, which is what die flaneur’s allegorical walk was intended to correct With a nod to Hermann 
Lotze, Benjamin supplies the singular piece which explains the whole (and in so doing, helps to unearth a 
dormant consciousness). Lotze’s concern with a unifying view of the universe, that “One Truth should 
control the Manifold of Reality” (594), is not too far from the methodological concerns in the Arcades 
study, and thus deserves -  perhaps -  our attention. The central question in Lotze’s system is one of 
movement: moving “from the many things presented to our senses [...] to the unity of the world, this 
ordered cosmos without which the many cannot be” (Santayana 21). There certainly exists a paradox in his 
view -  a “simultaneous attribution of unity and multiplicity  ̂to the universe - but this paradox disappears
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once we see that what is multiple is really a “single spiritual process” (Santayana 185 and 155). For Lotze 
the world is like a melody (the one) and the notes in the melody are the many; every individual note -  that 
is, every individual thing or person — has its place in the melody, which is how unity is formed out of the 
many parts. To be, then, is to be in relation to some thing else, but the question remains: how does one 
come to realise this truth? In Microcosmus, Lotze hints at how he arrives at such a conclusion: “Enclosed 
within the great machine of Nature stands the smaller machine of the human mind” (25). He can piece the 
many into a cohesive whole, is justified in doing so, because we, as humans, do so innately. We convert the 
many singulars into the whole when we unite sense perceptions, which is how the “machine of the human 
mind” functions. Lotze provides an example: when one first perceives a tree with blossoms or leaves on it, 
the single image of a tree is preserved, but this image is not disrupted when we glance upon a barren or 
leafless tree, or when we merely look upon the trunk of a tree. The ability to piece the particulars together 
(the trunk or a leafless branch), to combine the separate, is the “form of Judgement!” (Lotze 234), which, 
thus far, is similar to Aristotle’s theory of knowledge. In Lotze’s conception, however, judgement is 
instinctive, and, as it is based on experience, is not to far from how an animal functions. Judgement enables 
us to “ascribe phamomena to beings that appear, events to causes, and laws to the connection of things,” but 
there is still a “higher cognitive energy -  the activity of Reason” (236). Reason separates us from animals 
because it moves beyond the connection of things to the idea “that the sum of reality can exist only as a 
perfect unity and totality” (237). This footnote on Lotze is nothing more than a sketch, but the idea that the 
Tittle world’ of the human mind provides a view to the larger world (that the mechanics of human 
judgement [piecing the whole from the parts] enables us to see that the relation between parts is really a 
connection between all things) is monadic, and thus has some affinities with the concerns in this paper. 
Benjamin’s allegory is a little world, which results in the glimpsing of a larger world. Aragon does not 
portray a microcosm -  it is half a world -  and, consequently, tire view to the whole remains out of reach.
From Chapter Four
1 There is much debate over this name. Wollen writes: “Artists were to break down the divisions between 
individual art forms, to create situations, constructed encounters and creatively lived moments in specific 
urban settings, instances of a critically transformed everyday life. They were to produce settings for 
situations and experimental models of possible modes of transformation of the city, as well as to agitate and 
polemicize against the sterility and oppression of the actual environment and ruling economic and political 
system” (121). Wollen’s summary is somewhat perplexing, but it encapsulates perfectly the confusion 
surrounding the word ‘situation.’ Sadler believes that a situation is “some sort of performance” or 
“theatrical experience” (105), which is a claim founded on the literature of the SI; Debord speaks of 
experimental theatre, directors, actors, and spectators, although he distances himself from figures like 
Pirandello and Brecht (Knabb 25 and 44). Sadler, however, retreats from his initial explanation to suggest 
that a situation is a kind of mood or behaviour stimulator, like the maze Constant built in Holland (106).
The most reasonable explanation, it appears, comes from Plant She writes: ‘“So far philosophers and artists 
have only interpreted situations,’ [the SI] declared, paraphrasing Marx and taking a swipe at Sartre: ‘the 
point now is to transform them. Since man is the product of the situations he goes through, it is essential to 
create human situations. Since the individual is defined by his situation, he wants the power to create 
situations worthy of his desires’” (Plant 20). Thus the name designates not an interest in theatre or 
labyrinths, but points towards activity: stripping “away the veils of commodified experience to gain the 
immediacy of a world directly lived” (38). This activity, moreover, is based on critique but is centred on 
transformation. Wollen writes: “Existence, Sartre had argued, is always existence within a particular 
context, within a given situation, which is not simply lived-in, but also lived-beyond, through the subject’s 
free choice of the manner of his or her being within that given situation. Debord, following Lefebvre’s 
injunction to transform everyday life, interpreted that as a positive injunction to construct situations -  as an 
artistic and practical activity -  rather than accept them as given, to impose a conscious order at least in 
enclaves of everyday life” (125-6). To call oneself a situationist is to resist the totalising forces of twentieth- 
century capitalism, and -  while never assuming the role of vanguard - to pave the way for others to follow. 
This programme is not countercultural, for it demands much more: radical change of a kind that May 1968 
scarcely offered a glimpse of.
f" . . . .
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2 Over its fifteen-year span, the SI had seventy total members, but at no point did it grow much larger than 
its original size (of eight persons), perhaps a result of Debord’s maniacal control: all but four had been 
expelled or had resigned (Plant 83).
3 Jappe suggests that the surrealist movement lost its currency long before World War Two, but its 
decadence became brutally obvious when it entered the world of advertising and hung in “the temples of 
bourgeois art” (50).
4 Not wishing to travel down that same road of eventual self-negation, the situationists suppressed art (Plant 
56), and later cleansed the movement of art altogether. Members were expelled or pressured to resign 
because of contacts they had made in the art world. And by 1962, all professional artists like Constant and 
Asger Jom were replaced by militants who had no background in the arts (Wollen 122 and 149).
5 French Marxists, at least in the university system, had embraced Capital and the Manifesto, but brushed 
aside all his other works, especially the early writings. This allegiance toward one or two of his works is 
absurd, argues Lefebvre, for “it is false [...] to consider that Marx’s thought was bom like Minerva 
springing forth from the head of Jupiter” (Critique 80). To pass over the 1844 Manuscripts is to ignore 
Marx’s conceptualisation of alienation, which bridges the gap between the philosophic and the economic, 
since alienation “is rooted in the production process [...] and is understood as being generated from the 
division of labour” {Everyday Life 120). Lefebvre, moreover, was vicious with dogmatists. In Critique o f  
Everyday Life he writes: “Dogmatism is a great evil which comes in countless forms. If we are to 
exterminate it we must hunt it down in every nook and cranny and drag it from its hiding place by the tail 
like a rat” (56).
6 An idea that Lefebvre stumbled upon in a conversation with his wife. He noticed a strange enthusiasm and 
joy in the tone of her voice as she praised a particular brand of laundry soap (Shields 66). When one grows 
enthralled with a cleaning product, the triumph of capitalism over the quotidian is assured. This market -  
that of daily life -  was considerably larger than any geographical market French Marxists, however, did not 
initially embrace Lefebvre’s views. He had to convince them first that analysis had to shift away from the 
base and toward the superstructure if the full scope of alienation was to be understood.
7 A dispute arose over an allegation of plagiarism. The situationists claimed that Lefebvre had stolen their 
ideas on and analysis of the Paris Commune. Not many contest this claim, but Highmore is the only one to 
point out the inconsistency in the situationist position. For in theory they did not care for the ownership of 
ideas - the proof of which is the fact that Debord’s writings have no copyright - yet in practice they took a 
hard line with offenders like Lefebvre (Everyday Life 139).
8 One such stunt was heckling Charlie Chaplin at a press conference.
9 Since Debord’s book lacks page numbers, the citations refer to the numbered paragraphs and aphorisms.
10 Neither is the spectacle “the culture industry, the mass media, [nor] the reign of images” (Jappe 146). The 
mass media, Debord writes, is the “most glaring superficial manifestation” of the spectacle (31). 
Furthermore, the notion of a culture industry (and its reign of images) is just the spectacle at its most 
obvious. The word ‘spectacle’ denotes the visible and, in that sense, is a misleading word, for it extends far 
beyond sight; it is, as Shields writes, the wholesale commodification of dreams, identity and lifestyle (77).
11 Jappe writes: “The spectacle is thus not a pure and simple adjunct to the world, as propaganda broadcast 
via die communications media might be said to be. Rather, it is the entirety of social activity that is 
appropriated by the spectacle for its own ends. From city planning to political parties of every tendency, 
from art to science, from everyday life to human passions and desires, everywhere we find reality replaced 
by images. In the process, images end up becoming real, and reality ends up transformed into images” (7). 
Or, as Debord puts it, the spectacle is “not a supplement to the real world, an additional decoration. It is die 
heart of the unrealism of the real society” (6). Perhaps an epigraph from the first chapter of Society o f the 
Spectacle is helpful here. The quotation, taken from Feuerbach’s preface to the second edition of The 
Essence o f Christianity, reads: “The present age [...] prefers the sign to the thing signified, the copy to the 
original, fancy to reality, the appearance to the essence.” Such a passage takes on new meaning in a time 
when an advertisement sells a lifestyle over a good, and features the brand name and not the product itself.
12 Debord writes: “Economic growth frees societies from the natural pressure which required their direct 
struggle for survival, but at that point it is from their liberator that they are not liberated. The independence 
of the commodity is extended to the entire economy over which it rules” (40).
13 The concept of the proletariat was somewhat passe as academic Marxism shifted away from economics 
and history (and, by extension, from talk of revolution) towards philosophy and aesthetics. Debord brought 
the discussion back to the proletariat and historical materialism through thinkers like Luckacs. The main
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theme of classical Marxism, the proletarian revolution, was largely “discredited by the cruel experience of 
Stalinism” (Wollen 127). Today, even the word ‘proletariat’ is distastefully dogmatic, attesting to how far 
Marxism has strayed in the last 60 years.
14 The economy in the West, after World War Two, was booming. Keynesian capitalism proved itself 
strong, allowing Europe to recover from continental devastation, and establishing the United States as a 
super-power. Amidst a time of such economic prosperity, it was difficult to make out the class which would 
bring about the end of the bourgeoisie. In point of fact, some have argued that the open antagonism between 
the working class and the bourgeoisie had been averted completely by post-war affluence (The Production 
ofSpace 24).
15 Debord’s brazen attitude towards the USSR was certainly refreshing, for “in the nineteen-sixties [...] 
despite widespread condemnation of Stalinism and defection from the French Communist Party, virtually 
no Left thinkers dared so much as describe the Soviet Union in plain language as a class society” (Jappe 
88).
16 Debord’s views do not exist in some abstract theoretical realm, but are applied practically. He opposed 
the vanguard of the PCF and the trade unions during May 1968 for the same reason that he criticised 
Bolshevism: that consciousness had to arise within and could not be assigned to an intermediary. The trade 
unions and the French Communist Party, he argued, would establish a bureaucracy which, in turn, would 
create a divide (and hierarchy) amongst itself and the working class. Debord strongly espoused council 
communism instead, since it allowed for working class self-govemance and self-expression.
17 By the nineteen-sixties, most scholars and theorists argued that the proletariat had disappeared. Debord 
was in the minority in his insistence that the proletariat did indeed exist, which he describes as the “vast 
mass of workers who have lost all power over the use of their own lives” (Jappe 28). Misery and material 
poverty certainly diminished over the century, but since alienated social relations extended to all areas of 
“lived experience,” the proletariat’s existence was guaranteed and its numbers enlarged (Plant 2 and 15). 
Twenty years after Society o f the Spectacle was published, however, Debord retracted his statement. In 
Comments on the Society of the Spectacle he suggests that the proletariat has been absorbed by the middle 
class, although he admits that, in turn, the lives of the middle class have been proletarianised (Jappe 29).
18 Highmore adds that the urban geography of French cities “internalized relations of colonization” 
(Everyday Life 117). He continues on the following page: “Urban space articulates relations of global 
domination in its ethnicization of inner cities into impoverished and ‘racialized’ zones.” Before the 
emergence of slums (at the city’s edge), the lower classes lived among the more privileged class. The 
bourgeoisie “lived on the lower floors, and workers and servants [lived] in the garrets. The one-room slum 
dwelling that had once been found, typically, at the end of a dark passageway, in a back courtyard or 
perhaps even in a cellar, was [over time] banished to peripheral neighbourhoods or suburbs” (Production of 
Space 316). Lefebvre suggests that this move away from the centre, and towards the outskirts, was 
motivated by “the lowest possible threshold of tolerabilixf (316): if the lower classes were to be tolerated, 
they would most certainly have to keep out of sight
19 It comes as no surprise that these scholars share the same position, but it is certainly odd that in all three 
descriptions the word ‘aimless’ features a prominent role. Wollen describes the derive as “drifting, 
unpremeditated journeys through actually existing cities in order to experience rapid, aimless and 
unpredictable changes of environment” (148-9; my italics). Shields suggests that drifting “was a matter of 
wandering aimlessly to see where one would end up and what surprises one might discover, rather than 
purposefully traversing the city to a predetermined destination” (184; my italics). Lastly, Highmore 
characterises the derive as “observant aimlessness” (Everyday Life 139; my italics).
20 The subordination to the random, in one particular case, was a worthwhile endeavour. Debord writes 
about a friend who wandered through parts of Germany with the aid of a map of London. Really this 
exercise is nothing more than a game, he writes, but it finds its justification in its “insubordination to 
habitual influences” (Knabb 7). In any other scenario, however, there is no room for the random in the 
situationist derive.
21 Sadler writes: “The plethora of arrows implied a massive number of permutations for drifting, and Jom 
and Debord’s wish to squeeze so much [...] information onto the map may account for their decision to 
explode the fragments, freeing room on the paper. If situationists spent as much time drifting as they 
claimed, then it is possible that all these permutations were tested. And the precision of the maps was 
achieved only by some tough-mindedness about which streets were truly capable of transforming urban 
consciousness” (89).
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22 The ideal amount of time for a successful derive varies, Debord argues, but the statistical average is one 
day. But since the derive rarely occurs in its pure form (“it is difficult for the participants to avoid setting 
aside an hour or two at the beginning or end of the day for taking care of banal tasks; and toward the end of 
the day fatigue tends to encourage such an abandonment”) it often takes place within a limited period of a 
few hours (Knabb 52). In Ivan Chtcheglov’s case, the derive was dubbed a “continual derive” and it lasted 
three or four months, but that of course was an extreme case. As far as the ideal amount of people is 
concened, Debord writes: “One can derive alone, but all indications are that the most fruitful numerical 
arrangement consists of several small groups of two or three people who have reached the same awakening 
of consciousness, since the cross-checking of these different groups’ impressions makes it possible to arrive 
at objective conclusions” (Knabb 51).
23 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre argues that “spatial practice consists in a projection onto a (spatial) 
field of all aspects, elements and moments of social practice” (8). If capital is totalising, which it is, then 
‘social practice’ is made manifest in all spheres of life; everything can be traced back to the base. The city 
is no exception. We must, Lefebvre urges, quit seeing space as a “passive locus of social relations” (11) 
and, on the contrary, understand that there exists an active role of space “in the existing mode of 
production” (11).
*4 In the essay “Elementary Program of the Bureau of Unitary Urbanism,” Attila Kotanyi and Raoul 
Vaneigem address this traffic issue. Not only does it produce isolation by making travel from suburb to city 
possible; it further produces alienation by eliminating opportunities for camaraderie to develop between 
workers. They write: “[Traffic] is the opposite of encounter, it absorbs the energies that could otherwise be 
devoted to encounters or to any sort of participation” (Knabb 66). The automobile might pollute our air, but 
for these situationists, the car pollutes our essence as well, turning the inherently social into asocial beings. 
25 In The Production of Space, Lefebvre writes about the contradictions of space: if twentieth century 
capital was as progressive as many had claimed, why did the modem city contain so many class disparities? 
Over time (during the 1950s and 1960s) those inequalities became less apparent as urban conditions 
improved. However, reality still contradicted myth -  the lie that capitalism produces egalitarian societies; 
the observer’s task merely grew more difficult as (s)he had to look harder for the (urban) evidence to refute 
the myth. Lefebvre’s foremost concern is not the gathering of evidence. Instead, he writes about the 
disappearance of spaces of contradiction in order to alert his readers to the need to move from perceptions 
of the ‘real’ to the real itself - the difference between the seemingly equal and true equality (Production of  
Space 319).
> 26 Lefebvre was one of the first thinkers to talk of the social structuring of the city, “of the complex way in
« which cities are divided into distinct quarters, [and] based on class occupation or function [...]. Of course,
I city planners and administrators were well aware that cities are subdivided, and indeed that they had to be if
| they were to function efficiently. But sociology now implied that traditional planning, which had grown up
I under a rationalist umbrella, reduced the intricacy of city structuring to fallaciously simplistic levels”
j (Sadler 20).
27 In Les contradictions de I ’Etat modeme, Lefebvre writes: “Social space became a collection of ghettos: 
those of the elite, of the bourgeoisie, of the intellectuals, of the immigrant workers, etc. These ghettos are 
not juxtaposed, they are hierarchical, spatially representing the economic and social hierarchy, dominant 
and subordinate sectors” (Shields 178). In Lapensee marxiste et la ville, he writes: “Cities are transformed 
into a collection of ghettos where individuals are at once ‘socialised,’ integrated, submitted to artificial 
pressures and constraints [...] and separated, isolated, disintegrated” (Shields 178). The word ‘ghetto’ is a 
loaded term, especially for those living in North America: a better word would be ‘zones’ in this context. 
The real ghettos or slums in France disappeared during the economic boom after the World War Two. Class 
disparities grew less perceptible, on one level anyway, but in “suburban space [...] detached houses 
contrasted with ‘housing estates’ just as sharply as the earlier opulent apartments with the garrets of the 
poor above them” (Production of Space 316). Cities will always remain hierarchical as long as society is 
similarly structured, because the social will inevitably manifest itself spatially, which is Lefebvre’s point. 
However, the degree to which they are hierarchical will inevitably vary, which is the Si’s point
28 Haussmann certainly introduced a functionalist aesthetic, but functionalism, specifically in Paris that is, 
persisted long after he died. One of the most significant problems with such an aesthetic is that what 
appears ‘neutral’ or non-ideological is in fact the reverse: that despite the rationalist garb, architecture and 
urban planning are indeed ideological (Production of Space 317). The wide boulevards are perhaps the most
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obvious example, but, for the situationists at least, examples of functionalism were less important than its 
effects.
The situationists argue that the absence of a critique of architecture stems from the realisation that shelter, 
in most climates, is a necessity; as a basic need then, housing, etc. evades scrutiny. Lefebvre, however, 
takes a different view. Why, he asks, is there no “architectural or urbanistic criticism on par with the 
criticism of art, literature, music and theatre”? (Production ofSpace 92). His answer conventional criticism 
has both a subject and an object, but a critique of space lacks both. Upon closer inspection though, such a 
critique has an object, “strategic space,” and a subject, “the state (along with its foundation in specific social 
classes and fractions of classes)” (94). The reason why there is no critique, given the existence of both a 
subject and an object, is that criticism is diverted by treating what is suspect -  the work of urbanists and 
planners -  as beneficent: “[0]ne occasionally hears talk of a ‘pathology of space,’ of‘ailing 
neighbourhoods, and so on. This kind of phraseology makes it easy for people who use it — architects 
urbanists or planners -  to suggest the idea that they are, in effect, ‘doctors of space.’ This is to promote the 
spread of some particularly mystifying notions, and especially the idea that the modem city is a product not 
of the capitalist or neocapitalist system but rather of some putative ‘sickness’ of society” (99).
Cities reinforce reification because people identify with their surroundings (Knabb 66). Marx once wrote 
that “men can see nothing around them that is not their own image; everything speaks to them of 
themselves.” When social relations are displayed spatially, they, over time, become internalised and 
naturalised, which is why the situationist programme was so urgent If the urban remains unexamined and 
undertheorised, the city will, like the fictional Coketown, continue to exist as an incubator for the 
production process. Of course the SI came and went and cities still remained essentially the same, but the 
sheen, at least, was wiped away.
Haussmann s restructuring of Paris was motivated by a desire to quash revolutionary action — like 
barricade-fighting - but had led to a revolt during the actual renovating process. Highmore quotes from 
Lefebvre’s Writings on Cities: “One strong aspect of the Paris Commune (1871) is the strength of return 
towards the urban centre of workers pushed out towards the outskirts and peripheries, their reconquest of 
the city, this belonging among belongings, this value, this oeuvre which has been tom from them”
{Everyday Life 139). More ironically, his wide boulevards provided the ideal conditions for mass 
demonstrations like those in May of 1968 (Solnit 219).
32 Thereis another version of the events of May ’68 which gives the students very little credit for their 
involvement Instead of being called the vanguard, the students were seen as the “rear guard of the whole 
movement (Knabb 232). Accordingly, the students were scarcely a factor in the events, something the 
numbers reveal: compare the ten to twenty thousand students (and scarcely a thousand during the violent 
street confrontations) with the ten million striking workers. A significant fraction of French students, the 
situationists would admit, took part in the movement, but the workers were the central agents and May -  it 
could not be disputed - was more a strike than a student revolt
Wollen writes: “Debord wanted to free the ego, the conscious self, from the determinism of the 
unconscious and the displacement of the surrealist notion of poetic freedom, as the uncompromising release 
of repressed desire, into the practical and political register of council communism. This displacement also 
involved, of course, semantic shift in the meaning of the word ‘desire’ (from the unconscious to conscious) 
£."]” (136).
In Postmodernism, or The Cultural Logic o f Late Capitalism, Fredric Jameson argues that there certainly 
exists a divide between what many call ‘modernity’ and ‘postmodemity,’ and as one who espouses 
historical materialism, he sees this schism as the result of changes in the production process. The three 
major shifts in capital - which Jameson borrows from Ernest Mandel’s periodisation - are market 
capitalism, the monopoly stage or imperialism stage, and multinational capitalism (sometimes referred to as 
postindustrial capitalism). The fundamental difference between our own age (multinational or postmodern) 
and the first two movements (modernity) is that we have difficulties representing our world in a way that 
those living in the preceding age did not Jameson cites the work of Duchamp, Marinetti, and Diego Rivera 
to demonstrate that the technology of the day (the means of production) was prominently featured in the art 
of these figures. Today, however, one finds little emblematic power from a computer monitor. “It is 
immediately obvious, writes Jameson, ‘that the technology of our own moment no longer possesses this 
same capacity for representation” (36). But the problems of artistic representation are “figurations of 
something even deeper, namely, the whole world system of present-day multinational capitalism” (37). The 
analysis of art, then, is just a careful ruse; Jameson is working with metaphors here, for the inability to
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represent technology stands as a metaphor for the inability to grasp “the whole new decentered global 
network of the third stage of capital itself’ (38). The concision and uncertainty associated with living in a 
‘postmodern’ time is thus nothing other than a failure to grasp our (economic) reality, due in part to its total 
dimensions. In short, the vertigo of the postmodern age is symptomatic of the impossibility of 
understanding our present world. According to Jameson the remedy is simple: we need a secure footing 
from which we can take in the totality. This foothold is the Bonaventure Hotel in downtown Los Angeles, 
built by John Portman in 1977; in his hands Jameson turns this building into an image of the totality and our 
failure to grasp or comprehend it The hotel’s entranceways do not lead to the lobby, he observes, at least 
not directly. Two of the entryways are through the back gardens on the sixth floor and, upon entering, one 
must walk down one flight of stairs to find the elevator which one takes to finally reach the lobby. The front 
entrance is similarly confusing: it admits the guest onto the second-story shopping balcony and from there 
(s)he must take an escalator to the registration desk. Jameson reads this unorthodox architectural design of 
the lobby (that one cannot access from the street) as an attempt at “being a total space, a complete world, a 
kind of miniature city [...]. Portman’s Bonaventure ought not to have entrances at all, since the entry way is 
always the seam that links the building to the rest of the city that surrounds it: for it does not wish to be a 
part of the city but rather its equivalent and replacement or substitute” (40). The aesthetic of the exterior 
seems to support Jameson’s claim. The Bonaventure is clothed in reflective glass which repels the outside 
city. Instead of incorporating itself into the urban landscape the outer walls erase the presence of the hotel, 
for when one looks upon it from the street one does not see the Bonaventure -  one sees “the distorted 
images of everything that surrounds it” (42). To buttress his argument, Jameson returns to the lobby. The 
hotel is a structure with four symmetrical towers, but, given their symmetry, “it is quite impossible to get 
[one’s] bearings in this lobby” (43). The second floor shopping area, moreover, suffers from the confusion 
of the four identical towers. There are many stores to frequent, but if one discovers a store of his/her liking, 
(s)he finds it nearly impossible to locate on a second visit The end result is that the merchandise is marked 
down considerably in order to entice guests to shop in such an unpleasant, labyrinthine space. Jameson is 
making a case for a metaphor here; the Bonaventure is a total space (not part of the fabric of the downtown 
L.A. since it repels its surroundings) and the confusion and vertigo one experiences in the hotel lobby is the 
decentredness one feels when one cannot cognitively map his/her position in this third stage of capitalism. 
The hotel guest’s confusion is really our confusion with the entirety of capital. As the guest cannot locate 
him/herself in the lobby, so we must position ourselves outside of the total space in order to achieve some 
measure of “critical distance.” Jameson writes: “What the burden of our preceding demonstration suggests 
[...] is that distance [...] has been abolished in the new space of postmodernism. We are submerged in its 
henceforth filled and suffused volumes to the point where our new postmodern bodies are bereft of spatial 
coordinates and practically [...] incapable of distantiation” (48). Does the Bonaventure as metaphor for the 
total dimensions of capital provide a space from which we can take in the whole? Certainly Jameson’s 
reading is effective in that it condenses a whole world into a single image, but a populace which 
understands his analysis of Portman’s building will not take to the streets. Benjamin also condensed an 
entire world, but his work bore little in terms of (revolutionary) results. The monad is important because it 
provides a view, or, as Jameson phrases it, a footing from which we can understand the whole. The derive is 
the crucial next step after establishing a foothold, representing the need to move beyond mere cognition.
The Bonaventure is a useful way to comprehend our world, but it cannot bridge the gap between thought 
and feeling. The situationist drift, conversely, accomplishes this feat through its emphasis on the 
experiential.
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